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Abstract 
This thesis has studied three aspects of  renewable energy integration in two small island states; 
Cyprus and Cape-Verde.  In chapter 1, we introduce mechanism and present results of an 
integrated investment appraisal of an onshore wind farm for electricity generation that is owned 
and operated by a private investor. This model is applied to the situation in Santiago Island of 
Cape Verde. Such an appraisal is carried out to determine if the project will yield a high enough 
rate of return to be interest to a private investor while at the same time yielding a positive net 
economic present value from the perspective of the electric utility and economy of Cape-Verde. 
From the perspective of the electric utility and the economy, the results of such an ex-ante 
financial and economic appraisal of wind electricity generation depends critically on one’s view of 
the expected long-term level of future fossil fuel prices, negotiations of the power purchase 
agreement (PPA) price and wind capacity factor.  
 
In Chapter 2, we investigate the impacts of wind and solar renewable power sources on both 
electricity generation and planning by employing a cost minimization model including economic, 
technical as well as regulatory constraints. This model is applied to the situation in Cyprus. The 
cost minimization model demonstrates that the use of wind alone and mix of wind and solar 
power in an electricity generation mix reduces the overall cost of the system. Due to high cost of 
electricity generation from fuel oil in Cyprus, we conclude that shift toward wind and solar mix of 
energy sources in Cyprus will have significant impact by means of cost reduction. Therefore, 
integrating these renewables will essentially contribute to the welfare of Cypriot consumers 
alongside its environmental and health benefits associated in them. At the higher prices of fuel, 
the additional savings from wind, and wind and solar mix increase so that it can be seen as strong 
policy to hedging againts risk for fuel price fluctuations and increase.  
 
 
In Chapter 3, we study the impacts of  implementing real-time electricity pricing (RTP) in the 
Cypriot electricity market with and without wind/solar capacities. We particularly show impacts 
of  RTP pricing on power prices, peak and off-peak capacities/energy, emissions from electricity 
generation and consumer bill savings. We use a merit order stack approach to generation 
investment and operation decisions. Empirical results show that dynamic pricing will increase 
generation capacity utilization by means of  reduction in equilibrium installed capacity reduction 
and increase in load factors of  off-peak plants. These savings are larger at higher demand 
elasticities. Because such dynamic pricing will allow consumers to pay lower prices for their 
energy consumption, it will however increase the total electricity generation. Therefore, the 
emissions from electricity generation will potentially increase resulting from increased energy 
consumption, however. Because wind (solar) availability comes mostly during low (high) demand 
hours when relatively cleaner (dirtier) plants operate in the system, we find that there is 
considerable potential for capital cost savings and emission savings from smart metering even 
with only a small consumer response and at moderate participation in the programme. At the 
current costs of solar, investing in wind alone will however yield higher bill savings. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
 
Overview  
 
The combination of access to clean water, food, shelter, and energy services are part of basic 
human needs. Furthermore, access to these services should be available at an ‘affordable’ price 
and their supply should be ‘reliable and ‘clean’ as they are fundamental for economic and social 
development. The educational, health and welfare benefits associated with access to affordable, 
reliable and clean energy services are substantial and the lack of these services often has adverse 
effects in terms of economic growth and development1.  
 
Although these statements are dogmatic, world energy access statistics are worrying and reveal 
that even access to energy services is not a right but still remains a privilege for some individuals 
in some parts of the world. For instance, the fraction of the world population still  living in the 
dark and suffering from dirty cooking facilities2 was high at 18.1% (1.258 billion people) and 40% 
(2.642 billion people) in 2011, respectively (World Energy Outlook, 2013). The main hallmarks 
of  poverty in developing and less developed countries related to energy poverty are low 
electrification, insufficient installed capacity along with poor transmission and distribution 
infrastructure, lack of  power supply reliability3, high electricity production costs (leading to high 
prices)4, and heavy reliance on traditional biomass use5.   
                                                          
1 See studies by Karekezi, S., S. McDade, B. Boardman and J. Kimani, 2012: Chapter 2 - Energy, Poverty and 
Development. In Global Energy Assessment - Toward a Sustainable Future, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Luxemburg, 
Austria, pp. 151-190. 
2 Traditional biomass use is widespread in Africa and developing Asia and it includes burning forestry wood and 
agricultural residues.  
3 As of February 2013, total capacity installed in Africa is 147 GW and it is equivalent to capacity installed in Belgium 
(AfDB Blogs, 18 February, 2013), and Modi, V., S. McDade, D. Lallement, and J. Saghir. 2006. Energy and the Millennium 
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Small island economies also suffer from similar problems. For instance, the majority of small 
islands have low electrification excluding developed small islands such as Cyprus and Malta in 
Europe, and Singapore in South East Asia, but almost all island states are heavily dependent on 
the import of fossil fuels for their energy needs, suffer from high electricity production costs due 
to the high transportation charges paid for fuel imports and diseconomies of scale in electricity 
generation (Monteiro Alves et al. 2000; Mayer 2000; Hatziargyriou, 2002; Weisser, 2004; Duic, 
2004; Duic et al., 2004; Woodruff, 2007; Segurado et al., 2011), and face reliability problems in 
power supply due to insufficient installed capacity and/or having an isolated electricity system 
(Mayer, 2010; Antikainen et al., 2009; Duic et al., 2003)6.Heavy reliance on petroleum products in 
the electricity sector makes it very expensive and at the same time difficult to guarantee the 
security of energy supply in small island states.  
 
Small island economies have limited natural resource endowments, so their economic activities 
are limited and focussed mainly on service sectors such as tourism, education and financial 
services. The island electricity sectors are at the same time experiencing an increasing demand for 
energy mainly from domestic residential and tourism sectors, but suffer from an inability to 
supply energy to satisfy the increasing demand at low cost and in a reliable and environmentally 
friendly way. High electricity generation costs due to high oil prices, diseconomies of scale in 
electricity generation and heavy dependence on expensive fuel imports in turn negatively affects 
their competitiveness in the tourism sector, increases the share of household budgets allocated to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Development Goals. New York: Energy Sector Management Assistance Program, United Nations Development Program, 
UN Millennium Project, and World Bank. 
4 See http://www.afdb.org/en/blogs/afdb-championing-inclusive-growth-across-africa/post/the-high-cost-of-electricity-
generation-in-africa-11496/ 
5 See World Energy Outlook 2006 – Focus on Key Topics, Chapter 15 - Energy for Cooking in Developing Countries, 
2006. 
6 For example, half of the Cypriot island’s generation capacity was lost from the Vasilikos power plant disaster on 
July 2011. Estimated total damage to the Cypriot economy was more than €3 billion, equivalent to 15% of GDP in 
that year (Bloomberg, 2012). The high loss of national income from the explosion is mainly due to coinciding with 
the summer energy load when demand for electricity is highest, so this disaster hit the island's finance and tourism 
sector.  
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energy bills and increases fuel payments on fuel imports. The argument is therefore that 
conventional electricity generation from fossil fuels creates economic and financial vulnerabilities 
and difficulties for households, businesses and national governments. Hence, a supply of 
affordable, reliable and clean electricity is indispensable for their economic transformation (e.g. 
Cape Verde) as well as to sustain the level of economic growth (e.g. Cyprus) in the long-run. The 
key challenge in an island’s power sector is therefore to address the energy problems in a way to 
boost energy access and supply energy services at an affordable price and reliably by arranging the 
portfolio mix of generation technologies and fuel mix7.  
 
Given the abundance of various renewable energy resources in island countries, movement 
toward a green economy seems to offer a gateway to deal with energy challenges in island 
economies. The idea of increasing the renewable share in electricity generation and facilitating the 
integration of renewables into the system receives significant political support by means of 
enforcement of green regulations and financial incentives that govern market access to renewable 
energy sources in island countries (Chen, 2007; Weisser, 2004; Garcia and Meisen, 2008)8. 
Counting emission reduction benefits alongside the energy security (fuel supply) risk-reducing 
and self-sufficient power generation properties of renewable technologies have resulted in 
support granted to RES investments in island countries as their power system is isolated 
(Maxoulis and Kalogirou, 2008) and abundant of various renewable energy resources exist 
including wind and solar (Weisser, 2003; Chen et al., 2007).  
 
Energy related problems of small island states are linked to providing clean and sustainable 
energy in a cost–effective manner whilst maintaining system reliability in terms of both energy 
                                                          
7 See Moss and Leo (2014), Shaalan, H.E. (2003), Joskow (2010)   
8 Although we will not discuss the pros and cons of renewable incentive programs here, renewable power incentives 
such as guaranteed prices or say FITs schemes in Europe is based on energy output of particular renewable energy 
source but not on the amount of  emissions reduction by the renewable energy source. This is quite different to 
carbon pricing paid by “dirty” power sources, for example carbon pricing is not biased toward any technology and 
kwh of carbon payments depend on carbon intensity of the fuel to generate kwh of energy.  
 4 
 
security and energy adequacy. Among all renewable energy sources, the focus of this research will 
be on the economics of wind and solar energy which are the two main indigenous forms of 
renewable energy sources in island economies.  
Motivations and Goals of Research 
 
In the past, investment decisions in electricity generation technologies were largely driven by their 
capital costs and fuel prices such as fuel oil, coal, and gas.  The current perception is that 
electricity generation from fossil fuels is relatively cheaper than that from renewables. Therefore, 
in the absence of stringent environmental interventions (i.e. neglecting social costs of electricity 
generation) to establish a price for emission of pollutants and green tariffs to promote renewable 
energy technologies, the outcome might be the large expansion in capacity of less 
environmentally friendly fuels such as coal and fuel oil.9 This means that emissions of 
environmentally harmful substances from electricity generation are bound to increase with 
conventional electricity generation although the supply of electricity comes at relatively lower 
cost. Utilities are still experimenting in order better to understand and assess the “true” costs and 
benefits of renewables based on renewable investments in different countries.  
 
It is well recognised and established that both the timing and scaling (and location) of power 
production determines its benefits and costs. The expected return from renewable investments is 
to generate electricity economically and in an environmentally sustainable way while securing the 
energy supply. But aggressive renewable energy policies and financing instruments intended to 
increase the share of renewables in the energy mix and reduce emissions from these sources 
might come with high compliance costs that adversely impact on the economy as a whole (Peters 
et al., 2012; Hoppmann, 2013). Today, developed and developing island economies’ desire to shift 
                                                          
9 See The Economist, 22 September 2014, % of GDP lost from coal generators; approximately 11% to Chinese 
economy, 8% to Russian economy, 6% to German economy, and 4% to UK and US economies. 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2014/09/daily-chart-17?fsrc=scn/fb/wl/dc/priceofexposure 
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towards renewable energy sources (as outlined above) also result in public interventions to attract 
investments in renewables in the form of guaranteed tariffs, renewable targets etc. 
 
The main motivation of this research is to study the various economic impacts of grid-connected 
renewables on vulnerable island economies. Pointing out the key results from each chapter, we 
suggest a menu of public instruments to facilitate the operations of the power market successfully 
via investments in power generation technologies and improved pricing of electricity. It is hoped 
that this research can contribute better understanding and better energy policies while trying to 
propel their economies toward sustainability.     
Outline and Summary of Research Chapters 
 
Before proceeding to the outline of  the research, we summarize the following limitations of  this 
research: (1) the supply of  renewable energy is deterministic10 (2) there are no transmission 
constraints and we assume the integration of renewable energy into the national grid is successful, 
(3) unquantifiable and non-monetized benefits and costs such as avoided health benefits and net 
employment change from renewables are excluded, (4) we ignore renewables that are not grid-
connected. The other assumptions relating to each study are presented within the substantive 
chapters.  This research is organized as follows. 
In chapter one, we analyse the distributions of potential benefits and costs realized from grid-
connected wind investment. It is conceptually wrong to state whether renewable investments are 
good or bad without allocating the benefits generated and costs incurred from any renewable 
source of electricity generation. To correctly investigate the distributional impacts of wind power 
                                                          
10 Wind speed (solar irradiation) is a random outcome so that the energy from wind (solar) generators is estimated 
from the wind speed (solar irradiation) probabilities in a construction site at each hour of the day. The stochastic 
nature of the relationship of wind power (solar power) to wind speed (solar irradiation level) is not modeled in this 
research, however. Examples of such analysis stochastic long-term planning models include, for example, Fürsch, et 
al. (2012), Nagl et al (2012).  
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investment by private investors, the mechanism in this chapter draws a strict line between 
financial returns (monetary value of private benefits) and economic returns (monetary value of 
public benefits) when evaluating such investments. The research in this chapter is applied to 
Santiago Island of Cape-Verde, but can be applied to any grid-connected wind investment in any 
other country with an isolated power system where such investments are made by the private 
sector.  To our knowledge, such a distribution-based impact assessment is yet to be carried out 
for this type of energy investment.  
 
This appraisal is carried out to determine if the project will yield a high enough rate of return to 
be of interest to a private investor, while at the same time yielding a positive net economic present 
value from the perspective of the country. From the viewpoint of the electric utility and the 
economy, the results of such an ex-ante financial and economic appraisal of wind electricity 
generation depends critically on one’s view of the expected long-term level of future fossil fuel 
prices, fuel-oil matrix, wind capacity factor and negotiations of the power purchase agreement 
(PPA contract price) price for wind energy. 
 
In chapter two, we try to quantify the impacts of wind and solar power penetration on electricity 
expansion and generation in Cyprus by including regulatory constraints such as a renewable 
energy target and emission targets. In this way we can capture the economic costs of these 
regulatory constraints on the electricity sector and test whether green regulations are cost-
effective means to reduce emissions and achieve mandatory EU renewable targets while 
protecting consumers from high prices.  In order to do this, wind and solar sources are brought 
into a supply system alongside generation from conventional plants. We initially build a 
theoretical model where the objective is to minimize the weighted sum of economic cost and the 
monetised value of pollutant emissions from electricity generation given a set of supply 
constraints. We apply this model to assess the economic and environmental impacts of 
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integrating wind and solar power in the Cypriot power supply system. The model presented in 
this paper can be applied to any isolated power system with similar national renewable and 
emission reduction targets. To our knowledge, such an impact analysis is yet to be explored for 
Cyprus.  
 
To anticipate the results somewhat, given the fact that solar power is currently an expensive 
source of electricity generation, solar power will probably not be integrated in the national grid in 
the near future. Current public policies in promoting renewables in the form of taxes and other 
policy measures might impair the system by relying on large volumes of wind alone in the 
thermal-renewable generation mix. These conclusions are based on the assumption that 
consumers will pay fixed regulated tariffs for their energy consumption. From an empirical 
analysis, we suggest that it is not yet the right time to shift to renewable energy sources in Cyprus 
and it is better to postpone such capital-intensive investments in electricity generation based on 
the expectation that Cyprus will move from regulated tariffs to time-varying energy pricing and 
will be able to ultimately include natural gas in its supply mix.  
 
In chapter 3, we analyse the potential impacts of implementing real time pricing (RTP) of 
electricity on the need for long-run capacity, on total demand, on renewable energy sources such 
as wind and solar, on emissions, on prices, and on consumer bills. The existing literature shows 
that the application of RTP or near-real time (e.g. time-of-day pricing, TOU; critical peak pricing, 
CPP) retail pricing promises to reduce/postpone peak demand investments, enhance reliability in 
the system, lower the costs of generation (i.e. prices), and facilitate the integration of renewable 
sources of electricity  – which are also major concerns for island economies. We present results 
for the Cypriot electricity market considering the characteristics of the market assuming that wind 
and solar sources of power are both constrained. To our knowledge, such screening of impacts 
from implementing dynamic pricing of electricity has yet to be explored for Cyprus. The model 
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presented in this paper can be applied to any isolated power system with a similar radical 
objective of moving towards RTP in the electricity market. We adopt a constant elasticity 
demand function and then follow an optimal stacking approach to generation investment and 
operation decisions. In this approach, a system planner minimizes the total cost of power supply 
but without charging long-run system marginal costs to consumers as the RTP program itself 
implies marginal cost pricing principle. We present impacts of RTP on total capacities (MW), 
energy consumption (MWh), capacities (MW), emissions (tonnes), fixed and demand-weighted 
prices (€/MWh) and consumer welfare (€). 
 
We also compare results from RTP programs with and without renewables (wind and solar in this 
case) in order to understand the implications of RTP in the conventional system alone and 
implications of RTP with wind/solar integration. In 2010, neither wind nor solar sources of 
electricity generations were included in the system. Therefore, the analysis with renewables is 
used to assess their future potential impacts on prices, capacities, emissions and consumer bills 
that potentially will help us to understand their implications for the system and on customers 
when both wind/solar are included in the system in 2020 or shortly after.  
 
Based on empirical results, we find that dynamic pricing will increase utilisation of  existing 
installed capacity, and will reduce the need for peaking plants resulting in savings in capacity 
dependent on the customer response. However, because real-time pricing will lower energy 
prices, total electricity generation will increase. The immediate implication of  this is an increase in 
emissions from electricity generation. With respect to consumer bills, we find that both fixed and 
RTP customers are better-off  by means of  lower energy bills. They will pay for additional energy 
in comparison to fixed regulated pricing of  electricity. Because wind (solar) availability coincides 
with low (high) demand hours when relatively cleaner (dirtier) plants operate in the system, we 
find that there is greater potential for capital cost savings and emission savings, but not 
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necessarily energy cost savings from smart metering even with only a small consumer response, 
and/or with moderate participation in the programme (i.e. 50% of total customers). At the 
current costs of solar, wind alone will yield lower bills. 
In the final concluding chapter, we summarize the results of each preceding chapter and discuss 
the key policy implications based on our findings. Lastly, we identify what other research 
questions emerge out of this exercise and which are ripe for further investigation. 
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CHAPTER 1: IS WIND GENERATION A GOOD INVESTMENT FOR CAPE-
VERDE? 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The limited availability of exhaustible natural resources,  rapidly growing demand for electricity 
and increase in greenhouse gas emissions from electricity generation have caused many 
policymakers to propose that any increase in the supply of electricity be generated from 
renewable power sources. The reasons for the increasing trend towards investment in renewable 
resources are mainly attributed to their perceived unlimited availability, low operating costs and 
nature as sources of electric energy that are emission free (Murray, 2009)11. At the same time, the 
implementation of various renewable support programs by governments is accelerating the 
deployment of renewable energy technologies, for example renewable energy targets, the 
emissions trading system (ETS), and Feed-in-tariff (FITs) in Europe. In addition, as the market 
for wind and solar has grown, so the costs per kWh have reduced drastically. As a result, 
increased penetration of wind and solar energy continues in electricity networks. Given the 
optimistic national targets for renewable electricity generation, for example in Europe, an active 
debate exists on the advantages and disadvantages associated with renewables. Meanwhile, global 
wind power development is experiencing dramatic growth with an increase in global installed 
capacity from 18 GW at the end of 2000 to 240 GW at the end of 2011 (IEA, 2013).  
                                                          
11 Renewable sources of power supply may produce some negative externalities such as noise pollution, land 
deterioration and bird kills associated with wind farms, all being non-market environmental goods. Note that these 
costs are not the same across the renewable technologies. These negative externalities are excluded in our analysis, 
but these affect the public perception and might create resistance toward these investments (Bergman and Hanley, 
2012; Toke et al., 2008; Alvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 2002; Krohn and Damborg, 1999). Compared to conventional 
electricity generation technologies, for instance, wind is relatively clean and has less negative environmental impacts 
than others (Sundqvist, 2002).  
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Foreign or local independent power producers (IPP) started selling electricity under long-term 
contracts with state owned electric utilities in Africa in the early 1990s (Gratwick and Eberhad, 
2008; Woodhouse, 2005; Oliveira et al., 2005). This is a first step toward the establishment of 
joint ventures - state majority ownership of generation in collaboration with private investors (i.e. 
independent power producers). The electric utilities in Africa signed power purchase agreements 
(PPA) with private suppliers (or IPPs) to build power plants as the first step towards reforming 
their less efficient electricity sector12. The motivations for this gradual movement are as follows: 
electricity investments are highly capital intensive but public electricity utilities in Africa are 
capital-rationed, the electrification rate in sub-Saharan Africa is very low, while almost all 
governments are constrained in their ability to borrow to expand the electricity capacity to meet 
the increased demand for energy even for existing connections, and the absence of  reliable and 
efficient electricity supply limits their economic and social development (Albouy and Bousba, 
1998; Turkson and Wohlgemuth, 2000; Bacon and Jones, 2001; Gratwick and Eberhad, 2008).  
 
The private renewable power investors often sign long term power purchase agreements based 
only on the amount of electricity delivered to the public utilities which allows them to earn a rate 
of return from invested capital in exchange for power purchased by the public electric utility. The 
                                                          
12 This transition in Africa appears to be very problematical, however. Public-Private Partnership (PPP) electricity 
projects in Africa might not be effective and efficient due to corruption (World Bank, 2009; Karekezi and Kimani, 
2002), over-estimation in stated capital costs in IPPs investments (Phadke, 2009), and IPPs willingness to invest in 
low capital cost plants (fuel is often supplied by the state owned utilities) - possibly to meet high debt ratios set by 
the banks, and cover the political risks associated in their power purchase contracts12.Therefore, consumers might 
end-up paying higher electricity prices for low investment cost but high generation cost plants, while private 
investors might earn more than “fair” returns even on their low investment cost plants. Thus, poor institutions, lack 
of legal capacity, and lack of competitive bidding mechanisms on IPP investments in Africa all create conflict rent 
seeking in the sector and imprudent investments in the sector. That is why, regulatory arrangements together with 
improved institutional and legal capacity are necessary to achieve equilibrium in regulations and improve efficiency in 
the sector (Jamasb, 2006; Phadke, 2009; Eberhard, 2011).  For more information on IPPs in building infrastructure 
capacity in African countries, see studies by Worch et al., (2013), “A capability perspective on performance 
deficiencies in utility firms”,  Utilities Policy , 25:1-9, Eberhard, A. and Gratwick, K. (2013), “Investment Power in 
Africa, Where from and where to?”, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, The Future of Energy  14.1 :39-46, and 
Karekezi, S., and Kimani, J. (2002), “Status of Power Sector Reform in Africa: Impact on the Poor”, Energy Policy, 
30(11-12):923-945. Also, see Vecchi et al. (2013) similar problems in developed countries, “Does the private sector 
receive an excessive return from investments in health care infrastructure projects? Evidence from the UK”, Health 
Policy, 110 (2-3):243-270.  
 12 
 
long – term PPA contract is a key element for the development of the wind energy sector. Such a 
rigid long term agreement (depending on its terms) would be highly risky for thermal generators 
that must deal with fluctuating fuel prices. Such an agreement, however, is highly compatible with 
the operation of wind farms because their costs are mainly the up-front investment costs. In this 
chapter, we investigate the impacts of adding large-scale wind power in Santiago, Cape Verde that 
is supplied by a foreign owned IPP where the public electric utility signs a long-term take or pay 
PPA with the IPP.  With the completion of the wind project, the private IPP added 9.35 MW of 
wind capacity to the existing system, and the electricity electric utility in Santiago, Cape Verde is 
the off-taker of the generated wind electricity.  
 
Existing studies in the literature define the social cost of wind integration as the private costs of 
wind electricity generation net of the avoided fuel and environmental costs enabled by the facility 
(e.g. Kennedy, 2005; Denny and O’Malley, 2007). This study goes further and allocates the 
benefits and costs of wind electricity generation amongst the different stakeholders of the project 
based on the PPA. This analysis is useful as the role of the private sector in undertaking power 
projects including renewable projects has greatly increased over time (Meyer, 1998; Martinot, 
2001; Weisser, 2004; Phadke, 2009; World Bank, 2013)13. To our knowledge, such an impact 
assessment is yet to be carried out for this type of energy investment. 
 
High costs of electricity generation – yet unable to cover the high costs of electricity generation 
with imported petroleum products, and unreliable power supply are burden on the economy of 
the Cape-Verde (IMF, 2013)14. With the aim of reducing energy costs, and ability to reliably meet 
                                                          
13 Also see World Bank Database for Private Participation in Infrastructure Database, including investments in 
electricity sector. Up to date country data is available at: http://ppi.worldbank.org/resources/ppi_glossary.aspx 
14 Cape-Verde uses two-block “increased block tariff” for the customers. The retail electricity tariff for block 1 
consumers (consumption <=60,000 kWh/month) is 30 CVE/kWh equivalent of 0.27 Euro/kWh and the retail 
electricity tariff for block 2 consumers (consumption >60,000 kWh/month) is 37.89 CVE/kWh equivalent of 0.34 
Euro/kWh (See, Economic Regulatory Agency of Cape-Verde: 
http://www.are.cv/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=51&limit=5&limitstart=0&order=date&
dir=DESC&Itemid=111). 
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both current and future demand for energy, the Government of Cape-Verde sets ambitious 
targets for the contribution of renewable electricity generation about 50 percent of total 
electricity required in 2020 solely through private sector investments (ECOWAS Centre for 
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, ECREEE, n.d.; European Commission, February 
2014). In this context, it is interesting to set-up a model for Cape-Verde that can help regulatory 
bodies to improve long-term power purchase contracts by means of achieving the renewable 
policy objectives at the lowest cost possible – especially when considering the conflict of interests 
between the electric utility/economy of Cape-Verde and private power supplier. Due to high cost 
of solar PV for electricity generation and high cost of off-grid wind electricity generation, the 
emphasis is put on the economics of the grid-connected onshore wind source of electricity 
generation15’16.   
 
The contribution of this paper is two-fold: the focus of this paper is first to provide a mechanism 
to draw a strict line between economic analysis and financial analysis or public benefits and 
private benefits when evaluating the welfare changes from renewable electricity generation when 
the private sector is involved in such investments. The second objective is to evaluate the viability 
of on-shore grid-connected wind turbine installations from the perspectives of the different 
market players including the public electric utility, the private investor, the country and local 
government17. Each of these stakeholders is affected differently by the proposed wind power 
installation. And, usually a country-specific electricity system analysis is required in order 
accurately to assess the costs and benefits of the integration of a renewable electricity generation 
                                                          
15 Also see, Jensen (2000), Renewable Energy on Small Islands, available at http://www.gdrc.org/oceans/Small-
Islands-II.pdf and Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN, see full report at 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/i2345e/i2345e05.pdf 
16 Note that land based wind investment are called as on-shore wind and ocean (sea) based wind investments are 
called as off-shore wind. Krohn et al (2009) state that the capital costs of offshore wind capacity is still about 50% 
more than onshore wind and its applications are predominantly in northern Europe (e.g. UK, Denmark, and the 
Netherland).  
17 Reduction in CO2 emissions and the extraordinarily high profits of foreign investors are benefits to the world 
rather than only to the country where the renewable project is actually undertaken.  
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facility into a larger electricity system. Wind energy is capital intensive in nature and the life time 
of the wind turbine is approximately 20 years18 (Mills et al., 2009). Thus, a twenty-year net cash 
(resource) flow statement is prepared for each of these stakeholders. The costs and benefits of 
the integration of wind power generation into the island’s electricity grid are evaluated for a 
period of 20 years. Since all the future benefits and costs must be expressed in the price level of a 
given year, the nominal values of the cash or resource flows are deflated to the 2010 price level 
and present values are calculated for each interest group by applying the relevant discount rate(s). 
Hence, the integrated appraisal framework allows us to determine who picks up the benefits and 
costs of this wind electricity investment by the private IPP. Because each economic actor pays 
and receives different costs and benefits from any economic activity including the investments on 
renewable power generation, this framework also allows re-distribution of these benefits and 
costs from such investments. In this way, regulators can link renewable energy investments and 
relevant energy policies in such a way as to benefit both the economy and utilities while allowing 
private investors to earn a fair return on their investment.  
1.2. Literature 
 
The capital investment costs of the grid-connected onshore wind farm are composed of i) capital 
equipment cost (wind turbine) accounting for between 68% and 75% of the total cost, ii) grid-
connection/cabling costs (transformers, sub-stations, connection to transmission and distribution 
lines) iii) cost of civil work (transportation and installation of wind turbine and tower, road 
construction, construction of wind turbine foundation) iv) other capital costs (licensing, 
consultancy, permits, financing costs) which all accounting for the rest of total cost (Blanco, 
2009; Krohn et al., 2009; Tegen, 2012)19. The annual operation and maintenance costs (insurance, 
taxes, spare parts, management and administration) are not as well-known as capital costs and 
                                                          
18 See www.worldsteel.org/pictures/programfiles/Wind%20energy%20case%20study.pdf 
19 Note that there are two types of wind energy generation; land based wind investment are called as on-shore wind 
and ocean (sea) based wind investments are called as off-shore wind.  
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usually constituting less than 5% of total investment costs (Krohn et al., 2009; Blanco, 2009). The 
shares of different capital cost components of wind farm varies by project and where the project 
is being developed, however. For example, the cost of the grid integration vary significantly 
between projects as these costs depend on further system network improvements and 
transmission upgrade needed to connect wind farms to the grid, remoteness (distance) of wind 
farm from the network (Krohm et al., 2009; Tegen, 2012). In addition, the kWh of wind costs 
cannot be identical in every region or country since kWh of energy vary depending on wind 
conditions of the site and type of wind technology such as its height, rotor diameter and MW size 
of wind turbines, (Mills et al, 2009; Tegen, 2012; National Renewable Energy Laboratory , NREL,  
2011).  
 
Since most renewables are intermittent, they cannot be turned on and off with changing demand 
for electricity. Therefore, the economic value of renewable power depends on location and the 
hours when the renewable plant replaces the generation of electricity by thermal plants. The gross 
economic benefits are the total value of savings in fuel costs, fixed costs savings, capacity savings 
from adding renewable plant in the longer-term if its output coincides with the system peak-load 
and environmental benefits in the form of averted pollutant emissions. To start with, to achieve 
these savings from wind power generation, the rest of the generation system must be flexible 
enough to cope with the renewable power variability (Lund and Munster, 2003; Lund, 2005; 
Denholm and Han, 2011)20.  
 
Benefits from a typical renewable power project are the stabilization of electricity costs (perhaps 
at a high level), fuel cost savings (Jensen and Skytte, 2003; Bode, 2006; Sensfuß et al., 2008; De 
                                                          
20 In regions of the country where shortage in capacity occurs and/or the system is not flexible enough to cope with 
the intermittent energy sources, some of these benefits such as fuel and capacity savings cannot be realized. At the 
same time, these economic and environmental benefits are not attributed to wind and/or solar capacity investments 
only as they are realizable by any source of power generation technology with a lower marginal cost of generation 
which would also yield the same economic and environmental benefits but at different amounts.   
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Miera et al., 2008; Butler and Neuhoff, 2008; Weigt, 2008; Lamont, 2008)21 and the reduction of 
pollutant emissions from conventional electricity generation (Sims et al. 2003; Lund, 2004; 
Kennedy, 2005; Doherty and O’Malley, 2006; Delarue et al. 2009; Akella et al., 2009; Tsilingiridis et 
al., 2011). Therefore, it can be economically and environmentally desirable to feed renewables 
into the system. 
 
Electric power generated from most renewable sources is intermittent (variable) and non-
dispatchable. Because a large amount of elective power cannot be economically stored22, 
increasing the renewable sources of energy supply threatens the reliability of electricity generation 
systems because these energy sources fluctuate over time (Holttinen and Hirvoven, 2005; Karki et 
al., 2006). Because of this characteristic, a high level of penetration of renewable electricity 
generation technologies may create serious reliability problems in the power system supply 
(Holttinen and Hirvoven, 2005; Doherty and O’Malley, 2005; DeCarolis and Keith, 2005; Karki 
and Billinton, 2004; Smith et al., 2009, Boqiang and Chuanwen, 2009). In order to overcome this 
reliability problem with non-dispatchable renewables, utilities must keep additional reserves so 
that they can maintain the system reliability23.   
 
In this regard, the net benefits of the renewables should be estimated as the savings in fuel and 
carbon emissions, but after subtracting out the additional reliability costs (Strbac et al., 2007; 
Smith et al., 2004)24. In other words, while wind and solar energy sources save significant amounts 
of fuel from displacing power produced by conventional power generators, these sources cannot 
                                                          
21 Some authors strongly disagree on this, for example Etherington (2006) and Traber and Kemfert (2009). 
22 In the literature, energy storage technologies and the decentralizing of the wind farms are suggested as being 
solutions to problems associated with renewables. However, electric energy storage is not yet cost-effective. 
Decentralized wind farms require massive investments in transmission that may substantially reduce the benefits of 
wind. Therefore, to date none of these options are cost-effective.    
23In this analysis, we use reliability costs estimates from the literature so that we do not underestimate the results 
presented for public utility’s point of view and country-economy point of view.  
24Also see Munksgaard and Larsen (1998) and Bergmann et al., (2006) for external costs to determine social and 
environmental impacts of adding renewable in the system.  
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displace the capacity of conventional generating power units on a megawatt for megawatt basis25. 
As a consequence, renewable sources are limited in their substitutability for conventional thermal 
generators and cannot meet the entire demand for energy due to their uncontrollable variability. 
In fact, the capacity credit of wind or any other type of renewable shows that it is not a MW by 
MW substitute for conventional generation due to reliability concerns. And, this is valid for any 
type of electric utility if it faces power outages and power reliability problems in its supply system 
such as those in the islands of Cape Verde, and North Cyprus26. For example, a World Bank 
(2011) study for Cape-Verde suggests that wind-based sources of electricity generation will not 
provide firm generation capacity in Santiago Island of Cape-Verde, so that the integration of 
wind will not bring any reduction in thermal capital expenditures in Cape-Verde (World Bank, 
2011, p. 9). Although the WB report did not specify the reasons for this, it is likely because 
Santiago System is in the process of rehabilitation in terms of generation, transmission and 
distribution of electricity, whilst local government is planning to shut-down decentralized diesel-
oil generators and planning to expand the island network into single node while investing in fuel-
oil diesel plants (World Bank, 2011).  
 
Literature since the late 1970s argues that wind power is a feasible option in supplying the power 
in isolated islands where high winds are observed (Daviatian, 1978; Wright, 2001). The main 
reason is that diesel and gas turbines are usually used to generate electricity and that these plants 
                                                          
25Also see Lamont (2008), Bushnell (2010), and Green and Vasilakos (2010) for the impacts of wind on prices and 
capacities.  
26 Electric utilities in many developing countries (as well as developing and developed island countries including Cape 
Verde and Cyprus) also fail to provide reliable and adequate power supply to its existing residential, commercial and 
industrial connections. What is more, unreliable electricity supply from electric utilities has been cited as the major 
constraint to the businesses to operate in these countries and costs to the firms in terms of lost sales revenues and 
damage of physical capital from frequent outages (Oseni and Pollitt, 2012; Foster and Steinbuks, 2009). Therefore, 
firms take expensive precautions to cope with unreliable power supply by operating their own generation. This 
means that firms spend capital on self-generation plus the high marginal cost of generating electricity compared to 
kWh purchased from public grid as diesel fuel is mostly used to generate electricity from self-generations (Foster and 
Steinbuks, 2009). According to World Bank (2009, p. 19) survey data, the average cost of self-generated electricity is 
significantly higher than the actual cost of electricity supplied from the public grid. These averting expenditures 
results from unreliable power supply have not only direct implications for firms’ profits but also costs to their 
economies as the capital might be used in other productive investments otherwise. This is translated into loss of 
incomes as well as a loss of jobs. 
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are expensive in terms of oil consumption and have low efficiency, for example in Cape Verde.  
Some studies suggest that an isolated island power system, for example, Cape Verde, with no oil 
or gas pipeline interconnections and no electricity interconnections with other countries might 
need to keep larger spinning reserves due to lack of interconnection; and with an increase in 
intermittent source of power supply in generation mix, the amount of spinning reserves should 
be even larger to guarantee grid reliability, alternatively conventional power production to 
maintain grid reliability should increase as long as wind power penetration increases (Mayer, 
2000; Karki and Billinton, 2001; Fesquet et al., 2003). Hence, we can conclude that wind-based 
power supply cannot meet the entire load demand in island power systems.  
Previous studies showed that high wind integration in the Island of Santiago’s power supply 
sounded economically viable. For example, Cabral et al. (2009) argue that 5.1 MW grid-connected 
utility scale wind capacity integration will enhance grid reliability in the form of a reduction in 
both active and reactive losses by 24.88% and 13.83% during peak hours and 12.41% and 
12.65% during off-peak hours. Based on capital cost estimates of wind farms, they conclude that 
wind investment is good investment for Cape-Verde, but two potential problems in their study 
are: (i) they estimate cost savings in the form of loss reductions net of total wind investment costs 
assuming that the utility invests in wind projects and (ii) wind investment capital costs are 
assumed to be $1.1 million per MW of wind capacity, which is much lower than the actual capital 
costs associated with onshore wind investment.  
 
Norgard and Fonseca (2009) study the technical utilization of grid-connected utility scale wind 
integration in the energy systems of Cape-Verde islands as function of the wind capacity. Based 
on their technical study and the characteristics of the energy system in Santiago Island, they argue 
that the penetration of wind capacity – at least up to 21% is possible – so wind-based output will 
be successfully produced and transmitted without any losses. They further conclude that the 
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avoided fuel savings from diesel plants alone can justify the installation of wind farms in Cape-
Verde including Santiago Island. These studies, however, do not analyse and study the feasibility 
of grid-connected renewables with private sector participation in the electricity sector via 
independent power producers (IPPs) type electricity generation projects as is the case in Cape-
Verde. Therefore, they do not take into account system supply and demand conditions while 
evaluating the economic feasibility of such investments.  
1.3. Electricity System in Santiago Island of Cape-Verde 
 
Cape Verde has a population of 494,401 spread over ten islands where half of the Cape Verdeans 
live on Santiago Island (World Bank, 2012). As of 2010, the nominal GDP per capita in Cape 
Verde has reached $3,798 (World Bank, 2012). It is expected that increasing population growth, 
the expansion of the service sectors including real estate, tourism development and increased 
production of desalinated water will create strong growth in the demand for electricity. The 
frequent black-outs due to the capacity deficit together with extremely high energy losses due to 
low infrastructure facilities however, constitute a critical barrier to sustaining higher economic 
growth. Hence, high fuel prices to generate electricity reflected in electricity tariffs, increasing 
capacity to meet the projected demand and chronic power supply reliability are the main 
challenges of the electric utility company in Santiago Island of Cape Verde. The government in 
Cape Verde aims to meet the rapidly rising demand for power in Cape Verde in an 
environmentally friendly and cost-efficient manner.  
 
At the same time, unreliable electricity supply from electric utilities has been cited as the major 
constraint to the businesses trying to operate in African countries including Cape Verde and costs 
to the firms in terms of lost sales revenues and damage to physical capital from frequent outages 
(Oseni and Pollitt, 2012; Foster and Steinbuks, 2009). Therefore, firms have to take expensive 
precautions to cope with unreliable power supply by generating their own electricity. This means 
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that firms spend capital charges on self-generation plus the high marginal cost of generating 
electricity compared to kWh purchased from the public grid as diesel fuel is mostly used by 
private agents to generate electricity (Foster and Steinbuks, 2009).  
 
According to World Bank survey data, the average cost of self-generated electricity in Cape-
Verde is significantly higher than the actual cost of electricity supplied from the public grid. 
These averting expenditures resulting from unreliable power supply have not only direct 
implications for firms’ profits but also costs to their economies as the capital might be used in 
other productive investments. This is translated into a loss of incomes as well as a loss of jobs. In 
addition to this, ELECTRA, the electric and water utility in Cape Verde bear hidden costs in the 
power sector. These hidden costs include distributional losses, under-pricing and uncollected 
energy costs and accounted for approximately 2% of the country’s GDP (Briceño-Garmendia 
and Benitez, 2010). This means that cost recovery by ELECTRA does not reach 100% and result 
in financial deterioration in its capital assets.  
 
Abstracting from any positive rate of return on capital, the regulated electricity tariff is even less 
than the break-even price – that is the price for revenue collection is less than the cost-recovery 
price for operations and capital depreciation so ELECTRA incurs a deficit in its power supply. 
This simply means that ELECTRA’s return on capital is even negative and ELECTRA’s 
operations are mostly financed with debt. The reasons for this are: (i) regulators consider the 
efficient level of energy losses for the tariff-setting that is less than the actually reported energy 
losses by ELECTRA, (ii) ELECTRA’s poor level of revenue collection from billed electricity 
sales and (iii) very high losses in transmission and distribution of electricity (World Bank, 2011; 
IMF, 2008). In addition, the World Bank report (2011, p.7) actually stated that both 
disagreements over tariff adjustments and poor long-term investment planning in the sector were 
the major reasons for the failure of the privatization of ELECTRA in Cape-Verde. 
21 
 
Figure 1.1. Santiago Island of Cape-Verde Energy Network27  
 
 
                                                          
27 The author has drawn both transmission and distribution lines as straight lines, although they depend on the 
landscape. This map is subject to change with time as energy sector projects are on-going in Santiago Island of Cape-
Verde. This map has been based on information publicly provided from the following sources: (1) 
http://www.ecreee.org/sites/default/files/unido-ecreee_report_on_cape_verde.pdf; Annex F6 – 8 (page 17), (2) 
http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/santiago-production-capacity-and-distribution-network-
strengthening-project-6625/ (published on 27/04/2010, accessed on 20 October 2014), (3) 
http://www.electra.cv/novo/INVITATION%20FOR%20BIDS.pdf, pages 1-2, (5) Regulatory papers by 
ELECTRA, available at http://www.electra.cv/index.php/Relatorios/View-category.html 
(6) World Bank, December 2011, Project Appraisal for a Recovery and Reform of the Electricity Sector Project in 
Cape-Verde.  
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Therefore, Cape-Verde’s energy problems were ultimately due to massive institutional and 
governance failure (i.e. regulations) which led to imprudent and reckless energy policies, poor 
long-term investment planning in the sector and failure of the privatization of ELECTRA in 
Cape-Verde. In order to solve the energy problems outlined above, the government of Cape-
Verde placed its faith in long-term investment planning in generation, transmission and 
distribution of electricity. The national government with aid from international organizations (e.g. 
World Bank) and regional banks (e.g. African Development Bank) has been implementing a 
series of rehabilitation projects in the sector. As part of those rehabilitation investments in 
generation, an increase in renewables (mostly on-shore grid-connected wind investments) was 
perceived as part of the diversification of the energy supply that potentially reduced the thermal 
generation costs, and which could stabilize the electricity tariff from variation of oil prices.  
 
The plans also foresaw an increase in the reliability in power supply by means of reduction in 
energy losses and reduction in frequency of blackouts. Alongside investments in renewables and 
the use of inexpensive fuel in power supply (shifting from heavy fuel oil -HFO 180 to heavy fuel 
oil – HFO 380), projects to extend the transmission lines to isolated loads were considered 
wherever possible in order to increase the potential for fuel switching as isolated loads run with 
expensive and dirty diesel generators (World Bank, 2011). These investments in generation, 
transmission and distribution of power supply will eventually allow ELECTRA to take advantage 
of economies of scale in its operation with a single centralized power station. 
1.3.1 Demand for Electricity in Santiago Island 
 
The demand for electric generation for the year of 2010 is presented in figure 1.2. In the figure 
below, the total 8760 hours in a year are plotted on the x-axis while the demand for capacity in 
MW is ranked on the y-axis. For instance, the baseload demand for electricity in the island is 
about 10 MW which must be supplied 24 hours a day continuously. The amount of electricity 
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that falls into the extreme peak load time is about 40 MW that must be supplied over only 261 
hours a year.  
 
Figure 1.2 Annual Load Duration Curve of Santiago Island as of 2010 
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 Source: Reproduced from data supplied by Simonsen Associados (February 2008) 
 
Demand for electricity is an exogenous variable in our analysis. Using Santiago’s historical annual 
demand for electric energy in the year 2006 and a subsequent demand study for the island 
prepared for ELECTRA by Simonsen Associados (February 2008), the annual projected load 
duration curves from 2010 to 2031 are produced for the island. Based on demand studies 
available to the public, we projected the demand for electricity such that there is a 15.5% annual 
increase from 2007-2012, a 6.25% annual increase from 2013 to 2017, a 5% annual increase from 
2018-2022, a 4.75% annual increase from 2023-2027 and lastly a 4.5% annual increase from 2028 
to 2031.  
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1.3.2 Supply of Electricity  
 
Power plants differ in terms of costs they incur for an additional MWh of electricity generation 
because each technology requires a different type and amount of fuel plus non-fuel operating 
costs (O&M) to produce a unit of electricity. Demand for electricity is met from a heterogeneous 
mix of power plants, so the marginal cost of power supply varies throughout day. Santiago Island 
has its own isolated electricity supply system. The existing power supply mix of the island in the 
year 2010 includes those generators running with fuel oil and diesel oil. ELECTRA is the 
electricity authority of Cape-Verde responsible for the generation, transmission and distribution 
of electricity in all islands including Santiago Island of Cape-Verde. 
 
Santiago Island of Cape Verde has some of the highest transportation costs for fuels of any 
jurisdiction in the world. For instance, the domestic fuel oil costs for electricity generation are 
about 150% of the world price due to transportation costs and taxes, and might also come from 
low demand for fossil fuel imports and additional transportation charges paid on fuel transport as 
the energy systems in Cape-Verde split into independent island energy system.28 The power 
supply characteristics of the existing system is provided in Table 1.1 with each power plant’s year 
of establishment (t), kW available capacity, type of fuel and amount of fuel oil requirements to 
generate each kWh of electric output. As expected, the generation plants are heterogeneous so 
the operating costs and emissions from individual power plants at each kWh of electricity are not 
the same because of differences in their type and amount of fuel consumption. 
 
In this paper, we assume that there will be a 1% annual increase in oil requirements for an 
additional kWh electricity generation of the existing and any new power plants due to the asset’s 
degradation that starts after the first year of operation. Similarly, there will be a 1% annual 
                                                          
28 For more information, see the summary literature and discussion regarding transportation costs of fuel imports 
into island economies are discussed in Weisser, D. (2004), “On the economics of electricity consumption in small 
island developing states: a role for renewable energy technologies?, Energy Policy, 32: 127–140 
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decrease in oil requirement for the new power plants until the time of operation due to 
technological advancement. Both parameters are assumed to be only a function of time. 
Furthermore, we assume that all candidate power plants are running with heavy fuel oil.  
 
Table 1.1 Power Supply Mix by Plant and Fuel, Santiago Island as year of 2012 
 
 
While deciding the capacity and the year of investment we consider both the growth in the 
demand for electricity and system reliability such that expensive diesel generators should be in an 
“idle” position as they serve as reserve capacity to maintain the grid reliability. The peak demand 
for electricity generation capacity is expected to grow as fast as the overall growth in energy 
demand. Therefore, the investments in new electric generation are expected to be in significant 
amounts as well as frequent. 
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1.3.3 Renewable Power Potential in Santiago 
 
Because of its geographical conditions, Santiago Island of Cape Verde has great potential in both 
wind and solar electricity generation (Ranaboldo et al., 2014). To illustrate, average annual wind 
speed at 70 m height is 9 m/s on the island (Cabral et al., 2009) and the solar irradiation level is 6 
kWh/m2/day (Ranaboldo et al., 2014; UNIDO and ECREEE, n.d.)29. Although levelised cost of 
electricity from solar PV is still higher than market prices for electricity and transmission 
investments are very high, off-grid solar systems might be the least-cost option for electricity 
supply in poor rural areas (Casillas and Kammen, 2010), especially in rural areas without grid 
access which have a big distance to the national grid (Deichmann et al., 2011). Particularly off-grid 
solar PV and off-grid wind power applications are recommended for the isolated grids run by the 
electric utility (ELECTRA) where high MRC diesel plants operate, and grid connection is highly 
expensive due to the low population density in rural areas (World Bank, 2011; Ranaboldo et al., 
2014 . At the same time, the high solar irradiance level in the island allows residential, hotel and 
industrial users to utilize it for water heating that can potentially contribute to reducing fuel use 
for electricity generation and reduce overall peak demand on the grid.   
The Cabeólica wind farm project is a public-private partnership (PPP) between the government of 
Cape Verde, the electric utility (ELECTRA) and a foreign private sector investor (InfraCO). The 
total number of onshore wind generators installed on the island is 11 with a generation capacity 
of 0.85 MW/each which translates into a total nominal capacity of 9.3 MW. This translates into 
25% of the country’s energy needs (InfraCO, n.d.)30. The wind farm is located in a southern part 
of Santiago Island, near the city of Praia. The wind power project is owned by a foreign owned 
IPP by the name of InfraCO. The foreign IPP is responsible for installation, operation, and 
                                                          
29 See global atlas for renewable energy (e.g. global mean annual wind speed and mean annual solar irradiance levels), 
via (i) International Renewable Energy Agency at http://irena.masdar.ac.ae/ or (ii) UN supported wind and solar 
potential assessment map via http://en.openei.org/apps/SWERA/ 
30 http://www.infracoafrica.com/projects-capeverde-cabeolicawind.asp 
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maintenance of the wind farm. The wind farm will occupy 30 hectares of land that will be rented 
at a fixed cost by the project from the local municipality. The wind farm is connected into the 
island’s power grid by transmission lines which require additional transmission investments31. The 
project sells the electricity it produces to the national power grid and the public utility is the only 
purchaser of the wind power supplied by the private IPP. The public utility is responsible for the 
transmission as well as distribution of power to the existing users on the island.  
 
The wind farm is assumed to operate from the beginning of 2011 to the end of 2030. The 
technical availability factor of the wind turbines is assumed for the purpose of this analysis to be 
100%, with an average annual load (capacity) factor to be 40% for the wind farm. For the sake of 
simplicity, the availability factor and capacity factor of the wind turbines are assumed to be the 
same throughout the life of the project32. Furthermore, we assume that there are no negative 
externalities associated with wind power itself33. In our analysis, the power from wind is assumed 
to be supplied successfully such that the system is flexible enough to cope with wind power 
variability. The existing system is moreover assumed to be flexible enough to utilize the wind 
power when the wind blows. Hence, we assume that the wind power produced by the IPP is 
successfully utilized at all times and there is neither a penalty nor a compensation payment made 
by either party. 
 
                                                          
31 We did not include transmission issues in this research.  
32 Availability factor directly relates to the technical point of view and describes the ability to operate wind farm 
safely. In recent years, technical availability of wind farms reaches to 99% so that wind farms can operate reliably 
about 8,672 hours of the year (24 hours * 365 days * 99%) out of 8,760 hours (24 hours * 365 days * 100%) 
(Kaldellis and Zafirakis, 2013). Therefore, 100% availability factor means that wind turbine is ready to generate 
electricity at all times of the year. But, wind turbine will actually generate electricity if wind blows above its cut-in 
(start running wind speed) and below its cut-out wind speed (shut-down wind speeds) that describes its capacity 
factor. Hence, different from availability factor of wind farm, capacity factor of wind turbines is a function of the 
wind speed in the area of construction of farm and the power curve of the particular wind turbines constructed. 
Therefore, capacity factor is the key parameter that actually dictates the amount of electricity that can be produced by 
the wind turbine. To illustrate, 10 MW of installed wind capacity generates annual energy equals 35,040 MWh with 
100% (availability factor)* 8760 (total hours in a given year; 365 days* 24 hours) * 10 MW (total installed capacity) * 
40% (average annual capacity factor) = 35,040 MWh. 
33 See footnote 11. 
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The capital costs of the project are assumed to be disbursed in two periods: 50% at the end of 
2010 and the remaining payments at the end of 2011. The capital, and operating and maintenance 
(O&M) expenses of the wind project are presented in Table 1.2 above. Revenues of the foreign 
IPP are based here on an assumed PPA tariff that is agreed upon between the private supplier 
and public utility before the implementation of the project. We assume that IPP will continuously 
supply the electric power without any technical problems and subject to the pricing scheme of 
the PPA.  
 
Table 1.2 Capital and O& M Costs of Installed Wind Capacity in Santiago in 201034 
 
 
 
 
The main problem with renewables is that power produced by the wind generators may not be 
needed and cannot be consumed because there is no more thermal generation that can be shut 
off. This is not the fault of the IPP, so the utility will be obliged to pay the IPP under a take or 
pay contract even though it has no use for the electricity. The penalty or compensation payments 
                                                          
34 For analysis, we converted all monetary variables from Euro to US $. Real exchange rate between Euro/$ is 0.78 
in 2010. Real exchange rate appreciation/depreciation factor is assumed to be 0% throughout the project. The NPVs 
of the projects are presented in US $. From the reports, we assume that 1/3 of the total capital costs will spent on 
wind investments in Santiago Island as 9.5 MW out of 28 MW wind capacity will be invested in Santiago Island 
alone.  
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may also occur during the project operation time. The penalty payment is made by the private 
sector if it cannot supply the power, and the compensation payment is made by the public utility 
when the private IPP supplies more wind power than set in the contract.  In the analysis that 
follows this PPA prices are assumed that illustrate how critical is the negotiation of the PPA 
price.  
 
The total investment cost of the wind farm is €17.3 million in Santiago Island of Cape Verde. 
The financing will come from two sources: term debts from commercial banks and cash equity 
from the IPP.  Total loan from term debt will be 60% of total investment cost (in nominal 
prices). This loan will be drawn as follows: €7.5 million in year 1 and €2.88 million in year 2.  The 
real interest rate of the loan is 7% and the principal of the loan will be repaid in 8 equal 
consecutive annual instalments starting at the beginning of the year of power generation35. 
Interest accrued on the loan balance from the previous period is paid on a continuous basis, 
starting from year 2. The lender’s benchmark is an annual debt service ratio of 1.7 minimum. The 
remaining investment costs of the proposed project will be covered by the IPP as cash equity and 
the required rate of return on the funds spent is 10%36. In the following analysis, three flat rate 
PPA prices are used: 100€ /MWh, 110 €/MWh, 120 €/MWh and 130 €/MWh that actually 
                                                          
35 See Weiss and Sarro, 2013. They estimate impacts of long-term power purchase agreements on weighted average 
cost of capital changes so levelised cost of wind energy. They assume that banks will provide over 20 years loan 
duration that does not apply in reality in many countries give that longer duration of loan increases the risks 
associated with the loan itself. The interest rate of the loan itself also depends on duration of loan. In other words, 
banks do not charge the same interest rate for a 5 year loan duration and a 15 year loan duration. Therefore, their 
analysis is perhaps misleading and does not represent the situation in renewables. 
36 The pricing of renewable power subject to financing parameters and it is sensitive to financing arrangements of 
IPP investments, market and non-market (e.g. political risks) involved in its investments and highly affects the 
distribution of project benefits and costs. Also see similar cost-based approach for tariff setting in renewable projects 
in the USA, CREST Model, Renewable Energy Cost Modeling: A Toolkit for Establishing Cost-Based Incentives in the United 
States, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, US Department of Energy. The complete model and manual is 
available at: http://financere.nrel.gov/finance/content/CREST-model. For more theoretical discussion see Wolf 
Heinrich Reuter (2012), “Renewable energy investment: policy and market impacts”, Applied Energy, 97: 249–254. 
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illustrate how financing costs (i.e. the weighted average cost of capital - WACC) are actually 
reflected in the price of wind electricity37.  
 
Because the private sector will generate a green source of electricity, it will also earn carbon 
credits from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)38. The $/MWh carbon credits are 
calculated by using a MWh to tCO2 conversion since electricity production is calculated in MWh. 
The conversion factor for carbon is given as (tCO2/MWh) 0.9049 and the carbon price/ton is 
assumed to be the rates offered by the Clean Development Mechanism (2006) which are 15 
€/tonne until 2013 and 10 €/tonne after 201339. Then by the amount of wind power 
replacement, annual earnings from carbon credits are calculated to be subject to a 7.5% excise 
tax.  
1.4. Load Analysis and Methodology40  
 
The load duration curve shows the relationship between the demand for capacity and time, i.e. 
the distribution of the demand for electricity over the time period (Poulin et al., 2008)41. Unlike 
conventional generators, wind turbines generate electricity only when the wind blows at the wind 
farm site. This is why, in the load duration curve analysis, the wind power supply is best treated 
as a negative demand since its output is intermittent. To do this, we simply subtract the electricity 
produced by the wind generators in each hour to give net demands and form a new annual load 
                                                          
37 Lower risk associated with the investments in renewables will lower the interest rate and higher will be the debt-
equity ratio, so lower cost of equity-debt (WACC) will be – in turn lower levelized cost of energy.   
38 We assume these carbon payments will be paid throughout the project lifetime based on documents provided 
publicly available http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Environmental-and-Social-
Assessments/ESIA%20-%20Cabeolica%20Wind%20Farm%20Projectt%20-%2018.03.2010%20EV.pdf 
39 See Clean Development Mechanism, UNFCCC, July 2006, p.27 
40As an illustration, we use wind here however; it might be also solar power. The analysis is the same so that model 
can be applied for wind alone, and solar alone or wind and solar together.   
41Time measure can be anything including daily, monthly or annual.   
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curve42. Over the year the amount of electricity generated is given by the period-by-period wind 
capacity factor multiplied by the total installed nominal wind capacity as shown in equation 143.  
 
     ht                   (1) 
 
 
where:  
 
h  is time demand blocks  in year (off-peak, mid-merit, peak) 
 
t  is planning years (t,…,T)  
w  is wind turbine  
whtq  is total MW wind power generated from each wind turbine  w  at hours h of time t  
 
whtCF  is capacity factor of wind turbine at hours h of time t (%)
44 
 
wtK is wind turbine capacity MW at time t   
 
 
The load duration curve (net of wind generation) depends on a number of wind turbines, the 
technical availability factor of the wind farm, and the quality and intensity of the wind at any 
moment. These factors in turn determine the capacity factor of the wind farm within the project 
site (i.e. wind farm site). Demand and supply has to balance every second, so the remaining 
demand for electricity (residual load) has to be supplied by the thermal generators. Wind power is 
therefore an exogenous variable in our analysis. This can be expressed as follows: 
 
 
      ht                  (2) 
 
where:   
                                                          
42 See for example Lamont (2008) for similar approach. 
43 Lundsager and Hansen (2002) estimate the capacity factor at 30 meter height as 32% in Santiago Island. The speed 
of the wind is expected to be greater at 70 meters height, so we use 40% as being average wind power capacity factor 
in our empirical estimates. Also, see Cabral et al., (2009) for wind speed comparison at different heights. 
44 Due to wind speed data constraints, we assume the capacity factor of wind farm is 40% at all times and at all 
demand blocks.  
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 is demand net of wind capacity (equivalent of  total supply of  electricity from thermal 
generators) and ghtD  is demand gross of  wind capacity at block ‘h’ in MW.  
From equation (2), we can clearly state that demand for electricity that conventional system is net 
of wind quantities such that: 
 
       ht                                 (3) 
 
where:  
 
zhtq  is MW conventional electricity supplied by plant  “without” wind integration at hours h of 
time t  
 
is total MW residual demand for electricity at hours “h” of time t  
 
 
From equations (1) to (3), we can express the wind power output using the following equation: 
 
 
     ht                  (4) 
 
      
where: 
 
whtq     
is wind electricity supplied at hours h of  time t  
zhtq  is conventional electricity supplied by plant z  “without” wind at hours h of  time t  
zhtq      is conventional electricity supplied by plant z  “with” wind at hours h of  time t  
l          is load ( e.g. peak demand, off-peak demand load) 
      is hours of duration of load l (e.g. number of peak load hours, off-peak load hours) at time 
t  
 
The economic dispatch method employs a mix of power generation plants with “the least cost - 
method” of electricity production. Generators are always ranked from the most economically 
efficient to the least economically efficient in such a way that the electric utility operates at 
minimum operating cost. This occurs when the plants are optimally dispatched in order from the 
lowest marginal running cost (MRC) $/MWh to the highest marginal running cost $/MWh.       
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Let us assume that there are three power supply technologies available: baseload plant, mid-merit 
plant and peaking plant to supply three load (i.e. demand); off-peak demand, mid-merit demand 
and peak demand. When the demand for electricity fluctuate between these loads when it is 
lowest (i.e. off-peak hours) and when it is highest (i.e. peak hours), the power supply technologies 
running in the system must also be altered in order to meet the fluctuations in demand. Baseload 
plants operate full time in order to meet the lowest demand for capacity. When the demand for 
electricity increases during the mid-merit and peak hours, additional capacity must be added to 
the baseload generation capacity and mid-merit capacity in order to meet the increased demand, 
respectively.   Note that the peaking plants operate only a fraction of the time in order to meet 
the highest demand for capacity. Mid-merit power plants fill the gap between the 
peak load demand and baseload demand.  
 
This is why, for the electricity system to be economically efficient, the baseload (peaking) plants 
are technologically more (less) capital intensive because of the high (low) levels utilization of the 
baseload (peaking) generation plants. This usually implies that the kWh marginal running cost, 
primarily fuel cost, of baseload plants (peak plants) is low (high). To sum up, baseload power 
plants are characterized by higher investment costs ($/kW) than peak power plants, but they 
produce electricity at lower marginal running cost ($/kWh) than the peak power plants. In order 
utility to supply at minimum cost (i.e. minimum price of energy), it is uneconomical to operate a 
baseload plant (peak plant) as a peak unit (baseload unit)45. In order utility to cover total cost of 
power supply, end-user price will exceed the marginal costs of baseload plants as price of energy 
must cover fuel and component for capital recovery running in the system46.  
                                                          
45 For example, see Porat et al. (1997), Long-run marginal electricity generation costs in Israel, Energy Policy, 
25(4):401-411.  
46Even if both baseload and peak technologies are assumed to be the same with respect to their costs (i.e. identical 
capital costs per kW and identical marginal costs per kWh), baseload price would be equal to marginal cost of 
baseload plant and peak price would be equal to marginal cost of peak plant but all capital costs (sum of baseload 
and peak capacity costs) still need be recovered during the peak period via capital cost surcharge.Therefore, marginal 
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Graphically illustrated, the combined cycle turbine (CCT) generator in figure 1.1 is said to be the 
first dispatched generator while the single cycle gas turbine (SCT) generator is the second 
dispatched generator. Therefore, marginal running cost of combined cycle turbine (MRCCCT) is 
less than marginal running cost of single cycle turbine (MRCSCT) which is in turn less than the 
marginal running cost of diesel engine (MRCDIESEL.). The proper economic dispatch application 
for a power system results in both a better resource allocation and greater consumer benefits due 
to reduced power prices. Wind sources of power generation have the lowest MRC because they 
produce electricity without consuming fuel. Thus, wind electricity is always almost the first used 
when wind turbines are available for power generation since it is the lowest marginal running cost 
generator in the new mix.  
 
Based on the figure above: (a) area of ACD represents the sum of the reduced electricity 
generation in MWh from each type of thermal power generation that is brought about by the 
introduction of the wind facility into the system and (b) the impacts of the wind generation on 
the optimal stacking of power plants such that the introducing of wind powered electricity 
generation tends to move the optional mix of plants towards an increase in the use of peak plants 
(cheap to build, expensive to operate)47’48.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
cost during peak hours would be still different than off-peak hours. The capital cost recovery charge would be 
estimated by the total capital costs of capacity running during the peak period over the period of peak hours. The 
difference will simply reflect the cost of adding capacity.  
47 See DeMiera et al., (2008) and Fursch et al. (2012) for details of load analysis with wind integration. Both studies 
illustrate short-term impacts and changes in long-run equilibrium in generation mix with wind integration.  
48 Different from economic dispatch (ED) model I employ in this research, objective function includes more cost 
components and the constraint function includes more dynamic constraints such as start - up cost, transmission 
costs/constraints and unserved reserve cost, and thermal unit ramping constraints, required min on/off times of 
thermal plants etc. In this research, I did not take into account short-term dynamic operational constraints such as 
transmission constraints, required minimum load hours of conventional generators that help system planner for the 
purpose of system security, balancing the demand and supply, and maintaining the power quality. Examples of such 
analysis include Padh (2004), Delarue et al. (2009) and Tuohy et al (2009), and Staffell and Green (2015).  
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Figure 1.3 Annual Load Duration Curve “with” and “without” Wind Integration 
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The principal problem of the centralised electric utility systems is to minimize the generation 
costs subject to the set of system and regulatory constraints. The power system planners apply 
different optimization tools to solve the problems occurring at different time horizons. The total 
economic cost of expansion is composed of the sum of total fixed costs (investment and fixed 
operating and maintenance costs) for candidate thermal power plants, total variable costs 
(variable operating and maintenance costs, variable fuel operating costs) for both existing and 
chosen candidate plants in the future. Note that we do not choose optimal wind quantities here, 
but we minimize the total supply of power with a given wind capacity and demand growth for 
electricity for the next twenty years.  Although there are numerous uncertainties in the operations 
as well as planning of power system such as wind speed and future demand load which need to 
be identified and taken care of are not accounted in this research. 
 
         (5) 
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where 
 
  is present value (discounted) of total fixed costs  
t  is planning years (t,…,T)  
e is index of existing power plants 
c is index of candidate power plants which are actually installed 
i is interest rate (%) 
r is discount rate (%) 
n is economic life time of proposed candidate power plant (years)  
cI is capital cost of candidate power plant ($/MW) 
and  are installed capacity of candidate plants and existing plants, respectively.  
ctF and etF fixed operating and maintenance costs of candidate and existing power plant at time 
t ($/MW), respectively.   
 
And, the present value (discounted) of total variable cost of energy supply is given by: 
 
 
             (6) 
 
 
where  
 
TVCPV   is present value (discounted) of total variable cost of energy supply 
 
t  is planning years (t,…,T)  
 
h  is time demand blocks  in year (off-peak, mid-merit, peak) 
 
 is hours of duration of load l  (e.g. number of peak hours, off-peak hours) at time t  
jetqf  
and jctqf  are the fuel consumption of candidate and existing  power plants in 
year t (litre/MWh), respectively 
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jtFpf  is price of j  type fuel in year t ($/litre) 
 
ehtq  and chtq  
are the electricity produced from each exisiting and installed candidate plant in 
interval h of year t (MW), respectively49. 
 
Therefore, optimal expansion is determined by minimizing discounted total costs; sum of 
discounted fixed and discounted variable costs. In equation (5), we simplify the analysis by 
assuming a single interest and discount rate in our simulations. For clarification purpose, we use 
the economic discount rate (r) for the minimization problem based on the sector being operated 
under a public electric utility. From equation (5), we further assume that fixed costs are uniformly 
distributed over the life-time of candidate plants and residual values of these power plants are 
equal to zero. In addition to this, we further assume that the economic value of decommissioned 
power plants equals zero such that decommissioning costs equals their residual values. Finally, we 
assume that there are no transmission constraints50. 
 
The variable costs affect the power generation mix and fixed and variable costs together affect 
the power expansion mix. Therefore, the total economic costs include both optimal stacking and 
optimal dispatching decisions within the model. Large amounts of electric power cannot be 
stored economically. Therefore, current and planned electricity generation has to meet demand 
for electricity at all times. The model presented in this chapter also uses the residual load with 
wind integration. The amount of electric power generation from conventional power plants is 
given by the availability factor (or technical availability) of each power plant.  
 
                                                          
49 Note that power quantities of thermal plants depends on availability factor ( ce aa , ) and  installed  power plant at 
time t (%) and capacity level of each power plant, in MW ( ctet KK , ) 
50 Wind power curtailment due to transmission constraints exists even in countries where transmission infrastructure 
is in good shape, for example, this issue was recently raised in Kingdom Community wind farm in Vermont. For 
more information, see Cardwell, D. (2013) 'Potential of green energy is crimped by transmission shortcomings", 
International Herald Tribune, 16 August, p.16. 
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The negative load duration approach discussed above can be adapted in the case of Santiago 
Island. The treatment to the load demand curve with “wind” power will be the same throughout 
the project life time because the growth rate for electric demand is assumed to be the same for 
both the peak and the off-peak demand. The growth rates for electric demand are consistent with 
the demand study for the Island by ELECTRA51.  The reliability issues associated with wind 
when the share of wind power is reduced over time are managed by adjusting the proportion of 
the diesel generators kept idle in order to be available to maintain the reliability and stability of 
the system. 
 
We run simulations for the next twenty years because the useful life-time of wind power 
investments is typically 20 years. Note that each cost component is assumed to be constant 
regardless of the operating regime, with or without wind integration. It is possible to combine all 
discounted fixed and variable fuel and operating (i.e. total present values of costs, in €) and 
express it in a single function as follows: 
 
         
              (7) 
subject to 
      ht                                      (8) 
 
       
ht
                  (9) 
       ht
                           (10) 
       eht                  (11)   
       cht                            (12)  
       ct  
               (13) 
 
 
                                                          
51 See Market Study for Cape-Verde, Simonsen Associados, in February 2008 (in English).  
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where: 
  is present value (discounted) of total fixed costs 
TVCPV   is present value (discounted) of total variable cost of energy supply 
 is demand net of wind capacity (equivalent of  total supply of  electricity from thermal 
generators) 
ehtq  and chtq  
are the electricity produced from each existing (e) and installed candidate plants (c) 
in interval h of year t (MW), respectively. 
eta  and cta  
are the availability factors of each existing and installed candidate plant in year t , 
respectively. 
and  are installed capacity of existing and candidate plants installed in the future, 
respectively.  
 
Non-negativity constraints identify the decision variables in our model. In order to compute the 
benefits and costs of this private sector wind investment, we will use quantities of thermal power 
“without” wind minus those “with” wind. Wind capacities are set as an exogenous variable. 
Hence, we do not determine optimum wind capacity, but we determine optimum thermal 
generation mix with wind integration.  Any type of a new conventional generator added into the 
system is the most efficient generator which replaces the ‘least economically efficient’ generator 
in the existing power mix (Harberger, 1976). In contrast, adding generation from a wind farm 
does not replace the “least efficient” plant, but alters the power plant mixture that allows us to 
achieve the minimum cost combination again during the period. In our estimates, this process is 
repeated on an annual basis, and the generators are ranked according from the most efficient to 
the least efficient. We assume that the mix of thermal plants does not change between the “with” 
and “without” wind scenarios for Santiago Island. In other words, any changes in the per-unit 
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level of capital and fuel costs due to changing the plant loads with wind integration are not 
accounted for.  
 
Santiago’s power system is small enough to allow us simply to rank the generators from the 
lowest to highest marginal running cost. If the installed amount of wind power penetrates the 
system, an analysis of the optimal power mix “with” wind must be carried out in order to derive 
the costs and benefits of wind power52. In our empirical estimates, we assume that non-fuel 
operating costs do not increase for the rest of the electric utility when the wind farm is integrated 
into the system: in reality they will increase. For instance, there may be a need for greater short 
term and long term reserve requirements once large amounts of wind are integrated into the 
existing generation53. As the wind capacity penetrates the system, these aspects of wind power 
might push system operators to take additional precautions in order to maintain the system’s 
reliability54 and adequacy55 depending on the size of wind power penetration and system supply 
and demand characteristics (Holttinen and Hirvoven, 2005). This will ultimately increase the 
marginal cost per kWh of electricity production by the wind turbines, and it is not negligible 
(Smith et al., 2004).  
 
In addition, generators incur some start up and shut-down costs when utilities start operating or 
shutting down generators when the wind starts and stops blowing. The start-up and shut-down 
costs will vary depending on the plant type and as well as the flexibility of the generation mix. For 
example, baseload generators need some time to warm up before they can start generating 
electricity, so utilities may be prefer to keep them running even when wind generation is 
                                                          
52 See for example Lund, H., (2005). 
53 See for example Strbac et al., (2007). 
54 Reliability is defined as “the ability of the electric system to withstand sudden disturbances such as electric short 
circuits or unanticipated failure of system elements” (NERC, 2007).  
55 Adequacy is defined as “ the ability of the electric system to supply the aggregate electrical demand and energy 
requirement of customers at all times, taking into account schedules and reasonably expected unscheduled outages of 
the system elements” (NERC, 2007). 
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(temporarily) available. Some proportion of the wind output produced during off-peak hours is 
likely to be surplus assuming that the baseload plants must operate at the same capacity 
throughout the project life56. This is the case for the future investments made on baseload plants, 
so this area is always in surplus power57. In our analysis, the wind power output in the area (figure 
1.2) above the minimum level of thermal production is excluded in the measurement of the 
benefits of wind power from the perspective of the IPP, public utility and the economy. 
1.5. An Integrated Analysis Mechanism  
 
An integrated investment appraisal framework incorporates financial, economic and stakeholder 
impacts of the investment project58. In this framework, the actual benefits received and costs paid 
by each interest group due to the wind power project are calculated. This in turn allows us to re-
allocate the benefits and costs according to the provision of the PPA. The integrated analysis 
framework also allows us to test the riskiness of all project variables that may affect the viability 
of the project so that a better management of the risks associated with the project can be made 
possible.  
 
We empirically employ this framework in order to assess the costs and benefits of a new wind 
farm in Santiago Island, Cape Verde that was commissioned in September 201159. The empirical 
results for Santiago Island illustrate how a set of estimates of the costs and benefits can be 
distributed between the public utility, the IPP, the economy and the local government. Due to 
                                                          
56 Surplus of wind power can be manageable, see Lund, H., and Munster, E., (2003). 
57 The economic loss in this case is equivalent to wasted wind electric output when wind turbines produce an electric 
output but which is not utilized by the public utility.  
58 For details, see Jenkins, G.P., Kuo, C.Y., and Harberger, A.C. (2014) "Chapter 1: The Integrated Analysis", and 
also "Chapter 2: A Strategy for the Appraisal of Investment Projects", Cost - Benefit Analysis for Investment 
Decisions. 
59 We initially apply an economic dispatch model to find the least cost combination of power generators on an 
annual basis for the island. Wind power is examined in a way that it is used as supplementary or substitute for 
generation from conventional thermal power plants in Santiago Island, Republic of Cape Verde (hereafter Cape 
Verde). The wind turbines are introduced into a conventional power grid with multiple sources of thermal generation 
capacity such as fuel oil and diesel oil generators. Thus, the annual kWh of energy displaced by the wind turbines is 
estimated based on economic dispatch results.  
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Figure 1.4 PPA Greenfiel Contract Mechanism – take or pay contract  
 
 
       Source: own illustration. 
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the quality and strength of the wind speed and high delivered costs of petroleum products to the 
island, this location is potentially very favourable for this type of electricity generation project 
(Lundsager and Hansen, 2002; Cabral et al., 2009; InfraCO, n.d.). The wind project in Cape Verde 
is of a commercial-scale, developed by an international investor/developer under a public-private 
partnership scheme (InfraCo, n.d.). The financial analysis produces results for both the private 
wind power supplier and the public utility. 
 
1.5.1. The Independent Power Producer’s Point of View 
 
Different from the thermal electricity generation investments, the private investors who own 
such a wind farm incur almost zero variable cost (wind is free) to generate electricity, but face 
very substantial capital costs (Krohn et al., 2009). Since the capital costs are known, the objective 
of a long-term power purchase contract (PPAs) is reducing the risks of the operation and 
providing a stable stream of revenues to the IPPs to cover their operating and maintenance costs 
and financing costs (Wiser and Pickle, 1998; Burer and Wustenhagen, 2009)60. In this way, their 
project can be made bankable and enable financial institutions to provide cheaper loans (lower 
interest rates together with longer duration of loan repayment period) for their investments as 
well as attract equity investors (Weiss and Sarro, 2013; Lesser and Su, 2008). This contractual 
arrangement will then lead to lower renewable energy prices that the private sector charges and 
the utility pays.  
 
Both the MWh of the electricity supplied from wind turbines and selling price per MWh of 
power are pre-determined in the power contract. The price of energy per MWh is adjusted with 
                                                          
60 Given that egPRrRri )1(  , i is nominal interest rate (i.e. rate of interest for borrowing), r is real 
interest rate and R is risk factor involved for a particular project depending on the type of investment and where it is 
actually implemented and so includes political risk, corruption in that country etc. and 
egP is the expected inflation 
over the life time of project. Hence, lower risk in investments translates into lower interest rates (lower financing 
cost) as well as a longer repayment period. Alternatively, higher risk will increase expectations on return so that 
investors can compensate and demand higher interest rates. Therefore, the loan-equity balance in private sector 
investments plays a crucial role in the price of energy they sell to the public sector and risk-sharing (i.e. role of PPA) 
between private and public sector is inevitable.  
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inflation to reflect the variations in the costs. Because we do not know the contract details signed 
between entities, we assume that price of wind energy does not change over time. Therefore, the 
revenues of the IPP are secured and the market risk of wind turbine investors from their 
operations are removed with the exception of the risk associated with their operating and 
maintenance costs (Jensen et al., 2002; Baylis and Hall, 2000; Lock, 1995). The financial viability 
of the wind power project for the IPP is estimated by deducting the costs of capital, operating 
and maintenance (outflows) from the revenues from wind power sold out (inflows) to public 
utility. An additional source of revenues to the IPP is the (net of excise tax) revenue from the sale 
of the carbon credits that it receives for implementing this wind power project.The financial cash 
inflows, outflows, and net present value from the perspective of the IPP can be expressed as in 
equations 14, 15 and 16 below, respectively. 
 
                                                             (14) 
 
 
(15) 
                 (16) 
 
where: 
 
IPP
t
FB  is financial revenues accrued by private IPP from wind investments in period “t” 
(million $)61 
 
t    is planning years (t,…,T)  
 
h    is time demand blocks  in year (off-peak, mid-merit, peak) 
                                                          
61 These benefits are secured as they are clearly specified in the PPA. This is fixed price PPA for wind quantities. 
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whtq  is MWh of wind energy produced from installed wind capacity at each load hours 
of time t 
 
wtp   is fixed contract price of wind power in $/MWh
62 
zhtq  is MWh of energy produced from installed thermal power plant “without” wind 
integration at each load hours of time t 
 
zhtq'  is MWh of energy produced from installed thermal power plant “with” wind 
integration at each load hours of time t 
 
   is hours of duration of load l  (e.g. number of peak hours, off-peak hours) at time 
t  
   is MWh to 2tCO  conversion for carbon credits 
 
ctp   is carbon credits earned from fuel replacement in $/MWh 
 
IPP
t
FC  is total cost of wind investments and operations paid by the IPP at time “t”  
 
t
I  is investment costs associated with wind investments in million $/MW 
 
wtK   is total wind capacity installed  in MW 
 
wtF  is fixed operating and maintenance expenses of private IPP per MW of wind 
capacity in million $/MW 
 
c   is rate of excise tax on carbon credits paid by the IPP  
 
   is rate of income tax paid by the IPP  
 
r   is financial discount rate63  
                                                          
62 Levelized cost of electricity from renewable is the minimum price that renewable supplier must get in order to just 
break-even. In Europe, this price (e.g. FIT) is higher than the LCOE per MWh as aim is to increase the share of 
renewable and promote more renewable installations. When debt obligations from the bank is taken into 
consideration (i.e. annual debt service coverage ratio), the price is higher than LCOE per MWh. Note that debt 
obligation starts with the operations, and usually last 8 years. Therefore, return on equity investment might be 
substantially higher than average years when debt is repaid. Thus, private sector has incentive to cheat by presenting 
shorter life for their investment to earn high return from high prices for the electricity they supply.  
63 The choice of private discount rate, however, reflects the perceived risk of the project, the regulatory and 
investment climate in a country where investment is actually undertaken, financing mechanism of the project and the 
profitability of alternative investments. The weighted average cost of capital (abstracting from the corporate tax rate 
component) is given by:  where  and   are cost of equity and cost of debt, 
respectively.  and are the share of equity and debt financing, respectively. Both the cost of equity and cost of 
debt is higher for wind investments undertaken in a developing country, for example UNDP suggest that cost of 
equity reach at 18% and cost of debt reach at 10% in developing countries (UNDP, 2013, p.34). We expect both the 
cost of equity and cost of debt to be smaller, however, if private sector sign long-term power purchase agreement 
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IPP
t
NPV
0
 is net present value in millions of $ at 2010 price level 
1.5.2. The State-Owned Utility Company’s Point of View  
 
From the public utility’s perspective, the actual incremental benefits of having an IPP investing in 
wind turbines is the lower fuel consumption that results from sum of the reduced power 
generation from the conventional thermal generation plants64. These thermal generators are 
heterogeneous in terms of their characteristics such as age, type and amount of fuel used and the 
load factor. Fuel savings from individual thermal plants are therefore directly dependant on the 
kWh amount of electric power actually displaced from each conventional thermal generator by 
the power supplied by the wind energy.  
 
The amount of payments to the IPP is made on the basis of the MWh of power supplied by the 
wind farm in a given year65. It is calculated without considering the type and time of displacement 
of power from conventional generators. In short, the net annual savings of the electric utility are 
estimated by the financial value of fuel savings (inflows) reduced by financial payments made to 
the wind power generation (outflows). In PPP-type renewable investments, all investment costs 
associated with the wind farm will be paid for by the foreign IPP, but the public utility pays for 
the additional investments needed in new transmission lines to connect the wind farm into the 
national grid and the reliability costs due to the intermittent and non-dispatchable nature of wind 
power as part of operating cost of the wind farm. Therefore, integration of wind turbines into the 
national grid involves capital and reliability costs – costs to mitigate the risks and maintain the 
grid reliability with wind integration. In this regard, the benefits of the renewables are savings in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(Weiss and Sarro, 2013). Cabolica wind farm project is 70% debt financed and remaining 30% is equity financed 
(Mukasa et al., 2013, p. 15). Therefore, the estimated WACC (the financial discount rate) is 12%. Because, long-term 
power purchase contracts reduces the risk of loan (Weiss and Sarro, 2013), we evaluated the private returns at 10% 
discount rate. 
64  See footnote 11.  
65 Note that we simplify our analysis in a way that we conduct our estimates on annual basis rather than daily or 
monthly.  
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fuel and emission savings, net of reliability and additional infrastructure costs with wind 
integration, and financial payments made to the IPP.  
 
The financial cash inflow, outflows and the net present value from the perspective of the state 
owned utility company can be expressed as in equations 17, 18 and 19 below. 
 
                                                 (17)          
                                                                                    
                                                                                 (18) 
 
 
                                                                                       
(19) 
  
 
where: 
 
t    is planning years (t,…,T)  
 
utility
t
FB  is financial benefits from fuel savings accrued by the public utility from wind 
investments in period t 66  
 
h    is time demand blocks  in year (off-peak, mid-merit, peak) 
 
 
   is hours of duration of load l  (e.g. number of peak hours, off-peak hours) at time 
t  
 
z   set of all existing thermal generators in the system in year t 
 
                                                          
66 Financial price of fuel includes transportation charges and taxes, so financial cost of fuel for electricity generation 
is higher than world price of fuel. But, financial cost of fuel for electricity generation increases as world price 
increases by the amount of transport charges (% of world fuel prices) and tax distortions (% of CIF prices). 
Therefore, fuel cost of electricity generation ($/barrel) = World Price of Fuel (FOB) plus transportation charges and 
taxes paid. 
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zhtq  is MWh of energy produced from installed thermal power plant “without” wind 
integration at each load hours of time t 
zhtq'  is MWh of energy produced from installed thermal power plant “with” wind 
integration at each load hours of time t 
 
zjtqf  is quantities of fuel used by the i thermal generator in litres/MWh in period t  
 
jt
Fpf   is financial cost of j type of fuel in period t in $/litre 
 
ztF  
is fixed operating and maintenance costs of exisiting and candidate and existing 
thermal generators installed in the sytem, in $/MW 
 
ztK  is MW of thermal capacity from each plant “without” wind integration at time t 
 
ztK   is MW of thermal capacity from each plant “with” wind integration at time t 
 
utility
t
FC  is PPA payments paid by the public utility to the IPP and reliability costs paid in 
period t   
 
whtq  is MWh of wind energy produced from installed wind capacity at each load hours 
of time t
 
 
wtp   is fixed contract price of wind power in $/MWh
67 
 
w
Fpr  is financial cost of maintaining the reliable electricity supply in € per MWh of 
wind power supplied  
 
r   is utility discount rate 68  
 
utility
t
NPV
0
 is net present value in millions of $ at 2010 price level  
                                                          
67 Levelized cost of electricity from renewable is the minimum price that renewable supplier must get in order to just 
break-even. In Europe, this price (e.g. FIT) is higher than the LCOE per MWh as aim is to increase the share of 
renewable and promote more renewable installations. When debt obligations from the bank is taken into 
consideration (i.e. annual debt service coverage ratio), the price is higher than LCOE per MWh. Note that debt 
obligation starts with the operations, and usually last 8 years. Therefore, return on equity investment might be 
substantially higher than average years when debt is repaid. Thus, private sector has incentive to cheat by presenting 
shorter life for their investment to earn high return from high prices for the electricity they supply.  
68 For the utility and economy discount rate, using the Ramsey formula:  where ‘ ’ is social discount rate, 
‘ ’ is the rate of pure time preference (measures impatience) that ranges between 1-3%, plus productivity of capital 
(return on investment) that is product of the consumption elasticity of marginal utility ‘θ’ (measures how fast 
marginal consumption decreases in consumption that ranges typically between 1-2%) and the growth rate ‘g’ 
(measures how fast consumption increases). Since, we do not know these variables, we use the discount rate that is 
used by the AfDB, that is 10%. See African Development Bank, Cape-Verde Report, page 6, available at: 
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Cape_Verde_-
_Praia_Airport_Expansion_and_Modernisation_Project__PEMAP__-_Appraisal_Report.pdf 
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1.5.3. The Country- Economy’s Point of View  
 
The economic costs and benefits resulting from wind turbine investments are different from the 
financial benefits and costs due to tax distortions in the markets. The financial benefits and costs 
of the project to the Cape Verdean economy are adjusted for taxes and distortions to arrive at 
their real economic worth to the country as we carry out quantitative economic analysis from 
economic prices, not market prices. In order to move from financial analysis to economic 
analysis, we apply economic conversion factors to the financial prices and a foreign exchange 
premium to the inflows and outflows of foreign exchange caused by this project.  
 
The economic benefits received from the wind project that accrue to the country are basically 
fuel savings and the taxes levied on the revenues of the IPP receive from the carbon credits. 
When moving from the financial analysis of fuel savings to the economic analysis of fuel savings, 
a fuel oil specific conversion factor is used to estimate the savings in fuel from a country-
economy point of view69. In addition, any excise taxes levied on the value of the carbon credits 
are added to the economic benefits generated from the wind project in Santiago Island as they are 
a net inflow of resources to the country. On the economic costs side, the financial payments as 
stipulated by the PPA for each of the MWh of electricity supplied by the foreign IPP are made in 
foreign currencies. So these payments must be increased by the foreign exchange premium (FEP) 
to estimate the economic costs paid to the host country70. 
 
The economic resource inflows, outflows and net present value can be expressed as in equations 
20, 21 and 22 below. 
                                                          
69 The import duties and VAT on fuel oil will cause the financial price to be greater than its economic cost while the 
existence of a foreign exchange premium will increase its economic cost. The net effect is to cause the economic 
value to be less than the financial price of fuel oil.  
70 FEP captures all domestic and international taxes and distortions associated with tradable items, so it captures the 
changes in the welfare in a country from foreign exchange payments that is paid to the private investor.  
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(20) 
 
    (21) 
 
   



 
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1
0 1
T
t
country
t
country
t
tcountry
t ECEBEOCKNPV                                                    (22) 
where: 
 
 
country
t
EB  is economic benefits accrued by the country-economy from wind investments at 
time t  
 
zhtq  is MWh of energy produced from installed thermal power plant “without” wind 
integration at each load hours of time t 
 
zhtq'  is MWh of energy produced from installed thermal power plant “with” wind 
integration at each load hours of time t 
 
zjtqf  is quantities of fuel used by the i thermal generator in litres/MWh in period t  
 
jtEpf  is economic cost of fuel j type of fuel in time t in $/litres adjusted by the 
corresponding conversion factor for fuel.  
 
   is MWh to 2tCO  conversion for carbon credits 
 
ctp   is carbon credits earned from fuel replacement in $/MWh 
 
ztF  
is fixed operating and maintenance costs of exisiting and candidate and existing 
thermal generators installed in the sytem, in $/MW 
 
ztK  is MW of thermal capacity from each plant “without” wind integration at time t 
 
ztK   is MW of thermal capacity from each plant “with” wind integration at time t 
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c   rate of excise tax on carbon credits paid by the IPP  
 
   rate of income tax paid by the IPP  
 
w
Fpr  is economic cost of maintaining the reliable electricity supply in $ per MWh of 
wind power supplied  
 
country
t
EC  is economic costs paid by the country-economy from wind investments at time t  
 
FEP is foreign exchange premium paid on international currency transactions in % 
 
EOCK  is economic opportunity cost of capital (discount rate)71  
 
country
t
NPV
0
 is net economic present value in millions of $ at 2010 price level   
 
1.5.4. Externality Analysis  
 
Using an integrated approach, the stakeholder impact analysis is now computed. There are some 
externalities associated with the economic activity (project) that cause the economic benefits and 
costs to be different from the financial benefits and costs72. The difference between the economic 
resource flow and financial cash flow represent the tax and other externalities associated with the 
wind project in question. In this research, we identify and capture tax externalities created by the 
wind farm project. The stakeholder analysis of a typical renewable project is conducted to identify 
which particular segments of society reap the project benefits and which ones, if any, lose from 
the implementation of that particular renewable project. The stakeholder analysis of any project 
builds on the following relationship: 
 
 kExtFVEV            (23) 
where:  
  
EV  is the economic value of an input or output 
                                                          
71 See footnote 68. 
72 See footnote 11. Although there are other externalities, non-monetized benefits and costs from this particular wind 
investment is excluded.  
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FV  is the financial value of the same variable  
 
 kExt  is the sum of all the externalities that make the economic value different from the 
financial value of the item.  
 
 
In other words, the economic value of an item can be expressed as the sum of its financial value 
plus the value of externalities (i.e. taxes, tariffs, consumer/producer surplus). On the basis of 
identity above, the following relationship also holds, if a common economic discount rate is 
applied:    
  
 x
EOCKEOCK
f
EOCK
e
ExtPVNPVNPV                          (24) 
where: 
 
EOCK
eNPV  is the PV of the net economic benefits (country) by the economic cost of capital 
 
EOCK
fNPV  is the PV of the net financial cash flow (utility) discounted by the economic cost of 
capital 
 
 x
EOCK ExtPV is the sum of the PV of all the tax externalities generated by the wind project. 
 
 
The Government of Cape Verde  
 
In this case, government fiscal impacts arise because of the reduced tax revenues due to the 
decline in petroleum imports. On the other hand, the government collects taxes on the project’s 
earnings from the sale of carbon credits. In addition, because both the fuel saving and the PPA 
payments to the IPP involve foreign exchange, a foreign exchange premium is applied to these 
offsetting resource flows. In this case the foreign exchange premium is simply the extra tax 
revenues that can be generated from the purchase of tradable goods and services when additional 
foreign exchange is acquired by Cape Verde. When foreign exchange is used by the project to 
make payments abroad, then the premium reflects the indirect taxes given up by the country. 
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There will be a loss in indirect tax revenue as fewer tradable goods and services can be now 
purchased by others.  
 
utilitycountryiesexternalit NPVNPVPV                                (25) 
 
In brief, the government’s fiscal impacts are equal to the sum of the loss in tax revenues from 
reduced oil imports (-), the gain in the value of the foreign exchange premium on fuel savings (+) 
and the loss in foreign exchange premium due to the payments now made to the IPP (-), and the 
gain in excise taxes levied on the carbon credits received by the private operators of the project 
(+)73.   
1.6. Empirical Results  
 
Incorporating the simulation results into the integrated approach we described in section 1.5, the 
net impacts of renewable power integration into the island grid are presented for each point of 
view in order to show the viability of the wind project for each stakeholder. The benefits to the 
public utility are measured by the amount of fuel savings from conventional generators. The 
amount of fuel savings is estimated by the amount of power displaced by the wind turbines.  
 
The costs of the wind project to the utility are the payments to the IPP in exchange for wind 
power. Therefore, the receipts of the IPP are the annual expenses of the public utility. The 
benefits of the project owner - the IPP - are measured by the amount of payments made by the 
public utility where the PPA price for its power is set in advance. The wind project costs to the 
IPP include both capital and operations and maintenance (O&M) expenses, which are deducted 
from the benefits. Finally, we apply a single rate of discount throughout the project life and the 
                                                          
73 Note that this statement is true only if economic opportunity cost of capital (EOCK) is used to the count net cash 
flow for financial and economic analysis. The economic NPV and financial NPV will also differ due to application of 
economic conversion factors and the FEP and NTP adjustments made on the financial benefits and costs. This is 
how we get the government fiscal impacts as part of the externalities. Although we use the same rate discount rate 
for both financial and economic analysis, the EOCK may differ from the financial discount rate.   
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relevant discount rate for all interest groups is assumed to be the same at a rate of 10% (net of 
inflation)74.  For economic analysis, the foreign exchange premium for Cape Verde is estimated as 
10% (Kuo et al., 2014) and the conversion factor for oil is calculated as 0.99. Incorporating the 
demand for and supply of electricity and wind parameters (both financial and economic), NPVs 
are estimated to show the beneficiaries and losers from the wind power project. The numerical 
results in Table 1.3 are estimated for world prices of HFO 180 and 380 at 70$/barrel and 
60$/barrel, respectively75. Importing HFO 380 is cheaper for Cape-Verde than importing HFO 
180 (World Bank, 2011). Note that international and domestic transportation charges as well as 
taxes (both import tariff and excise tax) will be added in order to arrive at the financial cost of 
fuel for electricity generation in Cape-Verde.  
 
Local government is planning a shift from HFO180 to HFO380 starting from 2015 (World Bank, 
2011). That is why we test the impacts of changes in HFO380 on the public utility and economy 
of Cape-Verde.  Note that there is no relationship between oil prices and the net present value of 
the IPP. Oil prices affect the cash flow statement of public utility, the country-economy of Cape 
Verde and the government. Although the foreign IPP may obtain capital more cheaply, we 
assume that the economic cost of capital for Cape Verde equals the cost of capital to the IPP, as 
reflected in the calculations below.  
 
We present results from economic impact analysis and distributional assessments for particular 
groups of concern namely the IPP, electric utility, country-economy and national government. 
We present empirical results based on the fixed power purchase price (PPA) of 120 $/MWh and 
world heavy fuel oil prices HFO 180 and HFO 380 for electricity generation of 70$/barrel and 
                                                          
74 Note that costs are paid in year 0 but all future benefits are discounted using the discount rate so results are 
sensitive to discount rates that vary from country to country and it is reflection of country specific and project 
specific variables including opportunity cost of capital, rate of inflation and risk and uncertainty associated in 
investments.  
75 The delivered price for per barrel at Santiago is equivalent US $112.50 /barrel due to the high transportation costs, 
taxes paid on fuel imports both to get the fuel to Cape Verde and transport it domestically to the generation plants. 
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60$/barrel as they are key parameters in such projects. We find that at a price of 120 $/MWh, the 
net present value of the gain to the foreign independent power supplier (IPP) is $6.6 million, net 
gain of the economy of Cape-Verde is $1.1 million, the net gain of the electric utility is $6.1 
million and the net loss of government tax revenues is $3.8 million. We then test the impacts of 
the lower-bound price of wind energy at 100 $/MWh and upper-bound price of wind energy at 
130 $/MWh while keeping HFO 180 and HFO 380 fuel prices constant at 70$/barrel and 
60$/barrel, respectively.  
 
Table 1.3 Financial and Economic Feasibility of Wind Power Investment with Different PPA 
Pricing of Wind Energy (NPV values in billion $ and evaluated at 10% discount rate)76 
 
 
We find that with lower prices for wind energy, the net gains of the foreign IPP decrease to $3.9 
million, net gains of the economy of Cape-Verde increase to $3.9 million, net gains of the electric 
utility increase to $7.5 million and the net loss of government tax revenues decreases to $3.6 
million77.  In comparison to the status quo, we find that with upper-bound price of wind energy, 
                                                          
76 See equations (24) and (25). 
77 Note that the ELECTRA’s return on capital is negative and ELECTRA’s operations are mostly financed with debt 
and these debts are financed by local government. Therefore, wind project can potentially decrease the heavy burden 
on government budgeting the ELECTRA’s deficits and these government funds saved from wind project can be 
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the net gains of the foreign IPP increase to $7.5 million, net gains of the economy of Cape-Verde 
decrease to -$1.8 million, net gains of the electric utility decrease to $2.1 million and the net loss 
of government tax revenues increases to -$3.9 million. The reason for such high gains for the 
foreign wind power supplier is because the price of wind energy is higher than the actual levelised 
cost of energy (break-even price) for this particular wind investment and the higher price of wind 
energy comes from the financing structure and riskiness of these projects.  
 
At the PPA price of $ 120 per MWh, we find that the private investor, public utility (consumers) 
and country-economy are expected to earn a substantial return from the project while the 
government of Cape Verde will lose with such an arrangement for the values considered in this 
table. In this case, Table 1.3 suggest that the break-even price of PPA prices that makes the 
public utility and country (Cape-Verde) indifferent between generation from the wind farm or by 
its generation plants would be approximately $123.7 per MWh and 137.8 per MWh, respectively 
– a price well above which makes the profits of private investor (IPP) equal to zero: $94.4 per 
MWh.  
 
The analysis using an integrated investment appraisal framework also allow us to determine the 
values of the key variables such as price of wind energy, fuel price, the expected capacity factor 
for the wind generation, discount factor that would make electricity generation by wind turbines 
financially and economically feasible. In our analysis, we also test the impact of the price of 
oil/barrel (holding everything else constant) to show its impacts on interest groups, but especially 
on the public utility and the island economy.  We test the impacts of various fuel costs (i.e. HFO 
380) for electricity generation on results while keeping the price of wind energy at 120 $/MWh78.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
used elsewhere in the form of public investments. (e.g. better health and educations services, road improvements, 
health intervention programs etc). 
78 We test for HFO 380 because most of the benefits will come from reduction in HFO 380 as HFO 380 will be 
imported starting from 2015; 5 years after the project actually implemented.  
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In comparison to the status quo (where the. price of HFO380 equals 60$/barrel). We find that at 
a fuel price of 50$/barrel, net gains to the economy of Cape-Verde decrease to -$2.5 million, net 
gains of the electric utility decrease to $1 million but the net gains of the foreign IPP do not 
change as both quantities and prices are guaranteed before the implementation of wind 
investment and contract prices are wholly independent of fuel-oil price changes. The utility and 
country-economy benefits increase with higher fuel prices. Therefore, fuel price risk is entirely 
borne by the economy and the utility and such wind investments can only be viable with an 
expectation of an increase in fuel prices.  
 
Table 1.4 Sensitivity Results from World Price of HFO 380/Barrel (NPV values in million $, 
evaluated at 10% discount rate and PPA Tariff at 120 $/MWh) 
 
 
We can clearly conclude that holding everything else constant, if the world price of crude oil is 
expected to increase over time, the public utility and the country-economy will gain from the 
project, and vice versa. Since the payments to IPP are independent of the oil price, the NPV of 
the foreign IPP remains unchanged with respect to the change in the price of oil. In this case, the 
 58 
 
break-even price of heavy fuel oil that makes the utility indifferent between generation from the 
wind farm or by its generation plants would be approximately $47/barrel – a fuel price below 
current level at $65/barrel79’80. With the energy costs as stated, the wind turbine electricity 
generation is economically viable at relatively high domestic fuel prices caused by either high 
crude oil prices and/or high transportation costs. Santiago Island has some of the highest 
transportation costs for fuels of any jurisdiction in the world. High fuel transportation costs cause 
domestic fuel prices to be high and increases the attractiveness of electricity generation by wind.  
 
Similar to other sensitivity analysis and holding all other variables constant, wind capacity factors 
which bring net present value below zero are unacceptable whilst wind capacity factors that 
produce net present value above zero are acceptable. With a given stated wind investment costs, 
price of wind energy and fuel prices, there is a positive relationship between the wind capacity 
factor of wind farm and the NPVs of the interest groups with the exception of government81. An 
increase in wind capacity factor increases the amount of wind energy produced and sold, so the 
amount payments to the IPP and the fuel savings from installed wind capacity are both increased. 
The tax losses of the government of Cape-Verde increases at the higher capacity factor which 
means the taxes paid by the IPP to government is less than taxes foregone from oil imports. 
 
                                                          
79Although oil prices dropped sharply in mid-2014 down to below 50 $/barrel. The recent crude oil forecasts 
released by the US Energy Information Administration (April 2015) and World Bank (April 2015) show that average 
annual oil prices will increase over time. For complete EIA report, see 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2015).pdf and for complete WB, see 
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/GEP/GEPcommodities/GEP2015b_commodity_Apr2015.
pdf 
80 For real time oil price data, see for example: http://www.oil-price.net/. These prices are world prices, so exclude 
transportation and taxes paid by utilities, however.  
81 Note that the capacity factor determines annual energy production from wind as presented in equation 1, so it 
affects the levelised cost of energy (LCOE) from wind investment. For instance, lower (higher) capacity factor 
increases (decreases) the LCOE relative to the reference at 40%. This is because lower capacity factor of wind means 
lower energy generated from wind turbine installations given that capital costs per MW of wind is independent from 
production of energy from wind. For more details, see Tegen et al., (2012), 2010 Cost of Wind Energy Review, 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory and Kost et al., (2013), Levelised Cost of Electricity: Renewable Energy 
Technologies Study, Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems, Germany.  
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Within the range of wind capacity factors considered in this analysis, net change in private sector 
earnings is very sensitive to the capacity factor compared to net change in earnings by the utility 
and economy of Cape-Verde. This is because wind energy payments accrued over time cannot 
compensate the high capital costs paid by private sector that occur immediately upon 
implementation of the project. Therefore, private sector supplier takes more risk of lower 
capacity factor of wind farm while utility takes more risks of lower heavy fuel oil prices in the 
implementation of wind farm project.  
 
Table 1.5 Sensitivity Results from Different Wind Capacity Factor (NPV values in million $, 
evaluated at 10% discount rate and PPA Tariff at 120 $/MWh) 
 
 
Discount rate used in the calculations is 10%, but there is no single rate of return that is 
appropriate for every project and country. The choice of discount rate can potentially make a 
significant difference to whether the net present value of a project is positive especially when 
costs/benefits accrue over long periods. A high (low) discount rate implies that a much greater 
(smaller) weight is put on current costs and benefits relative to those that occur in the future. 
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Hence, we finally test the effect of different discount rates on the project outcomes for the 
interest groups.  
Table 1.6 Sensitivity Results from Different Choice of Discount Rate (NPV values in million $, 
evaluated at 40% wind capacity factor and PPA Tariff at 120 $/MWh) 
 
 
As shown in Table 1.6, our estimates of private return on investment are fairly sensitive to the 
discount rate assumption. As we expect, higher discount rate reduces the present value of the 
benefits which are accrued over time, while having much smaller effect on the initial capital costs 
involved in the project. For instance, increasing the discount rate from 10 percent to 12 percent 
decreases private returns by the amount of 48%, equivalent to net reduction by the amount of 3.1 
million $ from the baseline result of 6.5 million $. Decreasing the discount rate from 10 percent 
to 8 percent increases the private returns by about 62 %, equivalent to net increase by the amount 
of 4 million $, however. At the 15% discount rate, the private costs outweigh the discounted 
private benefits so private sector will not generate any return from the invested capital on this 
wind investment. At this high rate of discount rate, the electric utility and economy of Cape-
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Verde will still save nearly a million $ over a 20-year period and 3.7 million $ over a 20-year 
period, respectively.  
1.7. Concluding Remarks and Policy Recommendations 
 
Today, the Government of Cape-Verde intends to pursue the objective of harnessing power 
from wind energy with the joint participation and collaboration of the private sector – so called 
public-private partnership (PPP). Assessing the cost reduction potential from renewables is not 
sufficient to conclude whether it is truly viable for the economy or not.  The objective of this 
paper is to introduce a mechanism to evaluate the private sector renewable power investments 
such as wind and solar using an integrated analysis. Based on this integrated mechanism, the wind 
project will provide a substantial return for the foreign IPP. For the utility and the country the 
net benefits of the projects are directly tied to the world price of petroleum fuels, capacity factor 
of wind farm and the price of wind energy (PPA price of wind energy) supplied by the private 
sector. Therefore, policy initiatives to expand the use of grid connected utility scale wind 
integration in Cape-Verde seem to be promising, especially if the expectation is that the fuel 
prices will increase over time82.   
 
The wind electricity tariff has to be a socially desirable tariff that is to say it has to be at the 
lowest possible cost of supplying wind energy. On the flip side, the price of wind energy must 
also yield a sufficiently high rate of return to the IPP so that these investments will still be 
attractive from the private sector point of view and bankable from the lender’s point of view. As 
of today, long-term contracts between the private sector entity and the government (on behalf of 
the electric utility) provide price certainty in renewable investments, allowing producers to 
increase debt leverage at lower interest rates. Based on the long-term contracts, wind energy is 
tied to its own levelised cost of energy and the electric utility obliged to buy wind electricity at a 
                                                          
82 See footnote 79 and 80.  
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fixed price for 20 years. If the price of wind energy would vary with dispatching on both system 
costs and output, short-term improved operating efficiencies and long-term improved 
investments in generation could be reflected in the price of wind energy. Therefore, an effective 
regulatory oversight in the operations of the market by means of new tariff mechanisms 
considering the levelised costs of avoided energy and/or future long-term electricity investment 
needs of the country can potentially increase county-economy welfare gains from cheap(er) wind 
integration alongside with improved operating efficiencies. This will require integrating power 
market operations into power purchase contracts and essentially risk re-allocations between IPP 
and the government.  
 
The major concern of private sector participation is tied to weak institutional and regulatory 
mechanisms (i.e. governance) in developing countries. Weak governance results in higher risks 
involved in any type of infrastructure investments and so increases the cost of both equity and 
debt financing of such projects – and hence the price of energy83. Unlike many developing 
countries, Cape-Verde has a relatively high governance index with respect to the quality of its 
institutions including the rule of law, control of corruption, property rights etc., so we can argue 
that such contractual arrangements must be highly credible from the perspectives of both the 
private sector and lenders.  
 
Note that the distribution or say allocation of utility savings from wind investments depends on 
Cape-Verde’s public policy (institutional environment). These savings can be passed on to 
existing consumers as a lower electricity price. Although it sounds economically viable option, it 
might not be the socially desirable option. These economic savings have alternative uses that 
potentially might yield higher economic return from the overall welfare point of view. In Cape-
Verde, 28.1% of all households are poor (25% of total urban population and 51% of total rural 
                                                          
83 Payments include both energy (MWh) and capacity (MW) if a private sector investment is thermal plant.   
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population)84 - but subsidies in electricity consumption in Cape-Verde reached only to the 
bottom 20% of all poor, so allocation of electricity subsidies is said to be regressive in Cape-
Verde (Angel-Urdinola and Wodon, 2008)85. Hence, if Cape-Verde passes these savings to 
existing consumers by means of lower energy prices, it will increase consumer surplus of existing 
connections while making this subsidy distribution even more regressive. Given that these islands 
are small in size, we expect it to have relatively higher potential for achieving rural electrification 
in a more cost effective way because rural residents live closer to existing networks in such small 
islands. The use of these economic savings to finance capital investments in new connections for 
the poor-urban population and/or to subsidize off-grid rural electrification might be 
economically and socially more desirable than passing these savings to existing connections. 
Careful impact analysis in terms of use and distribution of these savings will necessarily show us 
how much wind integration with private sector involvement might solve energy poverty in Cape-
Verde. 
1.8 Limitations of Research and Future Work  
 
In this research, we neglect the following important issues although they potentially can alter the 
net financial and economic benefits. We assume that wind integration is successful so all wind 
energy produced is supplied from the wind farms to national grid end-users. But, if all wind 
output could not feed into the system successfully, these wind quantities should be reflected as 
wind output net of transmission losses and constraints and deducted from wind power sales. 
Secondly, we ignore the additional investment costs in the transmission and distribution systems, 
but connecting wind farms into the grid indeed requires such investments. The quantification and 
                                                          
84 Authors define poor households based on 2000-2001 household survey as follows: household is poor if the 
household annual per capita consumption falls below the official poverty line in Cape-Verde (amount equivalent to 
Cape-Verdean Escudo CVE 43,249.8 per capita a year). 
85 See for example, Komives, K., Foster, Vivien, Halpren, J. and Wodon, Q (2005), “Water, Electricity and Poor: 
Who Benefits from Utilities Subsidies?”, World Bank Publications, The World Bank.  Wodon, Quentin, and 
collaborators. 2008. “Electricity Tariffs and the Poor: Case Studies for Sub-Saharan Africa.” AICD, World Bank, 
Washington, DC. 
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monetization of wind energy losses and additional investments should be considered in order to 
better estimate net gain and loss for interest groups. Thirdly, we exclude start-up and minimum 
loads costs in defining the supply curve that can potentially increase the cost of integrating wind 
power into the system (e.g. Zhang et al., 2015). Finally, we did not include avoided health benefits 
and net change in employment from wind farm project as they are not easily quantifiable and 
monetized especially in less developed countries.  
 
Based on the empirical findings and policy recommendations from this research, we believe the 
following research questions will help regulators to design and implement better energy policies 
for their economic and social development. The large volume of energy losses due to low 
infrastructure quality is a major concern in Santiago Island of Cape Verde. As of 2009, energy 
losses from electricity generation were 26.1% in ELECTRA’s power operations in Cape Verde 
(Garmendia and Benitez, 2010). This means that only 74% of generated electricity is actually 
distributed to existing customers – that is equivalent to 137 GWh out of 185 GWh total 
electricity generation in 2009. Economic costs of energy losses are enormous in Cape Verde. For 
example, losses in firms’ sales revenue from power outages are 8% in comparison to 0.8% in 
middle-income countries (Garmendia and Benitez, 2010). This means that there are considerable 
cost savings possible from improving the performance in the existing generation and 
transmission and distribution system. Therefore, every dollar spent on improving the existing 
infrastructure such as reducing energy losses from low quality infrastructure might yield higher 
economic and environmental benefits in the form of cost and emission savings than cost and 
emission reduction savings with a wind expansion project but poor grid infrastructure.  
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Appendices 
 
List of Symbols 
 
t   planning years (t,…,T)  
h   time demand blocks  in year  
  duration of time interval h (number of hours in each time interval)  
  index of all power plants  
)(ze   index of existing power plants  
)(ew   index of existing wind power plants 
)(zc  index of candidate power plants 
whtq    total MW wind power generated from each wind turbine  at hours h of time t  
whtCF    capacity factor of wind turbine at hours h of time t (%)
 
wtK   
wind turbine capacity MW at time t
  
whtq  MWh of wind energy from installed wind capacity at each load hours of time t
 
  MW demand for electric power gross of wind energy in time interval h  in year t  
  MW demand for electric power net of wind energy in time interval h  in year t  
zhtq   conventional electricity supplied by plant z  “without” wind at hours h of  time t  
zhtq        conventional electricity supplied by plant z  “with” wind at hours h of  time t  
jetqf    
fuel consumption of existing  power plants in year t (litre/MWh) 
jctqf    fuel consumption of candidate  power plants in year t (litre/MWh) 
jtFpf    price of j  type fuel in year t ($/litre) 
w
Fpr  cost of maintaining the reliable electricity supply in $ per MWh of wind energy  
etK   installed power of existing power plants in year t in MW 
  capacity additions in year t  from thermal units (MW)  
n   economic life time of candidate power plant (years)  
cI   capital cost of candidate power plant in year t  ($/MW)  
 fixed operating and maintenance costs of candidate power plant in year t ($/MW)  
 fixed operating and maintenance costs of candidate power plant in year t ($/MW)  
ea              availability factor of existing conventional plant at interval h of the year t (%) 
ca             availability factor of existing conventional plant at interval h of the year t (%) 
   present value (discounted) of total fixed costs 
TVCPV    present value (discounted) of total variable cost of energy supply 
   MWh to 2tCO  conversion for carbon credits 
ctp   carbon credits earned from fuel replacement in $/MWh 
c   rate of excise tax on carbon credits paid by the IPP  
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   rate of income tax paid by the IPP  
FEP foreign exchange premium paid on international currency transactions in % 
EOCK   economic opportunity cost of capital (discount rate)  
r   real discount rate (%) 
  interest rate (%) 
NPV  net present values 
 
Economic Parameters of Candidate Technologies86  
                                                          
86 Note that we assume that candidate off-peak plants consume 20% less than the existing thermal running with fuel 
oil plant whilst peaking plants consume 30% more than candidate off-peak thermal plant running with heavy fuel oil. 
Results are sensitive to these capital costs, fixed costs and fuel costs assumptions, however. 
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CHAPTER 2: ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICIES 
IN THE CYPRIOT ELECTRICITY MARKET 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Given that sustainable development is ‘development which meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.’ (WCED, 1987); reliable, affordable 
as well as environmentally friendly supplies of electricity are vital elements to sustain the 
country’s goal of well – being (Dincer, 2000, Kaygusuz and Kaygusuz, 2002; Kaygusuz, 2007; 
Guneri, 2008). Therefore, sustainability clearly characterizes the desired but delicate balance 
between sustaining the current and future economic growth while preserving the quality of 
environment. Reliance on a supply of electricity from exhaustible natural resources clearly 
threatens the well-being of current and future societies due to their limited availability, fluctuating 
world prices and their adverse effect on environment from pollutant emissions. Therefore, 
investments on renewable energy sources (RES) offer a solution to the triple problem of energy 
resource and carbon constraints while enhancing the security of energy supply. Renewable energy 
sources in the form of wind power, solar power, bioenergy, ocean energy, geothermal energy, 
hydro energy, are indigenously available in most parts of the world and generate electricity at 
relatively low variable cost with almost no emissions. Total energy supply of countries, however, 
will still come from depletable fuel sources such as fuel oil, coal, natural gas (Global Energy 
Statistical Yearbook, 2013)87.  
 
                                                          
87 For detailed fuel-type data, see http://yearbook.enerdata.net/ 
 68 
Renewable power sources tend to reduce external energy dependency of non-oil producing 
countries on the level of importation, helping diversity of energy supply mix in order to mitigate 
the risk of price and quantity associated with the fossil fuels, and potentially reduce the risk of 
climate change (Domac et al., 2005)88. These are the main motivations listed for a long-term 
political desire in both industrialized and developing economies to shift away from the 
conventional thermal supply and to seek ways of supplying electricity in alternative ways (Murray, 
2009; Gelabert et al., 2011)89. In addition, these factors have fostered ambitious targets and/or 
implementation of a wide range of policies to promote the use of renewable energy sources 
(IPCC 2011; Teckenburg et al., 2011; Mikucki and Sleszynski, 2008; Murray, 2009; Reiche and 
Bechberger, 2004)90. 
 
Electricity expansion planning is a long run problem that is closely related to both the scaling and 
timing problem of new investments in an electricity generation plant to meet the increase in 
demand for electric power at its lowest cost, whilst system reliability is maintained (Turvey, 1963; 
Davitian, 1978; Covarrbias, 1979; Bloom, 1982; IAEA, 1984; Kothari and Kroese, 2009). The 
need for investment in new power plant(s) occurs when the existing capacity cannot supply the 
growing demand for electric power during peak hours simply by increasing their operational 
hours or can only increase by putting risk on the reliability of the system.  
 
                                                          
88 International Energy Outlook (2010) projections on both supply of and demand for the energy which for the 
period of 2007 to 2035 reveals that accumulation of CO2 emissions will be continued as energy generation from dirty 
fuel sources such as heavy fuel oil and coal will be still dominant in the world power supply between the period of 
2007-2035. See full report available at <www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/pdf/0484(2010).pdf> 
89 Nuclear power is cheap and clean source of power generation, but the construction of nuclear power stations is 
unlikely to increase (Lior, 2010) and public opinion against nuclear stations increase further especially after the 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster inn Japan.  
90 Frondel et al., (2010) strictly argue that government incentives to renewables do not encourage competition among 
producers and blocks the innovation process so increases the dependency on the existing technologies. They further 
argue that spending on R&D to improve efficiency might be a cost-effective measure in early stages of renewable 
integration than that of heavy subsidy programs given to renewable sources.  On the contrary, Van Rooijen and 
Wees (2006) argue that uncertainty as well as discontinuity of national energy policies in Netherland is the main for 
small development in renewable energy sector.  
 69 
In the past, the basic objective was simply to minimize the total sum of discounted total costs 
(fixed and variable costs) of the electric supply over the long-term horizon while satisfying a set 
of constraints91. The dimension of the electricity generation and expansion constraints in the 
modern optimization models are multiple due to increasing emissions from conventional 
electricity generation and increase in the use of renewable sources in electricity generation (Jia et 
al., 2000; Afgan and Carvalho, 2001; Fichtner, 2010). The potential greenhouse gas mitigation 
measures are multiple and include carbon capture storage and sequestration, energy efficiency 
and conservation programs and fuel switching. Among these mitigation measures, fuel switching 
by means of increasing the share of renewable energy sources has come to dominate the 
electricity markets as investing in renewables is believed to be the most efficient and effective 
solutions to environmental problems. This in turn has resulted in enforcement of green 
regulations and financial incentives that govern the market access to renewable energy sources92.  
 
The electricity demand of Cyprus has been increasing rapidly, for example, the electricity 
consumption in Cyprus has doubled between 1990 and 2003 and the expectation is that 
electricity demand of Cyprus will triple in the coming 20-25 years (Zachariadis, 2010). The 
electricity generation in Cyprus relies almost on fuel oil inputs. Therefore, increase in demand for 
electricity will potentially (i) increase the fuel oil imports of the electric utility (Electricity 
Authority of Cyprus, EAC), (ii) make Cyprus more vulnerable to potential macroeconomic 
imbalances through increase in its energy trade deficit, and (iii) increase emissions from the 
power plants of the electric utility that the emissions per capita in Cyprus increased by almost 
                                                          
91 Step by step method for solving single - objective optimization problem is explained by Mazer (2007), in Chapter 
5: A simplified Look at Generation Capacity Addition”. In this paper, a robust formulation for the multi-objective 
problems will be developed for an improved solution with simplification in order to avoid complicated engineering 
and technical details. 
92 Although we will not discuss the pros and cons of renewable incentive programs in this research chapter, 
renewable power incentives such as FITs scheme is based on energy output of particular renewable energy source 
(MWh) but on the amount of  emissions reduction by the renewable energy source. This is quite different than 
carbon pricing paid by “dirty” power sources, for example carbon pricing is not biased toward any technology and 
kwh of carbon payments depend on carbon intensity of the fuel to generate kwh of energy.  
 70 
20% between 1990 and 2010 and (iv) will leave the island one of the most vulnerable in terms of 
security of energy supply due to the isolated characteristic of the Cypriot electricity network  
(European Commission, 2013; Pilavachi et al., 2009). Then, it becomes apparent how important it 
is to introduce renewable energy sources (RES) to the Cyprus energy system to reduce costly 
dependency on fossil fuel imports for electricity generation, diversify the energy mix for security 
of power supply reasons, and reduce emissions from electricity generation.  
 
The major aim of this chapter is to quantify the impacts of wind and solar power penetration on 
the electricity expansion and generation in Cyprus as well as to investigate the economic costs of 
renewable energy regulations on the electricity sector. To do this, we examine wind and solar 
renewable power sources on the basis that electricity generated from these sources is used 
alongside generation from conventional plants. We initially build a theoretical model where the 
objective is to minimize the weighted sum of economic cost and pollutant emissions from 
electricity generation with a mix of renewables given the set of constraints. We apply the model 
to assess the economic and environmental impacts of an integrating mix of wind and solar power 
on the Cypriot power supply. The model presented in this paper can be applied to any isolated 
power system and can help regulators to assess the economic costs of integrating renewables into 
grid.  
 
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 Theoretical Literature  
 
One of the widely applied standard methods in electricity generation planning is to compare the 
economic performance of the power plant technologies by the levelised cost of electricity (LCOE)93. It 
                                                          
93 See Lazard (2009) estimates the levelized cost of energy comparison for conventional and renewable plants. LCOE 
estimates, however, for even for the same technology vary country from country, output depends on intensity of 
renewable source (wind speed, solar radiation level), and costs depends on site specification, distance from plant to 
national grid, cost of financing, etc. Note that energy from renewables such as from wind and solar depend on wind 
and solar intensities, so there is no universal LCOE for renewables, at least for wind and solar.   
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is calculated by dividing the present value of total life cycle costs of a power plant (€) by the 
present value of electricity produced over the system life by the same power plant (MWh) 
(Campbell et al., 2009). Therefore, the LCOE tells us the cost of producing a MWh of electricity 
by the power plant if costs are equally distributed over power production in a year. The use of 
LCOE is inappropriate with a mix of renewables due to reasons including (a) the load serving 
capabilities (peaking load vs baseload) of power plants are different, (b) power generation from 
many renewable sources such as wind and solar is intermittent and non-dispatchable94, (c) 
estimates fail to capture the integration costs of renewables on the overall system that are not 
negligible, and (d) estimates are in favour of less capital intensive plants at high rate of return but 
wind and solar power are both highly capital intensive investments (Awerbuch, 2005; 
Marcantonini and Parsons, 2010)95. The LCOE estimates must include market value as well as 
monetised values of net environmental externalities and financing from renewables, so we need 
more sophisticated levelised cost estimates in order to capture the true benefits and costs of 
electricity generation from renewables (Borenstein, 2012). However, the LCOE estimates can be 
a useful tool to design the renewable support policy such as setting up the feed-in tariff for 
renewable electricity96. In addition, levelised cost can be regarded as a breakeven price for 
generators that leaves them with zero profit and can be used to compare the costs of different 
power technologies serving the same load (e.g. coal and combined cycle gas turbine for baseload, 
single cycle turbine and diesel generators for peak load demand).  
 
                                                          
94 Intermittency is defined as variability in power output or  uncontrolled changes in output.  For instance, wind and 
solar power is variable with a changing wind speed and sunlight. Dispatchability is defined as ability of a given power 
source to increase and/or decrease output quickly on demand. For instance, wind and solar power sources must be 
used at the time wind and sun rise as power produced now cannot be used for the next minute. The intermittency 
and non-dispatchable nature of renewables are not the same across renewables and vary greatly between them. 
95 Also see Joskow (2011) and Borenstein (2011).  
96 The feed-in tariff premium payment consists of the purchase price and an additional payment to cover the 
difference between the purchase price and the guaranteed tariff – paid by consumers. The application of this price 
regime is different across countries and across renewable energy sources. For instance, the feed-in tariff is linked to 
the oil price and set by the Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority (CERA).  
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Policy makers also apply a screening curve approach to determine economically optimum levels of 
capacity to meet the demand for electric power for a given year (Kelly and Weibung, 1993; 
Shaalan, 2003). With this method, electricity demand is represented by a cumulative distribution 
function of the load in a given year and the curve is called the load duration curve. With this 
method, cost curves of individual power plants are plotted against the load curve to determine 
the optimal generation mix to supply different load demand if power plants are dispatchable 
(Stoft, 2002). Therefore, the screening curve approach may not be suitable to determine optimal 
installed capacity with wind and solar power integration as they are both non-dispatchable 
generators97.  
 
When the screening curve approach is used with renewables, residual demand is derived by 
subtracting renewable power from the load demand, so wind and solar power sources are both 
treated as a negative load in optimization to investigate the impacts of the renewable integration 
on the power system. The screening curve approach simplifies the intermittency of electric power 
from renewable sources. Finally, wind and solar power are not decision variables in this approach 
as they are assumed to be “already committed” power plants. Despite all the above, the screening 
curve approach is a useful tool to analyse investment decisions both under traditional integrated 
utility and competitive markets (Green, 2005). We can adapt the screening curve approach in 
order to analyse the benefits and costs of renewable power integration as in (Kennedy, 2005; 
Lamont, 2008; George and Banerjee, 2011), impacts of renewables on electricity prices as well as 
on generating capacity as in (Green and Vasilakos, 2011).  
 
Optimization models (simulation models) are used to analyse the impact of renewable power on 
electricity generation and planning decisions. These models are helpful to solve complex 
mathematical functions described within multiple objective functions subject to a large number 
                                                          
97 Olsina et al. (2007) claim the same argument with different reasoning. 
 73 
of constraints. The use of optimization models depends highly on details of information the 
researcher would like to obtain from the analysis. In the past year, the principal problem of the 
electric utilities has been to minimize the generation costs (objective function) subject to different 
levels of system and regulatory constraints (constraint functions) where both functions are linked 
to the length of time being considered. Therefore, the system planners use different optimization 
tools to solve the problems occurring at different time horizons (Mazer, 2007). In the literature, 
the time horizon is divided into three phases for a traditional integrated utility: short term, 
medium term and long term in which they are interdependent of each other. The electric utilities 
are faced with different constraints in each time horizon; therefore there are different solution 
mechanisms for each of the problems. 
1. The short term or economic dispatch (ED) problem is related to the allocation of the 
existing generators to meet the real time electricity demand at the lowest cost possible 
(efficient resource allocation problem within seconds to hours).  
2. The medium term or unit commitment (UC) problem is related to scheduling of the 
existing generators to minimize the cost in time (efficient scheduling problem within days 
to a week).  
3. The long-term or capacity expansion (CAPEX) problem is related to capacity and to 
the number of power generators a system should own in the future to minimize the cost 
(over a number of years). 
 
In this research, we simultaneously incorporate (1) economic dispatch model (optimal dispatching) 
and (3) long-term capacity expansion problem (optimal stacking) to determine optimal quantities of 
energy (MWh) and capacity (MW) so that we minimize sum of total electricity generation costs and 
expansion costs in energy system98. Solutions to the problems are straightforward if we are dealing 
                                                          
98 We explained the model in great detail in section 2.4 of this chapter.   
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with a single objective function in electricity generation and expansion that is the minimization cost. 
We will not go deeper into the single optimization models, but Mazer (2007) and Anderson (1972) 
provide details for each. Solving the multi-objective problems are difficult tasks because of the 
complexity of each problem arising from the following: 
 
a. Conflicting Objectives: Power plants emitting less are relatively expensive (combined 
cycle with natural gas) than others, and vice versa (coal plants). Hence, emission 
reduction maximization and economic costs minimization are two conflicting objectives. 
 
b. Heterogeneous Power Sources: Unlike conventional power plants, most of these 
renewable power sources are both intermittent and non-dispatchable.  
 
c. Shift from Monopoly to Competition: Invalidation of “ceteris paribus” assumption due 
to: greater uncertainty in market and market prices; utilities must consider consumer 
response to price change; utilities must take into account the actions of other suppliers; 
and electric utilities must have a better understanding of their cost structure (Hobbs, 
1995). 
 
The model we will apply in this paper is a multi-objective optimization problem that combines 
both economic costs and environmental emissions from electricity generation. Given these 
objectives, potential societal losses from electricity generation can be minimized when the model 
is applied in a consistent manner (Mazer, 2009). The most relevant models in the literature 
include: Hobbs (1995); Lineras and Romero (2000); Antunes et al. (2004); Meza et al. (2009); 
Tekiner et al. (2010); Kourempele et al. (2010); Muis et al. (2010)99. Alternatively, social welfare 
                                                          
99 Each of these authors uses a different solution algorithm in their models. We will use solution method followed by 
Mavrotas (1999). For more details, see section four of this paper. At the same time, welfare maximization can be also 
used, and relevant literature include Bushnell (2010), Green and Vasilakos (2011b), De Jonghe (2011) and Hirth 
(2012).  
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maximization can be applied such as models depicted by Bushnell (2010), Green and Vasilakos 
(2011b), De Jonghe (2011) and Hirth (2012).  
Hobbs (1995) provides theoretical approach to solve multiple criteria of long term resource 
planning that involves economic (costs), environment and social criteria simultaneously. He 
clearly states the advantages of using multiple criteria from two perspectives: (a) clarifying the 
trade-off between conflicting objectives for value judgement and (b) quantifying the priorities for 
different stakeholders involved in resource planning. Hobbs (1995) considers sources of 
uncertainties in his model such as market (demand) uncertainties as being high frequency short 
term uncertainties, while resource uncertainties together with the legal and economic 
uncertainties are low frequency long – term uncertainties. In addition, the adjustments for the 
same problem for the competitive market are also clarified by Hobbs (1995). The theoretical 
model for renewables is not discussed in his paper.  
 
Linares and Romero (2000) integrate dispatching costs together with the environmental damages 
in a multi objective model setting. Not only pollutant emissions from electricity generation but 
also the productions of radioactive wastes are included in the environmental impacts. To get 
compromise solutions from the model, they estimate the weights to be assigned on each 
objective function100. They apply the model and this weighting method to the Spanish power to 
get Pareto-efficient solutions. In this model, authors did not acknowledge the economic impacts 
of renewables on electricity generation and planning. 
 
Antunes et al. (2004) defines the problem as mixed integer linear programming with three 
objective functions including the expansion cost, a measure of environmental impact from 
                                                          
100 These weights actually depend on the regulator’s choice and are assigned to each objective function. Because we 
do not now these weights, we use  - constraint approach that involves minimizing a primary objective (cost) and 
expressing the second objectives in the form of inequality constraints (emissions). This approach allow us to create 
pay-off table with only Pareto optimal solutions. Algorithm details of the model is explained in in Mavratos (2009), 
Effective implementation of the e-constraint method in Multi-Objective Mathematical Programming problems, 
Applied Mathematics and Computation, 213:455–465 
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expansion and the monetized environmental impact of the energy output. In their model, peak 
clipping (peak shaving) is modelled in the planning process as being a demand side option. They 
apply a scalar function in order to obtain non-dominated optimal solutions that are given as non-
negative weighted-sum of the multiple objective functions.  
 
Muis et al. (2007) develop an optimization model for electricity generation planning with 
renewables with a carbon dioxide (CO2) target and a regulator’s constraint such as a renewable 
target. In their model, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are written in the constraint function that 
implies the use of  - constraint as solution approach. In this model, the authors did not 
acknowledge the economic impacts of wind power on electricity generation and planning, but 
solar was under consideration.  
 
Meza et al. (2009) integrate many conflicting objectives in their model but reduce the problem 
into a single period. They provide a model with four objectives all being minimization problems: 
cost, environmental impact, imported fuel and fuel price risk subject to system and regulatory 
constraints. The key element of their model is that it is realistic and useful especially for large 
utilities with many interconnections and variety of demand nodes. However, none of the 
renewable sources of power supply is investigated in their theoretical model. 
 
Tekiner et al. (2010) integrate reliability, expansion and dispatching decision in a multi objective 
model using simulation technique. The objective is to minimize the total expansion cost and 
emissions over multiple periods. The main distinction from other studies is that they incorporate 
multiple sources of pollutants in their model such as carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrogen dioxide 
(NOx) and sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions. In order to solve the problem, they apply a 
scalarizing function approach. The only renewable source of electricity supply considered in their 
model is wind, but dispatching results are not studied explicitly in the paper.  
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Kourempele et al. (2010) develop a multi – objective electricity expansion model for an isolated 
power system (Milos Island of Greece) considering demand constraints, and power generation 
and capacity constraints. The objective function includes both cost minimization and maximum 
reduction in emissions from electricity generation. In their model, both wind and solar power 
sources are included with technical boundaries in the model. However, regulatory constraints are 
not modelled, although they are highly influential on the outcomes.  
 
In addition to the models described above, Nagl et al. (2012) develop a theoretical stochastic 
model in order to estimate the impacts of increasing renewable power sources on both 
investment and dispatch decisions for the future European single grid. The objective is to 
minimize total discounted economic costs subject to demand, reliability, generation and 
renewable electricity generation constraints. The stochastic nature of the model is modelled by 
assigning weights (scenario probability) to each of the scenario undertaken. The key contribution 
of their model is that they evaluate a mix of wind and solar power including feed-in structure.  
The uncertain nature of wind and solar is captured with scenario estimates and possible export 
and imports of electricity between countries are modelled.  
 
Bushnell (2010) develops an equilibrium model of electricity investment in order to assess 
impacts of intermittent sources of power supply on generation mix, peak vs. off-peak thermal 
plants investments and power prices where the market is operating under competitive 
environment with capacity market. Two key contributions of his model are that wind power is 
included in the system due to regulatory policy constraint and the short term impacts of demand 
response to price changes on the generating mix are included.  
 
Green and Vasilakos (2011b) develop a theoretical model aiming to capture the long-term 
equilibrium prices as well as generating capacity with and without wind integration for both 
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competitive (social welfare maximization approach) and oligopoly market structures (supply 
function equilibrium approach). The model maximizes the social welfare under system generating 
and regulatory constraints with the wind power. The key contribution of their model is that 
impacts of short-term demand response in electricity prices on power generation capacity 
selection can be compared for the two market structures in question and relative impacts of wind 
integration on electricity consumers and producers (renewable and non-renewables) can be 
estimated for comparison purposes101.  
2.2 Applied Literature on the Economics of Renewables  
 
Previous studies in the literature, dealing particularly with renewable power integration, include 
impacts on power supply mix, power supply reliability, power markets potential on power prices 
and its environmental impact. This section reviews the most relevant contributions. 
Potential economic benefits generated from renewable energy sources are estimated using capacity 
factor (energy savings in MWh) and capacity credit (capacity savings in MW), respectively. In 
addition to these economic benefits, most renewables contribute to the environmental quality as 
they are emission-free technologies (Lund, 2004; Delarue et al., 2009, Akella et al., 2009). The social 
value (sum of economic and environmental benefits) generated from a particular renewable energy 
source are in the form of energy savings, fixed cost savings,  capacity savings and emission savings 
net of grid-level system cost. The economic value of a renewable energy source heavily depend on 
the time when it is produced, its penetration in the system (Holttinen et al,. 2011; Touhy et al., 
2009), and characteristics of the supply mix such as fuel mix and system flexibility and correlation 
between renewable source and system load as well as forecast error (Lund and Munster, 2003; Hirst 
and Hild, 2004; Lund, 2005; Bode 2008; Denholm and Han, 2011, Lew et al., 2011).  
                                                          
101 For instance, Green and Vasilakos argue that the effect of a large amount of intermittent generation (wind power 
is to be a major source) in the UK power mix will increase the level of price volatility in the wholesale market and 
result in considerable variations in annual profits of the power generators. However, prices be will be more than 
doubled together with an increase in their volatility and revenues of the power generator will be greater together with 
greater in their variability if electricity market is a duopoly.  
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Furthermore, long-run potential economic and environmental savings depends on expected change 
in demand for energy (changes in the shape of  load curve over-time), future changes in fuel prices 
(relative changes between prices of  fuel, gas, and coal) that are reflected in slopes of  the thermal 
supply curves and ultimately affects the size of  merit-order effect of  renewable generation (Sensfuß 
et al., 2008; Sensfuß et al., 2007), and long-term impacts of  renewables on optimal thermal-
renewable mix  (De Miera et al., 2008). Therefore, the actual costs paid and benefits generated 
from RES investments are different across countries with different demand and supply 
characteristics (Ferguson-Martin and Hill, 2011; Doherty et al., 2005; Lund, 2005; Kennedy, 2005; 
Warsono et al., 2007; Holttinen, 2008).  
 
Capacity factor is the capability of the renewable plant to generate electric energy (in MWh) 
during a typical year.  Renewables are low marginal cost plants with zero fuel cost, so they are the 
first dispatched generators in the system (Kabouris and Vournas, 2004; Singh and Erlich, 2006). 
In turn, renewable power sources when they are integrated into the power supply displace energy 
from conventional thermal plants by lowering the load demand the thermal system has to supply. 
Hence, adding these renewable sources generate savings in the form of a reduction in the variable 
operating costs (mainly fuel) and emissions from conventional electricity generation. The well 
accepted conjecture is that integration of wind and solar power (intermittent and non-
dispatchable renewables) is economically feasible when the monetary value of savings in fixed 
and operating costs net of the overall system cost of integrating these renewable plants is 
positive.  
 
Capacity credit is the amount of conventional generation capacity (in MW) that is replaced by the 
renewable generation while system reliability is maintained. Renewable power may create capacity 
value to the power system if the renewable output profile matches with times of high system load 
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(Grover, 2007), otherwise a high share of renewables with no coincidence of peak demand  might 
increase optimal peak and mid-load capacity in the long-run (Lamont, 2008; Usaola et al. 2009; 
DeJonghe et al. 2011)102 . Studies estimating the capacity credit from renewables for evaluating the 
economic value of electricity generation from renewable sources show that the capacity credit 
from renewable source decreases as penetration increases (Mills and Wiser, 2012; Lamont, 2006; 
Giebel, 2005; Holttinen, 2004; ESB National Grid, 2004; Van Wijk et al., 1992). The possible 
solution for the electric utilities to earn greater capacity credit might be decentralizing wind farms 
across different nodes (Chowdhury, 1991; Dincer and Rosen, 2005)103. However, decentralizing 
cannot be an option for a small island as wind speed or sunlight profiles do not vary greatly 
across small islands plus the fact that land in these small islands is an extremely scarce commodity 
for renewable investments. The use of capacity credit as an indicator for the assessment of 
economic value from renewables is questioned as MW to MW replacement does not exist with 
renewables (Holttinen, 2008).  
 
Ecological, health and productivity costs attached to the emission pollution generated from 
conventional electricity generation is one of the reasons for increasing the share of renewables in 
the energy mix including electricity generation, predicating government support and stringent 
environmental regulations (Bilen et al., 2007; Boccard, 2010; Kaffine et al., 2011 Hinrichs-
Rahlwes, 2013). When these environmental externalities are included in the cost estimates, 
especially GHG emissions, the gap LCOE from renewables against thermal generators gets 
smaller (Varun et al., 2010), for example inclusion of damage costs increase competitiveness of 
renewables against coal generators (Owen, 2006). The conjecture is that electricity generation 
from renewables will help us deal with problem of rapidly increasing global greenhouse gases and 
reduce local air pollution from electricity generation (Tsoutsos et al., 2005; Lior, 2010; Friedman, 
                                                          
102 See screening curve analysis, Usolar et.al (2009, p.5) 
103 For countries where decentralization can be an option we should also  take into account the increase in the cost 
of transmission as well as transmission losses which reduces the economic benefits from renewables. 
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2011; Bergman and Hanley, 2012), so that they contribute to the sustainable development of 
human activities104. This is why conventional plants may pay a tax for the emissions they create 
and renewable plants receive a subsidy from their output partly due to strong public support105. 
The economics behind this intervention is to minimize the negative externalities associated with 
electricity production that allows electricity production from power plants to converge to its 
socially optimum level.  
 
Kim (2007), for example, argues that valuing the externalities generated from electricity 
generation and including them in energy prices allows policy makers to achieve economically 
efficient allocation of power generation resources.  However, non-market costs including visual 
and/or noise irritations for residents and visitors are also considered as being part of negative 
externalities (Bergmann et al., 2006; Moran and Sherrington, 2007). When these negative 
externalities are included, the value of renewable power is partly reduced (Mirasgedis et al., 2000; 
Toke et al., 2008). However, the inclusion of all environmental, health and non-market costs can 
provide true feedback from public opinion and can also be integrated into the decision – making 
process106.  
 
                                                          
104 The effects of environmental quality on property prices are studied in the hedonic property value studies and air 
quality literature, formalised by Rosen (1974). For example, Davis (2011) adjust for differences across locations in 
observable power plant emissions, demographic and housing characteristics across regions in the US and show that 
housing values and rents drop between 3%–7% if property is located within 2 miles of a power plant, and reduction 
is significantly higher if the distance between property and power plant gets closer. Thus the location of property and 
its proximity to source of pollutant emission is a key driver of real estate values suggested from survey of research by 
Boyle and Kiel (2001). Chay and Greenstone (2005) employ an instrumental variable approach to demonstrate the 
impacts of concentration of particulate matter (PM) on housing values across the US and they show that elasticity of 
housing values with respect to concentrations of particulates ranges between -0.20 to -0.35. Hence, we can conclude 
that air quality matters for individuals and they actually price it high.   
105 These subsidies are not same across countries and renewable energy sources. Although solar renewable source is 
more abundant than wind in Cyprus, solar PV subsidies are larger than wind subsidies. Subsidies to promote 
renewable energy production ($/kWh) depend on particular renewable source and mainly variables such as cost 
components including capital costs, operating and maintenance costs ($), and output that is a function of renewable 
source abundance (wind speed, solar radiation level).  
106 For instance, UK experienced Campaign to Protect Rural England (CPRE) against wind farm in rural areas of 
UK, organized by landscape protection organizations in the country, for more details see Toke et al., 2008.  
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Considering renewables purely as a fuel and carbon saver as in (Manwell et al., 2002), ‘it would be 
nothing more than ‘overestimating’ the benefits or ‘underestimating’ the costs associated with 
renewable power integration because of the ‘intermittent’ and ‘non dispatchable’ nature of 
renewable such as wind power’ (Olsina et al., 2007). Maintaining the power supply reliability 
requires the reserve requirement due to the unexpected change in demand for electricity or 
unexpected power outages (Allan, 1989; Doherty and O’Malley, 2003; Dena, 2005; Sinden, 2007). 
Studies dwelling only on power supply reliability with renewable power integration suggest that 
electric utilities must keep an additional operational reserve in order to maintain the power supply 
reliability due to the intermittent nature of renewables (Holttinen and Hirvoven, 2005; Doherty 
and O’Malley, 2005; DeCarolis and Keith, 2005; Karki and Billinton, 2006; Smith et al., 2009, 
Boqiang and Chuanwen, 2009; Mills and Wiser, 2010). In addition, the electricity grid must 
contain flexible thermal capacity so that system can cope and to ensure supply reliability with 
intermit renewable electricity (Lund and Munster, 2003; Lund, 2005; Henkel et al., 2008; Jacobsen 
and Zvingilaite, 2010; Steggals et al., 2011).  
 
The precise argument is that electric utilities incur additional costs with an increasing renewable 
penetration in the system (Auer et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2004; Strbac et al., 2007; Georkilakis, 
2008; Holttinen et al., 2009). Hence, the reliability cost ultimately increases the marginal cost per 
MWh of electricity production from renewables that reduce the benefits from integrating them 
and will be reflected in higher electricity prices (DeMeo et al., 2005; Millan and Porter, 2005; 
Strbac et al., 2007; MacCormack et al., 2008). The renewable plant may contribute significantly in 
the reliability of the system if it replaces the peaking plant (Kirby et al., 2003) because back-up 
costs tend to decrease with respect to capacity credit earning (Cavallo, 1995; Green and 
Vasilakos, 2011a). At the same time, we believe that a renewable power source with low marginal 
costs creates more competition in the power market so the variability of the renewable power 
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may not be a problem in the short term since existing less efficient plants become the reserve 
capacity.  
Empirical studies investigating the impact of renewables on electricity prices reveal that 
promoting renewables both enhances the competitiveness and lowers the electricity prices in the 
power market with the fossil supply curve sloping upward – due to the merit order effect of 
renewables (Amundsen and Mortensen, 2001; Jensen and Skytte, 2003; Bode, 2006; De Miera et 
al., 2008; Butler and Neuhoff, 2008; Weigt, 2008; and Fischer 2006; 2009). The argument is that 
low marginal cost renewables force high marginal cost plants out of the system so consumers 
enjoy the lower electricity prices they pay reflected as higher consumer surplus. It also allows 
countries to diversify their fuel mix so that vulnerability of their economies to the price volatility 
of fossil fuels is reduced (Awerbuch and Sauter, 2006). The ex-post studies show that impact of 
the renewable power on electricity prices depends on when the particular renewable source 
produces its electricity during the day (Sensfuß et al., 2007; 2008), the structure of the power 
market such as number of market participants and degree of market power (Green and Vasilakos, 
2010b) and also depends on the marginal increase in electricity production from renewable power 
sources (Gelabert et al., 2011; Twomey and Neuhoff, 2010). At the same time, penetration of 
renewables might decrease the price of electricity from a lower demand for fossil fuels and 
demand for carbon permits (Rathmann 2007).  Thus the integration of renewables is successful, 
one way of seeing renewable electricity is that it hedges against fuel price fluctuations as it may 
actually stabilize the electricity costs in the market. 
 
Renewable power producers often sell their electric power at minimum guaranteed feed-in-tariff 
rates, which facilitated renewable investments including wind and solar PV in the EU (Jenner et 
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al., 2013)107. This is because investors are not able to cover the high capital cost from market 
prices without a fixed premium they receive on their output, so incentives result in larger 
deployment of renewables (Fabree et al. 2005; Munksgaard and Morthorst 2008; Mulder 2008). 
Among renewable support schemes, the price – based instruments such as feed in tariff (FIT) 
policies are applied, on the whole, as they are believed to be economically efficient (EU 
Commission 2008; Butler and Neuhoff 2008; DeMiera et al. 2008; Del Rio 2010)108. The cost of 
renewable support is reflected in the retail power prices consumers actually pay, however. This 
issue increases the concern about the costs of integrating renewable sources and intense debate in 
the political and academic arena.  
 
The market value of renewable electricity generation net of the subsidy paid to renewable 
generators derives its benefits or costs to the consumers. To put it simply, power costs for 
consumers decrease with renewable support so that consumers do not bear the full burden of the 
financial cost of renewable energy mark-up as in Germany (Bode, 2006; Sensfuß et al., 2008); in 
France (Jensen and Skytte, 2003); in Spain (De Miera et al., 2008), but consumers’ bills increased 
from renewable subsidy programme in Scotland and in the UK (Bergman and Hanley, 2012). 
Although investments in renewables are still highly costly, they are experiencing substantial cost 
reductions over the last decade due to renewable technology push policies (Junginger et al., 2005, 
Stern, 2007). Therefore, the need for adjusting the renewable support instruments with respect to 
cost reductions due to the development of renewable technologies, as in the feed-in tariffs 
currently used by 19 EU member states, is well acknowledged (Del Rio and Bleda, 2012; 
Bergman and Hanley, 2012; Teckenburg et al., 2011). 
                                                          
107 See Frondel et al. (2008) and Frondel et al. (2010). The first paper discusses spending, particularly on solar PV, in 
Germany, and the second paper argues that renewable policies are not cost-effective for climate change protection 
and employment creation in the German case.  
108 The importance of harmonization of national renewable policies between the member states is also perceived by 
the EU (Munoz et al., 2007), but European Commission (2008) points out the fact that the current barriers 
renewable technologies face with and low competition in the European electricity market postpone the desire of long 
– term objective of the harmonization of the RES support programs across the EU member states. 
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The feedback effect that the reduction in power prices due to the renewable integration 
negatively affects the electricity generation from non-renewables and alter the future investments 
in non-renewables (Olsina et al., 2007; Obersteiner et al., 2008; Jacobsen and Zvingilait, 2010)  
Renewable penetration may also increase the volatility in hourly prices in the short term as power 
from renewables fluctuates during the day – but the impact of fluctuations in wind speed on 
power prices might be smaller than the impact of the fluctuations in fuel prices on power prices. 
Hence, this may or may not result in a greater uncertainty in the market and increase the costs of 
operations from conventional units. Not only price risk, but large amounts of intermittent and 
relatively unpredictable renewable power (at least wind) in the generation mix also increases the 
market risks for conventional generators as it increases the price volatility as well as creates 
greater uncertainty in the output they supply – that is residual load (Fabbri et al., 2005; Steggals et 
al., 2011). This in turn may discourage future investments in thermal generators that already face 
fuel price volatility in their operations (Traber and Kemfert, 2011; Steggals et al., 2011)109.  
 
In fact, thermal power suppliers will tend to invest more in low-capital cost peaking plants with 
short payback periods (Denholm and Han, 2011; Euroelectric, 2011; Jensen and Skytte, 2002). 
Since renewables reduce the capacity factor of thermal plants, average costs tend to rise for 
thermal generators. Hence, the profitability of thermal generators depends highly on prices they 
receive during the hours when there is no or very little renewable power. Renewable electricity 
with low variable costs (almost zero) and uncertain output reduces the load that thermal 
generators supply and affects wholesale power prices through thermal displacement. Thermal 
                                                          
109 Therefore, impacts of adding renewables on current as well as future thermal investments is also important to 
take into consideration for energy policies. MacCormack et al. (2010) evaluate the large–scale integration of wind 
penetration in a deregulated market and its impacts on market prices, overall reliability of supply and revenues and 
costs of dispatchable conventional suppliers. They also argue that eventually, the reliability issue will necessitate re–
structuring the optimum mix of power plants in the very long-run. 
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power suppliers pay for the renewable support scheme by receiving less for their supply so 
reducing their profits. 
 
The impact of carbon prices on wholesale prices is clear: it increases the cost of electricity 
depending on the generation mix with heterogeneous emissions. Thus, the additional cost of 
electricity from coal, oil and other forms of fossil fuel further make renewables economically 
viable and cost-competitive per kWh energy. RES sources reduce the demand that thermal plants 
have to supply, and so will reduce emission allowance prices from the reduction in demand for 
emission permits.  
Finally, from the available literature, we can conclude that the price impacts of renewables 
depend mainly on the level of renewable power penetration in the system, in other words, there 
should be a large enough amount of renewable generation to alter the market prices (Hart and 
Jacobson, 2012; Weigt, 2009). Secondly, wind and solar sources of power are intermittent power 
sources, so the impact of adding renewables on power prices, depends greatly on which hours the 
renewable power source becomes available and therefore precisely its impact on price setting 
power plants (Hirth, 2012; Morthorst and Awerbuch, 2009; which Sensfuß et al., 2008; Lamont, 
2006). Thirdly, integration of renewable sources influences electricity prices differently across 
power market structures, and depends precisely on how the market is structured (Green and 
Vasilakos, 2010; Delarue and D’haeseleer, 2005). Fourthly, future changes in fuel prices (relative 
changes between prices of fuel, gas, and coal) and  prices that are reflected in slopes of the 
thermal supply curves and ultimately affects the size of merit-order effect of renewable 
generation (Sensfuß et al., 2008; Sensfuß et al., 2007). Finally, impacts depend on the system 
specific demand profile and supply characteristics of the plant mix (Bode, 2008; Anderson, 2007; 
Bode, 2007). 
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2.3. Electricity System in Cyprus110  
2.3.1 Supply of electricity in Cyprus 
 
Cyprus has a small and isolated electric supply system with a total nominal installed power 
capacity of 1,448.5 MW as of December 2011, of which installed wind power capacity is 102 MW 
(Transmission System Operator of Cyprus, 2010). With the exception of wind farms, all power 
generation units are owned and operated by the Electricity Authority of Cyprus (hereafter EAC). 
The EAC acts as the monopoly provider of the grid based non-renewable electricity. Therefore, 
the electricity market currently has no competitive wholesale and balancing markets in its 
operations. Existing conventional generators in the Cypriot grid are running solely with heavy 
fuel oil and gas oil. The conventional electricity generation mix includes gas turbines, steam 
turbines and combined cycle gas/ oil plants as of January 2012. These power plants are to be: gas 
turbine (peaking plant – least fuel efficient), steam turbine (intermediate load plant – second least 
fuel efficient) and combine cycle gas turbine (baseload – fuel efficient). There are three power 
stations In Cyprus, namely Moni, Dhekelia, and Vasilikos (see Figure 2.1). Total installed capacity 
in Cyprus is 1218 MW (see Table 2.2). The economic and technical data for the existing power 
plants are presented in the tables in the Appendix A and Appendix B. 
 
In terms of air pollutant emissions from electric power generation in Cyprus; carbon dioxide 
(CO2), nitrogen dioxide (NOx) and sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions are considered such that the 
electricity sector represents 20%, 36%, and 62% of total NOx, CO2 and SO2 emissions in Cyprus 
as of 2002, respectively (Tsilingiridis et al., 2011). The reported coefficients are given as tonnes of 
CO2, NOx and SO2 emissions produced per MWh of conventional electricity generation from 
each power plant. Therefore, emissions savings from renewable generation vary substantially and 
depend on the fuel source displaced by wind and solar power.  Currently, the EAC has emission 
                                                          
110 Analysis for the island completely excludes the northern part of the island. 
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permits for all of its power stations, where the emission permit costs are reflected in electricity 
prices paid by the consumers.  In addition, the EAC is subject to the emission limitation 
commitment as ratified by the national government of Cyprus. As of 2011, the country’s 
electricity generation comes almost all from imported oil sources. For the purpose of 
comparison, the emission levels for Malta and Cyprus are provided in Table 2.1 below where 
both countries generate electricity from fuel oil sources and both have an isolated power system. 
Table 2.1 Environmental Indicators of Cyprus and Malta111 
Selected Environment Indicators Cyprus Malta 
Total Surface Area (km2)* 9,250 320 
Total Population (2007)* 1,063,095 406,724 
Total GDP (2007)*  21,841,815,680 7,513,834,699 
CO2 emissions (millions of tonnes)
+ 8.2 2.73 
% change (1990 to 2007)+ 76.2 25.3 
CO2 emissions per capita (tonnes)
+ 9.6 6.71 
CO2 emissions per km
2 (tonnes)+ 886.28 8639.24 
CO2  emissions per unit of GDP
 (kg/$1,000 of 2005 PPP $)- 410.2 274.3 
        Sources: * World Bank Indicators, Online Library, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
       + Environmental Indicators: Greenhouse Gas Emissions in 2007, UN, (July 2010)112 
       - The Little Data Book on Climate Change, World Bank (2011) 
 
 
Note that natural gas has recently been discovered in Cyprus; electricity generation from natural 
gas will assist in the diversification of electricity generation fuel along with renewable energy 
sources (Cyprus Energy Regulatory of Authority, CERA 2011). Natural gas supply is expected to 
arrive to Cyprus in 2015 and ambitious plans are being made to use it for electricity generation 
(Energy Efficiency Policies and Measures in Cyprus, Cyprus Institute of Energy, 2009). The 
combined cycle units currently running with diesel oil are expected to be converted to generate 
                                                          
111For the changes in emission intensity of public conventional thermal power electricity and heat production from 
1990 to 2008 across EU member states, see the public information made available by European Environment 
Agency, http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/emissions-co2-so2-nox-intensity-1/assessment-1 
112 See http://unstats.un.org/unsd/environment/air_co2_emissions.htm 
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electric power with natural gas. Based on this expectation, all candidate conventional systems in 
this study are assumed to be running with natural gas rather than fuel or gas oil. The financial and 
economic data for the candidate natural gas fired plants are from capital cost estimates for 
electricity generation, prepared by the US Energy Information Administration (2011). 
 
In this chapter, technologies for electricity generation such as nuclear, coal, and oil-fired plants 
are not considered as competitive options. This is due to national target of utilising renewables 
(wind and solar) and investing on conventional plants running with the natural gas in energy mix 
of the island (Cyprus Energy Regulatory Agency, CERA, 2013; Henderson, 2013; Rodoulis, 
2010). The main reasons for such rational decision is the discovery of less pollutant emiting 
natural gas resources in the east Mediterranean around the Cyprus and the decline in costs of 
renewable power supply options dramatically. These two will shift energy focus away from 
OPEC oil countries in Cyprus. As previously stated, electricity generation costs are already high 
and emissions from electricity generation is a concern of the government; and because of high 
CO2 emission intensity and other negative environmental impacts of burning heavy fuel oil and 
coal together with high costs of importing them make them financially and environmentally 
unattractive for Cyprus Island. In fact, these two reasons increases the attractiveness of mix of 
natural gas and renewables for electricity generation in addition to security of power supply 
benefit from this mix113.  
 
It is crucial to estimate the fuel consumption of a power plant carefully as this is the greatest 
share in benefits from renewables in the form of fuel and emission savings. Fuel efficiency of 
power plants is compared with respect to thermal efficiency and fuel consumption in the 
generation of electricity. In this chapter, the tonne/MWh of fuel consumption for existing power 
                                                          
113 Darbouche, H., El-Katiri, L. and Fattouh, B. (2012). ‘East Mediterranean Gas: What Kind of Game 
Changer?’, Working Paper NG 71, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, December 2012. 
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plants is estimated using historical fuel consumption and production data. For candidate natural 
gas fired plants, we estimate gas consumption assuming the following efficiency levels.  
 
Table 2.2 Fuel Consumption Estimates for Candidate Gas – Fired Plants  
 
Plant Type Overall Thermal 
Efficiency (%) 
 
Heat Rates 
(Kj/kWh) 
Fuel Quantity 
(m3/MWh) 
Baseload Combined Cycle  58% 6207 144.35 
Medium Load Gas Turbine 45% 8000 186.05 
Peak Load Gas Turbine 34% 10588 246.24 
            * Heating value of natural gas is assumed to be 43,000 Kj/m3  
 
2.3.2 Demand for electricity in Cyprus 
 
Electricity retail prices including taxes and network charges in Cyprus are currently very high, so 
much so that they are the 4th highest in the EU at an average rate of 0.229 euros per kilowatt-hour 
as of 2014 - so at this rate consumers pay about 10% more than average EU citizens pay for their 
electricity consumption (Eurostat, Energy Price Statistics, 2014). As of 2014, the basic price in 
Cyprus that excludes taxes and network charges (i.e. electricity generation cost) are still the 
highest in the EU, however. (Eurostat, Energy Price Statistics, 2014)114. Demand for electricity in 
Cyprus has been increasing steadily at about 6% per year from 2000 to 2010, however. Therefore, 
this increase in demand for electricity will bring additional fuel consumption and capacity 
additions to supply this increase in energy demand115.  
                                                          
114 See: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Electricity_and_natural_gas_price_statistics 
115 For more information: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/doc/factsheets/mix/mix_cy_en.pdf 
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Figure 2.1 Power Generating Stations, Substations, Transmission and Distribution Lines in Cyprus   
 
Source: Electricity Authority of Cyprus, 2013 Annual Report, 
www.eac.com.cy/EN/EAC/FinancialInformation/Documents/AHK%202013%20ENGLISH.pdf 
 
Dhekelia 
Moni 
Vasilikos 
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Table 2.3 Energy Mix of Cyprus by Station and Plant Type   
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Based on figure 2.2 below, demand for electricity follows both diurnal and seasonal changes in 
Cyprus. Consumers’ electricity demand tends to increase more during peak load demand 
(summer days) than that during off-peak load (winter days) as shown in figure 2.2. That is to say, 
the quantity of electricity demanded by Cypriot consumers is higher when the air temperature 
increases in the island. Within these hours, the system approaches its available capacity during 
summer months of the year while only half of the generation capacity operates during the winter 
months of the year. This is due to the Mediterranean climate with hot and dry summers and mild 
winters.  
 
There is a massive influx of people into the island for short-term visits. The increase in 
temporary population during summer months of the year is translated into additional demand for 
electricity. Demand for peak capacity is also growing steadily in Cyprus as shown in figure 2.3 
due to economic growth, temporary population growth, and air conditioner usage. The fixed 
pricing policy of the electric utility in Cyprus does not serve to mitigate these seasonal 
fluctuations in demand during the summer season. As with most electricity utilities in the world, 
the problem of capacity expansion and the under-utilization of the existing generation mix exist 
in Cyprus as well.  
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Figure 2.2 Typical Daily Load in Cyprus - Winter and Summer Days in 2000 and 2010 
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Source: Based on data available in web, supplied by Transmission System Operator, Republic of 
Cyprus/http://www.dsm.org.cy/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=1 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Annual Load Duration Curves of Cyprus Island in 2000 and 2010 
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Source: Based on data available in web, supplied by Transmission System Operator, Republic of 
Cyprus/http://www.dsm.org.cy/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=1 
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2.3.3 Renewable Energy Sources in Cyprus 
 
The factors pushing renewable energy higher up the agenda in Cyprus include the role of 
electricity in economic development, fuel costs and climate change. Indigenous primary energy 
sources for electricity generation on the island include wind, solar and biomass power (Rodoulis, 
2010). Koroneos et al., (2005) and Pilavachi et al., (2009) study potential impacts of these on the 
Cypriot power sector. Both studies claim that introducing the indigenous energy sources will 
reduce the country’s energy imports as well as contribute to the long term security of energy 
supply.  
 
Meanwhile, the government of Cyprus sets various national targets to increase the overall use of 
renewables in order to fulfil its 2020 target set by the European Union, but the country still 
suffers from institutional and technical barriers for the development of renewable energy sources 
(Kassinis, 2009)116. Aside from the technical problems in wind power, both land planning 
problems and opposition from local communities are the main obstacles for wind power 
development in Cyprus (Gogakis, 2007)117. However, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and 
Tourism (MCTI) of Cyprus argues strictly that wind power is “the most effective and 
economically efficient” source of renewable power to achieve national renewable targets in the 
country’s electricity production (Gogakis, 2007; Rodoulis, 2010). Also, Cyprus Energy Regulatory 
Authority has already approved wind farm projects with significant capacities as of 2011 (CERA, 
2011).  
 
At present the grid connected solar PV is not competitive for sites with high irradiance and solar 
energy contributes a very small share of total electricity generation in Cyprus118. Depending on 
                                                          
116It is a climate change package of the European Commission (2008), suggesting 20% cut in emissions, 20% 
improvement in energy efficiency and 20% increase in renewables by 2020.  
117 Information is obtained from  official portal of EU at: www.energy.eu/publications/a07.pdf 
118 The use of solar water heating system is widespread in Cyprus as 91% of dwellings have a solar system installed 
that makes SWHs biggest contributor to RES (Cyprus Energy Institute, 2012, p. 22). These small-scale SWH 
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future costs of conventional electricity generation, solar electricity generation might be 
competitive against conventional electricity generation. The technological development, discovery 
of new depletable energy sources such as natural gas around the island, and reduction of 
extraction costs of depleting the natural resource with high thermal efficiency (i.e. low economic 
costs and low emission levels) mean that it will take longer for solar PV to be competitive against 
conventional electricity generation. Because renewable energy sources currently enjoy subsidies, 
the user costs per unit of installed wind and/or PV capacity are lower than otherwise in Cyprus.  
 
Wind is available throughout the day but usually produces more electric power during times of 
the day when demand for electricity and prices of electricity are lower. Wind power is 
economically feasible in high wind areas (wind speed exceeds 5m/s at 10 meter height) where 
earnings from wind power are sufficient to cover high capital costs. There are few locations 
suitable for wind farms as the wind power potential is limited across Cyprus (Pashardesand and 
Christofides, 1995; Jacovides et al., 2002; Koroneos et al., 2003; Pilavachi et al., 2009). In this 
paper, we take into account wind resource profiles in the Paphos and Larnaca districts as future 
wind installations are assumed to be allocated in these districts of the country.  
 
Currently, there are two wind farms in Cyprus; Orites wind farm (part of Paphos district) with 
nominal capacity of 82 MW and Ketonis wind farm (part of Larnaca district) with nominal 
capacity of 20 MW. As of January 2012, both these wind farms are connected to the Cypriot grid, 
and are operational and serving the Cypriot’s electricity load. We utilized three-hourly wind speed 
data available for Paphos and Larnaca from January 2001 to December 2011. Available three–
hourly wind speed data for the Paphos and Larnaca districts are provided for a height level of 9 
meters and 2 meters, respectively. In this paper, wind power is estimated for wind speed at 90 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
investments are subsidised by the government in Cyprus - see: 
http://www.mcit.gov.cy/mcit/mcit.nsf/All/BC386C0E0EFB879CC2256FC600311F46/$file/sxedio_EN_V30f+_d
raft.pdf?OpenElement) 
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meters height above the ground. Therefore, the log-law rule is applied in order to predict the wind 
speed at 90 meters height above the ground (Gualtieri and Secci, 2011)119.  Countries with a high 
solar potential have advantages in solar power as does Cyprus having almost 300 sunny days in a 
year with a high solar irradiation level. Cyprus has solar energy abundance with an average global 
radiation level reaching about 5.4 kW/m2 (Petrakis et al., 1998). Unfortunately, solar electricity 
may not be in the generation mix in the near future because of low efficiency and high capital 
investment costs (Gogakis, 2007) that are a major deterrent to its penetration in an electricity 
market (Kahn, 1995; Beck and Martinot, 2004).  
 
Solar photovoltaic electricity generation is not yet cost-competitive in most parts of the world 
and its applications represent only a small share of electricity capacity and electricity generation.  
Solar energy will be economically viable when electricity production from it is at least equal to 
savings from costs from conventional power generation. However, the use of solar heating has 
reached 554 kWth per 1,000 inhabitants as of 2009 in Cyprus that showed the country as being 
the world leader in solar heating on a per capita basis (Renewables Global Status Report, 2011). 
Unlike wind power, solar power is produced only during daylight hours and reaches its maximum 
in the middle of the day. In Cyprus, the solar irradiation received by a solar collector does not 
vary greatly (Kassinis, 2008; Pilavachi, 2009), a specific region for a candidate solar power site is 
not mentioned in this paper and the data for this analysis is obtained for the Larnaca district of 
the island.  
 
 
                                                          
119 
 
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90 90ln
/ln
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zx
u
ux  , where z is roughly the length in meters. Roughness of length for village is less than the 
roughness of length in mountain areas. The roughness of length values for the two districts are tested with respect to 
the wind power curve from wind in order to arrive at meaningful load factors for wind power. In this paper, value of 
z is assumed to be 0.04 for Larnaca and 0.08 for Paphos. 
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Figure 2.4: Annual mean wind velocity in Cyprus  
 
Source: Kassinis, 2009 
 
Figure 2.5: Annual Solar Irradiation Level in Cyprus   
 
Source: Kassinis, 2009 
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As previously stated both wind and solar generators are intermittent and non-dispatchable, it is 
also useful to estimate the correlation coefficient between the renewable electricity supplied to the 
grid and electricity demand by consumers.120 Note that such statistical analysis is not sufficient to 
conclude whether or not the wind or solar integration yield the capacity generation adequacy. The 
generating capacity adequacy models must incorporate the reliability tests/standards and the 
uncertainties surrounding the evolution of supply and demand for capacity (Council of European 
Energy Regulators, 2014)121.  
       Table 2.4 Correlation Coefficient between Wind, Solar and System Load 
 
 Correlation Coefficient 
Wind Profile (Paphos) and System Load 0.02 
Wind Profile (Larnaca) and System Load 0.12 
Solar Profile and System Load 0.47 
         Source: own calculations. 
 
There is a very weak positive correlation between wind profile and load demand, so there is 
almost as much wind power during low demand hours as at the peaks. A very weak positive 
correlation between wind power and load demand has important economic implications such as 
(a) the capacity factor of wind power during the peak hours is not much greater than its annual 
average, (b) penetration of wind power in Cyprus will lower the operating load of the power 
plants running during off peak time - cheap to operate but expensive to build, (c) power system 
may need balancing reserves with wind integration that adds to the system back- up cost and (d) 
power plants running during low demand hours must be turned on and off quickly (flexible 
enough) so that they can cope with wind power variations while savings in costs can be 
maximized. 
                                                          
120 Pearson product moment correlation coefficient shows the relationship (both strength and direction) between 
load demand and renewable power profile.  
121 See for example, Billinton, R., and Bai, G. (2004), “Generating capacity adequacy associated with wind energy,” 
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 19(3): 641–646. 
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From an environmental point of view, wind power supply displaces off-peak conventional power 
so it avoids emissions from low polluting plants in Cyprus. On the contrary, the coefficient 
estimates for a solar source seems more promising in economic and environmental points’ of 
view for the island. Given that there exists an inverse relationship between capacity credit and 
power supply reliability; (a) solar with high capacity credit might contribute to the system 
reliability both in short-run and long-run and it might indirectly serve to achieve a degree of 
reserve capacity for the system, (b) penetration of solar power in Cyprus will reduce the operating 
load of the power plants running during peak time - when the marginal cost of supplying load is 
also high 122, (c) emission reductions from solar capacity will be significant because  its availability 
at high demand hours when dirtier peak conventional operate in the system, and (d) solar power 
can act as a reserve for wind power in Cyprus when both wind and solar operate in the system.  
 
2.4. Model  
 
In this section of the paper, a model of a cost minimizing utility that is operating under specific 
demand, supply, reliability and regulatory constraints is presented. The model is deterministic so 
it does not capture the impacts of stochastic nature of renewables on the dispatching and 
scheduling of power plants. And, the dynamic operational constraints in unit commitment (UC) 
model are not presented as it requires extensive data on power plants including ramping units, 
start-up/ shut down times, minimum load requirements of power plants etc. Using the model, 
the nature of the benefits and costs of electricity generating from wind and solar sources into 
Cypriot (isolated power system) electric utility with different demand and supply conditions will 
be evaluated. Decision on capacity expansion planning requires consideration for both capital and 
                                                          
122 In terms of clarification, off-peak plants with their lower marginal cost of production per MWh run continuously 
and when the demand for electricity increases during the peak hours, additional capital must be added to the off-
peak generation capacity in order to meet the increased demand. Because of the low utilization levels of the peak 
generation plants, which operate only during peak hours will have higher marginal cost (sum of the capital costs plus 
operating expenses) of production per MWh. Hence, for the electricity system to be economically efficient, these 
peaking plants must be technologically less capital – intensive. This usually implies that the marginal running cost 
(primarily fuel cost) per MWh is high. 
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generation cost estimates (Turvey, 1963), so we employ both economic dispatch (ED) and 
capacity expansion (CE) problems simultaneously as we described each in section 2.2.1 of this 
chapter. For the sake of simplicity, the proposed model (a) is reduced into a single node in a way 
that all demand and supply is concentrated in a single node, (b) ignores Kirchhoff’s law of 
transmission capacity, (c) neglects the transmission costs and how they differ with and without 
renewable power123, (d) ignores renewables that are not grid-connected and (e) assumes that the 
operating system is flexible enough at all times to cope with the wind and solar variability.  
The set of model constraints include demand and supply constraints, capacity limitations, system 
reliability constraints, renewable constraints, regulatory constraints and non-negativity 
constraints. Because of the high level of uncertainty associated in economic and technical 
parameters for power generation plants in the case of long-term decisions (Hobbs, 1995), these 
parameters are roughly approximated in this paper. These parameters play an important role in 
electricity generation and planning decisions because they measure the relative strength and 
weakness of a power plant against their counterparts (Meza, 2007).  In order to reflect uncertainty 
of the parameters on the model outcomes, scenario analysis might be also employed to test the 
sensitivity of key input parameters used in the model.  
 
Given the demand profile presented in figure 2.2 above, dispatching of power plants must follow 
the same pattern so that demand equals supply at all hours of the day and all seasons of the year. 
Different from thermal power supply, electricity generation from wind and solar sources differs 
                                                          
123 Based on many EU area wind integration conducted by Holttinen et al., (2009), wind energy transmission costs 
range from lowest 0$/kW to highest as $310/kW, in 2005 prices. Auer et al., (2004) also investigates the impacts of 
different level of wind penetration and wind speed conditions on both additional system operation cost (capacity 
cost for system security and system balancing cost) and requirement on transmission and distribution network – grid 
extension cost - in EU (15) member states. They suggest that transmission and distribution upgrade with 20% wind 
share lie between € 2.5 and €3 per MWh of wind power, system balancing cost will lie between € 1.5 and €2 per 
MWh of wind power and finally the capacity reserve cost will lie between € 3 and €4 per MWh of wind power. 
Hence, the total will range between €7 and €9 for each MWh of wind produced if the wind power provides 20% of 
the total electricity consumption. Junginger (2003) covers both internal and external grid connection costs, and he 
argues that grid connection costs as a share of the total investment cost for off-shore wind farms are greater than for 
on-shore wind farms; internal and external grid connection cost range between 15% - 30% for off-shore wind farms, 
and 10%-15% for on-shore wind farms.   
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in different hours of the day due to daily weather changes (e.g. more wind during mid-nights and 
more sun during day time hours) as well differs across seasons (more wind during winter, more 
sun during summer months), as in Cyprus (Koroneos et al., 2005). Since electricity generation 
from renewable sources also follows both diurnal and seasonal patterns, it is more realistic to 
analyse the impacts of wind and solar power by considering the changes in the load factor of a 
conventional power plant running at each time demand interval h (different for peak and off-peak 
hours) of year ‘t’.  
 
In this chapter, demand for electricity is an exogenous variable; but the potential impacts of 
integrating short-term demand responses into long-term electricity expansion planning are 
considered in chapter 3. To properly illustrate wind and solar power availability the load in each 
hour time interval ‘h’ of the year should be considered. For this purpose, the two tables presented 
in appendices C and D summarize the number of hours when the load factors of wind and solar 
power coincide with the load demand (normalised relative to the average demand in the given 
year). Therefore, the optimization model is applied with a constraint of meeting the load demand 
at every sub-hour of the demand block. To do this, demand is divided into five load blocks 
including peak, high, intermediate, low, and baseload. Later on, each of these load demand blocks 
is sub-divided into five slices in order to combine the different load factor of renewable power 
sources and the load demand. Note that although there are numerous uncertainties in the 
operations as well as planning of power system such as wind speed and demand load which need 
to be identified and taken care of are not accounted in this research. 
 
Total Economic Cost (in Euros - €):  The total economic cost of expansion is composed of the sum 
of total fixed costs (investment and fixed operating and maintenance costs), total variable costs 
(variable operating and maintenance costs, variable fuel operating costs) and the variable cost of 
polluting from conventional electricity. The variable costs affect the power generation mix and 
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fixed and variable costs together affect the power expansion mix. Therefore, total economic costs 
include both optimal stacking and optimal dispatching decisions within the model. In this section, 
a cost minimization model is applied that is equivalent to social welfare maximization with 
inelastic demand.  
 
 
      (1) 
where:   is present value (discounted) value of total fixed costs, t  is planning years (t,…,T) , 
i interest rate (%), r is discount rate , n is economic life time of proposed candidate power plant 
(years), c is index of candidate power plants, cI is capital cost of candidate power plant (€/MW), 
e is index of exisiting power plants, and  are candidate capacity of candidate plants and 
existing plants, and cF and eF  fixed operating and maintenance costs of candidate and existing 
power plant (€/MW), respectively.   
 
Marginal running cost of a power generator composed of variable generation (fuel) cost and 
variable operating cost. These costs are known as economic dispatching costs from electricity 
generation. Variable operating costs and emissions from conventional power generator are 
functions of MWh electric power being produced. Moreover, the generation plants are 
heterogeneous so the operating costs and emissions from individual power plants for each MWh 
of electricity are not the same because of differences in their amount and type of fuel 
consumption.  
 
In this chapter, it is assumed that as thermal plant ages; the amount of fuel it requires to produce 
a MWh of electricity will increase gradually. This factor, assumed to be 1%, is the same for all 
installed power plants. It is also argued that overall efficiency of the system increases once new 
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plants become online (NPC Global Oil & Gas Study, 2007)124. Therefore, we implicitly assume 
that efficiency reduction due to physical depreciation dominates the efficiency gain due to new 
installations. The annual 1% increase in oil requirement for an additional kWh electricity 
generation of the existing and new power plants due to inefficiency starts immediately after the 
first year of the operation and included in the marginal cost parameter. Similarly, the variable 
O&M cost incurred by the plant is also subject to a 1% increase. 
 
Together with the fuel and non-fuel operating costs, the variable costs of pollution created by the 
power plants are included in the total variable costs as it also affects the dispatching decisions for 
the power plants in the system (Green and Vasilakos, 2011; Saleiro et al., 2007). What is more, 
these costs increase the relative attractiveness of the renewable power sources. These costs are 
financial costs and included in cost functions of power plants. The emission levels in quantitative 
units are also included as the total environmental degradation objective is measured in 
quantitative terms and required to assess the total environmental impacts from electricity 
generation. While deciding the minimum number of hours a plant which is relatively capital 
intensive with relatively lower marginal fuel cost, the utility runs the plant in question until when 
savings from lower fuel consuming plant offset higher capital cost of that plant. This is ‘turning 
point’ for the first generators on the load curve, starting from this turning point, utility runs the 
second relatively capital intensive with second lower fuel consuming plant, and so on. The 
variable cost of polluting power plants may increase in a country where emissions are priced in 
the power market - so comparison between fuel price and capital cost cannot be sufficient to 
determine right operational hours of plants. Although the carbon price fluctuates and has 
significantly  fallen since the second half of 2008, we use a the new projection for the carbon 
                                                          
124 Full working paper available at: http://www.npc.org/study_topic_papers/4-dtg-electricefficiency.pdf 
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price in 2020 of around €22/ 2tCO  – it is low in comparison to past projections as a result of 
recession (Commission of Climate Change, 2009, p.68).  
 
 
 
 

































T
t
H
h
C
c
hhtctctctjtc
H
h
E
e
hhtetetetjte
t
TVC
lqFpcCOVOMFpff
lqFpcCOVOMFpff
rPVO
,,,,
,,,,
12 1     (2) 
 
where: t  is planning years (t,…,T) , i interest rate (%), r is discount rate, h  is time demand 
blocks  in year , hl duration of time interval h (number of hours in each time interval), e  is set of 
existing power plants,  c  is set of candidate power plants,  tcf ,   
and tef ,  is fuel consumption of 
candidate and existing  power plants in year t (litre/kWh), respectively,  is price of j  type 
fuel in year t (€/litre or €/103m3N), teVOM , and tcVOM , variable operating and maintenance 
costs of all power plant in year t  (€/MWh), eCO and cCO is emission factor of all existing and 
candidate power plants (tonne/MWh), tFpc is 2CO price year t (€/tonne CO2), hteq ,  and htcq ,  
is 
electricity produced from each existing and candidate plant in interval h of year t (MW), 
respectively.   
 
 
It is possible to combine all the discounted fixed  11O  variable fuel and operating and 
environmental damage costs  12O  and express it in a single function as follows: 
 
12111 OOO                                       (3)  
 
We know that the generation displaced by and used to accommodate renewable output is not a 
proportional mix of the generation types in the system. Therefore, heterogeneity in emissions by 
fuel source in the system will have important implications for emissions savings from wind 
and/or solar integration. In order to estimate the emissions displaced by a new wind and/or solar 
PV installation, we need to identify the emission intensity of the marginal units displaced rather 
than system average emission rates. Total air pollutant emissions are defined as the sum of CO2, 
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emissions from conventional electricity generation. In this paper, emissions from power plants 
are assumed to be perfectly-mixing125 and emission savings from wind and solar power are 
computed by replacing an average unit of conventional electricity generation and using average 
emission rates for each. Note that we did not integrate the abatement technology in our 
economic and environment modelling.  
 
CO2 emissions:     
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hhtee lqCOlqCOO ,,21                            (4) 
 
where: t  is planning years (t,…,T), h is demand blocks in year t, hl duration (hours) of each 
demand block h , t is time, e  is set of existing power plants,  c  is set of candidate power plants, 
eCO and cCO are carbon emission factor of existing and candidate power plants (tonne/MWh), 
tFpc  is 2CO price year t (€/tonne CO2), hteq ,  is capacity supply from each existing plant in 
interval intervalh of year t (MW) and htcq ,  is the capacity supply from each candidate plant in 
interval h of year t (MW). 
 
Model Constraints 
 
Supply has to meet demand: Large amounts of electric power cannot be stored economically. 
Therefore, current and planned electricity generation has to meet demand for electricity at all 
times. The model presented in this paper also uses residual load with mix of renewables but 
without introducing the forced wind and solar capacity addition. Both wind and solar capacities 
are continuous decision variables in the model. Due to their reliance on weather, output from 
many of these renewable power sources is both intermittent and non-dispatchable. Integrating 
renewables into the power supply mix alters both the short-run optimum mix of power plants 
and long-term supply mix, but not in the same manner as adding a new conventional power plant 
                                                          
125 Also see Callaway and Fowlie (2009) and Novan (2011). 
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as those plants are dispatchable (Lamont, 2008). With wind and/or solar power, these long term 
impacts depend strictly on load profile and the renewable load factors occurring at that particular 
point of the load profile (Lamont, 2008). In this paper, load factors for wind and solar power 
sources are taken into account in order to capture the intermittent nature of renewable power 
supply. In addition, scenario analysis without wind and solar power will allow us to quantify the 
backup capacity required by the system which allows us to capture the non-dispatchable nature of 
a renewable power supply (Morris et al., 2010)126.  
 
ht                (5)  
where: h is time demand blocks in year t, j is sub-hour in each demand block, nre  is set of non-
renewable generators in year t, htnreq , is the MW capacity supplied from them in each demand 
block h in year t , nrc  is set of non-renewable candidate technologies that are installed in year t 
and htnreq , is the MW capacity supplied from them in each demand block h in year t, 
m
jhtweLF ,  is 
load factor of existing wind power in region m  at j  sub hour of in each demand block h of the 
year t , 
m
jhtwcLF , is load factor of candidate wind power in region m  at j  sub hour of time in each 
demand block h of the year t ,  jhtscLF , is load factor of candidate solar power at j  sub hour of 
each demand block h of the year t (%),  and  is the existing and candidate MW wind 
capacity in region m in year t, respectively.
 
 is the MW candidate wind solar capacity that are 
                                                          
126 In order to assess the economic value of electric power produced from renewables; we will compare “with” and 
“without” wind and solar power mix scenario. By this way, we are able to determine dispatchable back-up 
conventional generating capacity to renewable power assuming that required back-up capacity is MW to MW of mix 
of renewables (Morris et al., 2010 pg. 6). According to MW - MW back up capacity equalization, interconnection 
within wind turbines (as well as solar panels) is ignored, so required back up capacity is overstated with respect to 
increase in shares of renewables.  
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added into the system in year t (MW), and htD  is MW gross demand for capacity in time interval 
h in year t.  
 
System reliability: Operating reserves ( ) is required for maintaining the system reliability that is 
represented as fraction of peak demand. These reserves should be in the system as standby due to 
sudden fluctuations in demand for and/or supply of electricity. 
 
     tpht
NRC
nrc
htnrchtnrc
NRE
nre
htnrehtnre Dqsqqsq   1,,,,   ht               (6) 
 
where: nre  is set of non-renewable generators in year t, htnreq , is the capacity supplied from them 
in each demand block h in year t, nreqs  
is  reserves from existing conventional power plants in 
year t (MW), nrc  is set of non-renewable candidate technologies that are installed in year t, 
htnrcq , is the capacity supplied from candidate conventional plants at demand block h in  year t 
(MW), htnrcqs .  is the capacity supplied from them in each demand block h in  year t (MW), 
p
htD is 
peak demand for capacity in time interval h in year t, t  is reserve margin required by system 
planning at peak load in year t  (%) 
 
Electricity generated by conventional units: Amount of electric power generation from conventional 
power plants is limited by the availability factor ( a ) of each power plant.  
 
tnrehtnrehtnrehtnre Kaqsq ,,,,       ht                (7) 
 
 
tnrchtnrchtnrchtnrc Kaqsq ,,,,       ht                (8)  
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where: nre  is set of existing non-renewable generators and htnreq , is the capacity supplied from 
them in each demand block h in year t, htnrea ,  is availability factor of existing conventional 
power plants at time interval h of the year t (%) that is assumed to be the same throughout the 
year, tnreK ,  is installed exisiting conventional capacity of plants at time interval h of the year t (%) 
that is assumed to be the same throughout the year, nrc  is set of non-renewable candidate 
technologies that are installed in year t and htnreq , is the capacity supplied from installed candidate 
plants in each demand block l in  year t,
 htnrc
a ,  is availability factor of existing conventional 
power plants at time interval h of the year t (%) that is assumed to be the same throughout the 
year and tnreK , is installed conventional capacity from candidate plants at time interval h of the 
year t (%). 
 
Electricity generated from renewable power units: Unlike any conventional power plant, the amount of 
electric power that can be produced from renewable sources is determined by the load factor. In 
most cases, a renewable source of power supply has legal protection (grid access priority) to 
ensure it can sell its output.  
 
 
                       htwe,                 (9) 
 
 
   htwc,                          (10) 
 
 
                         htsc,                   (11) 
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where:
 
m
htweq ,  and
m
htwcq ,  is the existing and candidate installed wind power in region m  in interval 
h of the year t (%), respectively, 
m
jhtweLF ,  is load factor of existing wind power in region m  at j  
sub hour of in interval h of the year t (%), 
m
jhtwcLF , is load factor of candidate wind power in 
region m  at j  sub  hour of time in interval h of the year t (%), htscq , is the candidate solar power 
in interval h of the year t , jhtscLF , is load factor of candidate solar power at j  sub hour of time 
in interval h of the year t (%),  and  is the existing and candidate wind capacity in region 
m in year t, respectively.
 
 is the candidate wind solar capacity in year t (MW).  
A final note on the load data is that by imposing the equality constraint in the model for wind 
and solar power, the residual demand is implicitly derived within the model. When both wind and 
solar power is integrated into the electric utility’s grid, the change in the load demand or the 
residual demand is estimated by the following equation: 
ht
  (12) 
where: *htD  
is the residual amount of power that must be supplied from the non-renewables at 
each demand block,
 
g
htD  is demand gross of  wind capacity at block ‘h’ in MW.   
m
jhtweLF ,  is load 
factor of existing wind power in region m  at j  sub hour of in interval h of the year t (%), 
m
jhtwcLF , is load factor of candidate wind power in region m  at j  sub hour of time in interval 
h of the year t (%), jhtscLF , is load factor of candidate solar power in region at j  sub hour of 
time in interval h of the year t (%),  and  is the existing and candidate wind capacity in 
region m in year t, respectively.
 
 is the candidate wind solar capacity that are added into the 
system in year t (MW).  
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For various amounts of wind and solar power capacities (scenarios), the changes in the load 
factors at different demand blocks can be computed.  
 
Renewable power targets in electricity generation: The amount of electricity generation from mix of 
renewable sources represented as a proportion of total demand for electricity is set as the national 
target.  Being a full member of the European Union, the use of renewable sources will increase in 
the country’s electricity generation programme in order to comply with environmental measures 
set by the EU. The national renewable targets ( ) vary across EU member state that reflects the 
different availability of renewable resources in each member state.  
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 ,,,
     
1t                (13)  
where:
 
m
htweq ,  and
m
htwcq ,  is the existing and candidate installed wind power in region m  in interval 
h of the year t , respectively, htscq , is the candidate solar power in interval h of the year t , t is 
share of renewables in total demand for electricity in year t  (%) and 
ht
D is demand for electric 
power in time interval h  in year t (MW) 
 
Total capacity in the existing system: Some capacity in the system is expected to be decommissioned in 
Cyprus (Poullikkas and Kellas, 2004). As a consequence, the available capacity from existing 
power plants at time “t” is obtained by subtracting the power plants that are planned to be 
decommissioned in the same year.   
 
tdteet KKK ,1,           t                (14) 
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where: etK and 1, teK  installed power of existing power plants in year t (MW) and t-1, 
respectively, and dtK  is decommissioned capacity from existing power plant in year t (MW). 
 
Installed capacity of candidate units: This is necessary in order to avoid unrealistic solutions, and so 
new capacity addition must be obtained from a pre-assigned set of candidate capacities (Mazer, 
2007, p.143). This does not apply for wind or solar power because a small scale wind and/or 
solar capacity addition is realistic and possible. For wind and solar power, the future maximum 
amounts of wind and solar power that can be installed into the system are defined within the 
constraints of the proposed model.  
 
  nrcnrctnrc MWnumK ,       tnrc,                               (15)  
 
wtwc MWK ,         twc,                            (16)  
 
stsc MWK ,         tsc,                     (17)  
 
where:
 nrct
K thermal capacity additions in year t  (MW),
 nrc
num is number of different capacities 
assigned to candidate conventional plants,
 nrc
MW is pre-assigned capacities for candidate thermal 
power plants (MW), twcK , and tscK , wind and solar capacity additions in year t (MW),  
respectively and wMW  and sMW  is pre-assigned total wind power and solar power potential  
(MW).  
 
Non – negativity constraints  
0
,

hte
q        hte,                            (18)  
0
,

htc
q        htc,                             (19)  
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0, tcK        tc ,                             (20) 
 
where htcq ,  is conventional electricity produced from each candidate plant in interval h of year t  
(MW) and hteq , is electricity produced from each existing plant in interval h of year t (MW) and  
tcK , is capacity of candidate conventional and renewable (wind and/or solar) power plant (MW).  
 
A final consideration is the selection of an algorithm to solve the multi-objective problem. It is 
possible to reduce these two opposing objective functions into a composite (or single) objective 
function by a weighting approach or  -constraint approach (Zitzler et al., 1993). In the weighting 
method, a weighted sum of objective functions are optimized by assigning weight to each 
function while in the -constraint method; one objective function is optimized while other 
objective function (s) is included in the constraint sets. Using the  -constraint method, the trade-
off between the objectives can be easily computed as well as Pareto optimal – non-dominated 
solutions for the model can be obtained (Mavrotas, 2006). Note that a weighting approach can be 
used only when the decision maker has prior knowledge on each of the criteria. If it is not 
known, the  -constraint method would be appropriate as different allowable emission limits can be 
set to determine the least-cost solutions as well as possible trade-off between each optimization 
problem already defined above.  Since the weights are unknown in our analysis, the use of the ε-
constraint method would be appropriate.  
 
2.5. Empirical Results 
 
The cost minimization model presented here is the combined economic dispatch and capacity 
expansion problem of optimization with a mix of wind and solar power applications. The model 
is applied empirically for the Cypriot electricity grid from 2011 to 2020 and analyses are carried 
out at the price of fuel oil of 200 Euros/tonne (for existing plants), the price of natural gas of 250 
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Euros/m3N (for candidate plants) and the total level of allowable emissions of 30,000 thousands 
of tons during the planning period (Department of Environment Ministry of Agriculture, Natural 
Resources and Environment, Cyprus, May 2011)127. The discount rate chosen in the empirical 
estimates for Cyprus is 10%. We also present sensitivity analysis relating to the choice of discount 
rate at varying rates128.  
 
If an electric utility wants to keep operations at the lowest cost with the given demand for electric 
power, the optimal investments of the power generation units is more in favour of peak thermal 
and wind power. As expected, there will be no installations of new solar power in the near future 
due to the high capital costs associated with solar power investments. In order to achieve the 
minimum cost over the planning period in Cyprus, the optimal timing and size of expansion 
investments will be as follows: 
Table 2.5 Cumulative Optimal Time and Size for an Expansion by Plant Type (MW) 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Baseload  - - 74 129 300 300 300 
Intermediate - - - - - 13 300 
Peak - - - - - 46 46 
Wind  - 5 11 40 47 54 200 
Solar  - - - - - - - 
                    Source: own estimates. 
           
The net benefits of wind and/or solar power will be fuel savings from reduced use of thermal 
plants less the added costs of operating the thermal system to supply the remaining power 
                                                          
127See:http://www.moa.gov.cy/moa/environment/environment.nsf/724D802BD314A271C22579410036A4A3/$fil
e/PROJ%202011.pdf Maroulis, (2014), “Assessment of climate change policies in the context of the European 
Semester Country Report: Cyprus”, Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/g-
gas/progress/docs/cy_2014_en.pdf and Climate Action of the EU at 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/auctioning/derogation_faq_en.htm 
128 The social discount rate employed in the appraising public projects suggest that the rate of discount is equal to the 
rate of pure utility discount (typically 1-3%) plus [the elasticity of marginal utility (typically 1-2) multiplied by the long 
run average consumption growth rate that could be anything for Cyprus especially given the recent gyrations. 
Therefore, we used 10% discount rate in our analysis.  
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required that is not met by the renewable source. Based on the numerical results indicated above, 
there will be added costs in the form of increased average fuel costs per unit of thermal 
generation  because the optimal mix of plants with wind will require more peaking plants (single 
cycle gas turbine in our case) and fewer baseload plants (combined cycle in our case). However, 
the capital costs of these peaking thermal plants are less so there will be an offsetting benefit of 
lower capital costs than what would have been optimal without wind and/or solar power. Using 
fuel and natural gas price assumptions above, the changes in the total cost (variable generation 
and fixed costs) with and without (assuming to be reference case) wind power are presented 
below.   
 
The existing power supply mix does not include that of solar power, so scheduling of the power 
plants to meet the demand for electricity at the lowest cost includes a mixture of thermal and 
wind power sources only. Given the total estimated cost of power supply in scenario B, the 
optimal allocation of generation mix from both existing and new power plants at each demand 
block is presented below. In order to show the impact of different wind penetrations on the 
power system and economic costs, we estimate the costs under scenarios with no wind and solar 
capacity (Scenario I), high wind as in Table 2.5 (Scenario II), low wind with half the level shown 
in Table 2.5 (Scenario III), and equal wind – high wind amd solar capacity penetration (Scenario 
IV). Then, it is revealed that wind power installations will reduce the total costs of the system as 
they penetrate the system. This is due to the fact that wind replaces the power from conventional 
plants and saves variable operating and variable fuel costs from these plants. In any of the 
scenarios, no solar capacity will yet be in the system. 
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Figure 2.6 Total Cost of Power Supply (NPV values at 10% discount rate, Heavy Fuel Oil Price 
at € 50/barrel, natural gas price at € 450 / Nm3310 , carbon price at  €22/ 2tCO ), millions of € 
Source: Own calculations.  
However, correlation coefficient estimates between the renewable resource profile and system 
load tells us that it would be a better system from an engineering point of view to have both wind 
and solar power than wind alone. This is because the effect of introducing solar power into the 
mix may offset higher reserves or costs of wind power. This is a reasonable statement as solar 
power is more available in summer time when the demand for electricity reaches its peak level in 
Cyprus. In order to illustrate the scenario with a mix of wind and solar power, we include an 
additional constraint in our model so that we force solar power to be in the system129. This will 
allow us to show the impacts of wind and solar power penetration on the operating regime of the 
conventional system. The results reveal that there will be substantial reduction in the system cost 
if both wind and solar power penetrates the system than wind power alone. This is due to fact 
that solar power displaces higher variable cost plants than wind power.  
                                                          
129 This constraint implies that solar power is committed for the future power mix and capital costs will be incurred 
by the system. 
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When both wind and solar power capacities operate in the system, both optimal power 
generation and expansion units will be different from that of the wind alone case as presented in 
Table 2.5. The difference arises due to the different adjustment factors of the solar power 
alongside with wind power. We expect that solar power will save capital costs from peaking 
plants, as less peaking thermal will be needed with solar power. Therefore, solar power will 
generate earnings from the capacity credit.  
 
The factors such as high fuel (natural gas) costs and high transportation costs causing further 
increases in domestic fuel prices may increase the attractiveness of electricity generation from 
renewables. A new optimal level of thermal plant mix (optimal stacking) in electricity generation 
will also change depending on the relative changes between fuel oil and natural gas price. 
Therefore, comparative results with different fuel input assumptions are presented to show their 
potential impacts on optimal wind and/ solar power deployment.  
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Table 2.6 Impacts of Changing Fue and Natural Gas Prices on the Total Cost of Power Supply with Different Renewable Penetration, values in 
millions of € 
 
 HFO: €50 / Barrel 
 NG: 
€450/ Nm3310  
HFO: €55/Barrel 
NG: 
€475/ Nm3310  
Heavy Fuel Oil: 
€60/Barrel 
 NG:€500/ Nm3310  
Heavy Fuel Oil: €65 
/Barrel 
NG:€525/ Nm3310  
HFO: €70 / Barrel 
NG:€550/ Nm3310  
Scenario I 2,449 2,647 2,846 3,074 3,362 
Scenario II 2,336 2,471 2,608 2,773 2,970 
Scenario III 2,389 2,344 2,476 2,561 2,653 
Scenario IV 2,297 2,315 2,407 2,478 2,542 
Source: Own Estimates 
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The costs from an optimal mix of generating plants is calculated at a price of fuel oil from 50 
€/barrel to 70/barrel, while the price of natural gas from € 450 / Nm3310 to € 550 / Nm3310  
and the total level of allowable emissions remain the same at 30,000 thousand tonnes during the 
planning period in question. In order to show the impact of different wind penetrations on the 
power system and economic costs, we again estimate the costs under scenarios with no wind and 
solar capacity (Scenario I), high wind  (Scenario II), low wind with half the level (Scenario III), 
and equal wind – high wind amd solar capacity penetration (Scenario IV). The resulting costs are 
shown table 2.6 above. Based on table 2.6 presented above, we find that when the prices of 
conventional plants running with heavy fuel oil and natural gas increases, the additional savings 
from integrating renewables will also increases. This is because wind and solar sources will reduce 
fuel payments for the energy displaced from them.  
 
Moreover, estimation of the trade-off between costs and emissions, as shown in Figure 2.5, is 
important for policy makers as it allows policy makers to see the additional costs resulting from a 
lower level of emissions, and vice-versa. The lines in the Figure are derived by taking the level of 
emissions as part of the constraint set, since the value of the weight on each objective function 
may not be known. Based on the characteristics of the power system with its economic and 
emission parameters, we show that wind power is not an expensive source of electric energy for 
Cyprus with a significant amount of negative environmental externalities avoided for a small 
increase in costs. This type of analysis is for example useful when determining the effectiveness 
of the renewables targets in reducing the emissions. To put it differently, whether the use of 
renewables is effective or not depends on the trade-off between the high cost of electricity from 
renewables and the benefits they deliver in the form of abating local pollution and mitigating 
greenhouse gas emissions.  
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Conventional power generation is increasingly being penalized with emission costs and this 
ultimately increases the cost of electricity generation. Furthermore, an optimal level of renewable 
power penetration is expected to increase with the cost of emissions. All these impacts depend 
on the power plant mix such that more renewable penetration exists in a coal power oriented mix 
than in a mix dominated by oil or natural gas. This is due to fact that coal fired plants emit more 
carbon than oil fired or natural gas plants. Hence, the impact will be smaller for Cyprus 
considering its current and future power generation mix.   
2.6. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations  
 
The Electricity Authority of Cyprus currently imports all of the fuel oil needed to generate 
electricity and the percentage of imported fuel for power generation still remains very high. This 
heavy reliance on imported fuel oil for electricity generation, an increase in energy consumption 
per capita and the green regulations of the EU are the main motivating forces behind the push of 
investments in energy efficiency programs and renewables in Cyprus -  as a member of EU. 
 
Looking at the future of the electricity generation mix in Cyprus, accommodation of wind power 
on the national grid will become an increasingly important issue as wind is the largest new source 
of installed capacity in Cyprus. As in many countries, renewable sources of power supply have 
also grid access priority in Cyprus. Due to lower wind potential in the island, investors receive a 
fixed feed-in for twenty years and high subsidies from the special fund established for the 
purpose of supporting renewable energy sources in Cyprus. Because of higher upfront capital 
costs, the amount of subsidy for each MWh of electricity generated from solar power is higher 
than the level given to wind power investors.   
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Figure 2.6 Trade-off between Emissions and Costs at Varying Renewable Energy Targets  
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The most challenging issue is formulation and implementation of the right policy for promoting 
these renewables at the right time for the right use of potential renewables.  In the future, the 
effect of introducing solar and wind power into thermal electricity generation will work better 
than wind power alone. Therefore, wind power investments should be postponed until the unit 
cost of electricity generation from solar power can also show savings. We expect the gap between 
the unit cost of solar electricity and the unit cost of fuel to converge in the near future due to 
technological improvement, economies of scale and strong renewable support policy130. Wind 
power installations will continue given that it reduces the total system costs partially due to 
regulatory constraints in the system such as renewable power share and emissions limits and also 
reduction in capital cost installations. 
 
Not only does the fuel consumption of thermal plants, but future oil and natural gas prices also 
play a key role in renewable power deployment in any country. Thus, the expected benefits of 
wind and solar power generation for the electric utility as well as the economy of Cyprus depend 
on one’s view of future oil and natural gas prices as well as the ratio of the price of crude oil 
compared to the price of natural gas. Natural gas is now competing with “cheap but dirty” coal 
and “expensive but clean” renewable investments and it seems this will continue in the future due 
to a reduction in the extraction costs of gas (Burtraw et al., 2012).  
 
We run the sensitivity for the various fuel oil and natural gas prices in Cyprus and we find that 
when the prices of conventional energy running with heavy fuel oil and natural gas increases, the 
marginal savings from integrating renewables increases. In fact, the increase in prices of 
conventional fuel sources should bring these investment in the system earlier. These conclusions 
are valid on the assumption that consumers are not price-responsive, however.  
 
                                                          
130 See for example, Barbosa et al., (2012). 
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Exporting natural gas has an economic opportunity cost for Cyprus as it can be used in the 
domestic market for electricity production. Although it looks as if the domestic use of “cheap 
and clean” natural gas resources is viable from an economy and environmental point of view, 
careful evaluation of options for domestic use of natural gas versus exporting the natural gas is 
inevitable. Of course, the policy maker cannot ignore the potential of renewable energy sources. 
Comparing the value of fuel and carbon savings foregone from shifting toward natural gas plants 
would help policy makers to decide what to do with the natural gas and investments in 
renewables.  
Finally, we need to compare the value of  fuel and carbon savings foregone from investing the 
same amount of  capital in alternative power generation plant such as a “fuel efficient and clean” 
CCT131’132 because every dollar spent on reliable and relatively low cost technology such as CCT133 
may yield higher economic and environmental benefits than spending capital on on-grid. In this 
way, we will answer the question of  whether wind power is really cost-effective for the electric 
utility and economy of  Cyprus and a greener option for the environment. 
 
 
                                                          
131 Similar to what we suggest, Dale et al. (2004) analyze the impact of large-scale wind turbine installations in the UK in 
terms of the cost (price) that electricity consumers pay. They take into account generation investment costs, fuel cost and 
network cost including connection and infrastructure costs associated with wind investments. In their research, two 
scenarios are considered; (a) thermal generation (coal and gas turbines) dominates the power supply in 2020 and (b) 
together with conventional power, wind source of power supply (mix of on –shore and off-shore) represents 20% of total 
electricity production. They estimate that electricity consumers pay additional costs of just more than 0.3p/kWh in current 
prices, and pay less than 0.1p/kWh if wind has no displacement value. Based on their empirical result, they conclude that 
there is no reason for not supplying the country’s electricity demand by wind.  
132 With the research and development in the power generation industry, capital costs of conventional generators 
have been falling including the CCGT technology. In addition to this, capital costs of these generators are still much 
lower than wind and solar and also provide high reliability in power system as they are dispatchable (US Energy 
Administration, 2013). Last but not least, the fuel efficiency of CCGTs increased from 30-40% to 50%-60% in the 
last two decades and is even now improving over time (Asian Pacific Energy Research Centre, APERC, p.27 2010). 
Higher fuel efficiency in turn means lower fuel consumption and lower emissions per kWh of energy produced.  
133 The advantages of CCGT in an island economy, Cyprus, are analysed by Poullikkas, A., (2004), “Parametric study for 
the penetration of combined cycle technologies into Cyprus power system), Applied Thermal Engineering, 24 (11–12): 
1697–1707. 
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Appendix 
 
List of Symbols – Glossary 
 
t   planning years (t,…,T)  
h   time demand blocks  in year  
hl   duration of time interval h (number of hours in each time interval)  
jhl   duration of sub hour j  in time intervalh   
z  index of all power plants  
e  index of existing power plants  
)(enr  index of existing non-renewable power plants where 
)(ew   index of existing wind power plants where 
c  index of candidate power plants  
)(cnr  index of candidate non-renewable power plants where 
cbl = candidate baseload capacity, cbl = candidate intermediate capacity,   cpl   =   
candidate peaking load capacity  
)(cw  index of candidate wind power plants where 
)(cs  index of candidate solar power plants where 
ht
D   demand for electric power in time interval h  in year t (MW) 
*
htD   residual demand for electric power in time interval h  in year t (MW) 
p
htD   peak demand for capacity in time interval h in year t 
t   reserve margin required by system planning at peak load in year t  (%) 
nreqs   reserves from existing conventional power plants in year t (MW) 
nrcqs   reserves from candidate conventional power plants in year t (MW) 
etK   installed power of existing power plants in year t (MW) 
dtK   decommissioned capacity from existing power plant in year t (MW) 
nrcnum  number of different capacities assigned to candidate conventional plants  
nrcMW   pre-assigned capacities for candidate conventional power plants (MW) 
wMW   pre-assigned wind power potential in region (MW) 
sMW   pre-assigned solar power potential in region (MW) 
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ctK   capacity of candidate power plant(MW) 
n   economic life time of candidate power plant (years)  
cI   capital cost of candidate power plant in year t  (€/MW)  
ctF   fixed operating and maintenance costs of candidate power plant in year t (€/MW)  
tcnrK ,   thermal capacity additions in year t  (MW)  
etF   fixed operating and maintenance costs of candidate power plant in year t (€/MW)  
ctVOM  variable operating and maintenance costs of candidate power plant in year t   
(€/MWh)  
etVOM  variable operating and maintenance costs of existing power plant in year t  (€/MWh)  
ctf  fuel consumption of candidate power plants in year t  (m
3N/MWh) 
etf  fuel consumption of existing power plants in year t (tonne/MWh or m
3N/MWh) 
htcq ,       conventional electricity produced from each candidate plant in interval h of year 
t (MW)  
hteq ,       electricity produced from each existing plant in interval h of year t (MW)  
ftFpf  price of f  type fuel in year t (€/tonne or €/103m3N)  
htnrea ,             availability factor of existing conventional power plants at time interval h of the year 
t (%) 
htnrca ,             availability factor of existing conventional power plants at time interval h of the year 
t (%) 
m
jhtweLF ,  load factor of existing wind power in region m  at j  sub hour of time in interval 
h of the year t (%) 
m
jhtwcLF ,  load factor of candidate wind power in region m  at j  sub hour of time in interval 
h of the year t (%) 
jhtscLF ,  load factor of candidate solar power at j  sub hour of time in interval h of the year 
t (%) 
t   share of renewables in total demand for electricity in year t  (%)  
cCO   2CO emission factor of all power plants (tonne/MWh)  
eCO   2CO emission factor of all power plants (tonne/MWh)  
tFpc   2CO price year t (€/tonne CO2) 
r    real discount rate in year t  (%) and  
i   interest rate (%) 
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Appendices 
Appendix A:  Economic Parameters of the Existing Power Plants in Cyprus, as year of January 2012134135 
Unit   Technology  Fuel Type      Capacity Fixed O&M          Variable O&M        Fuel Consumption136 
                                             (MW)            (€/kW Month)         (€/MWh)                     (MWh)                          
Moni Power Station 
ST1 – ST 6  Steam Turbines  Heavy Fuel Oil  180      4.00   4.20  0.348 tonne 
GT1 – GT 4  Gas Turbine  Gasoil      150      1.25        6.00  0.360 tonne 
Dhekelia Power Station 
ST1 – ST 2  Steam Turbine  Heavy Fuel Oil    120      2.41        1.33  0.277 tonne 
ST3 – ST 4  Steam Turbine  Heavy Fuel Oil  120      2.41        1.33  0.277 tonne 
ST5 – ST 6  Steam Turbine  Heavy Fuel Oil    120      2.41        1.33  0.277 tonne 
ICE 1-2   Combustion E  Heavy Fuel Oil  100      1.57   3.20  0.205 tonne 
Vasilakos Power Station 
ST1- ST 2  Steam Turbine   Heavy Fuel Oil  260      0.83        1.50  0.221 tonne 
ST3                Steam Turbines  Heavy Fuel Oil    130       0.221 tonne 
GT1    Gas Turbine  Gasoil      38      1.25        6.00  0.372 tonne 
CCT1A   Combine Cycle  Gasoil      220      1.57             3.20  0.177 tonne 
CCT2A   Combine Cycle  Gasoil      220      1.57             3.20  0.177 tonne 
CCT1AA  Combine Cycle  Natural Gas     220      1.25        2.50  161 m3N 
CCT2BB  Combine Cycle  Natural Gas     220      1.25        2.50  161 m3N  
 
Wind Farm 
POWP1  Wind Power  Wind   82      5.90   0.00  0.00   
LAAWP1  Wind Power  Wind      31.5      5.90   0.00  0.00
                                                          
134 With the exception of fuel consumption variables, the data presented here is obtained from Poullikkas and Kellas (2004, p. 527), Table 2: Economic Characteristics of 
Existing Generation Units.  
135 Baseload plants are composed of Vasilakos combine cycle, intermediate load plants are composed of Vasilakos steam turbines and Dhekelia steam turbines, and peak load 
plants composed of Vasilakos gas turbine, Moni gas and steam turbines. 
136 Average values from 2003 to 2009, except year of 2008.  Fuel consumption parameters are estimated by dividing the total electricity generation to fuel consumption for 
the same year. For Vasilakos combined cycle plants, fuel consumption for Vasilakos combine cycle is assumed to be 80% of the most efficient plant in the system that is 
Vasilakos steam turbine. 
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Appendix B: Technical and Environmental Parameters of the Existing Power Plants in Cyprus, as year of January 2012137 
Unit    Commissioning Decommissioning Efficiency  CO2 Emission     
                                                                   (%)            (Tonne/MWh)138                
Moni Power Station 
ST1 – ST6  1966-1976  December 2015  25   1.069 
GT1 - GT 4  1992-1995  December 201X  34           1.165   
Dhekelia Power Station 
ST1 – ST 2  1982   December 201X  31   0.855 
ST3 – ST 4  1986   December 201X  31   0.855 
ST5 – ST 6  1992-1993  December 202X  31   0.855  
ICE 1-2  2009-2010  December 203X  41  0.635 
  
Vasilikos Power Station 
ST1- ST 2  2000   December 203X  39  0.724 
ST3                2007   December 203X  39  0.724  
GT1   1999   December 202X  21  1.106 
CCT1A  2009   December 2015  52        0.543         
CCT2B  2010   December 2015  52  0.543 
CCT1AA  2015   December 204X  52   0.181 
CCT2BB  2015   December 204X  52        0.181                
 
Wind Farm 
POWP1  2011   December 2031  ---  --- 
LAAWP1  2012   December 2032  ---  ---  
 
 
                                                          
137 The relevant data presented here is obtained from Poullikkas and Kellas (2004, p. 526), Table 1: Technical Characteristics of Existing Generation Units.   
138 Emissions from Vasilakos combined cycle are assumed to be 0.543 per tonne MWh of electricity produced, on the basis that the station is 10% more efficient than others.  
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Appendix C:  Demand and Renewable Power Coincidence in Cyprus in 2010 
 
Figure 2.7: Annual Load Duration Curve in 2010 – with and without 100 MW Wind Capacity139  
 
 
                                                          
139 Green area represents total wind electricity generated from 100 MW installed wind capacity. 
8760 
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Figure 2.8: Annual Load Duration Curve in 2010 – with and without 100 MW Solar Capacity 140 
 
                                                          
140 Green area represents total solar source of electricity generated from 100 MW installed solar PV capacity. 
8760 
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Appendix D:  Total Hours Coincident between Paphos Wind Power and Electricity 
Demand 
  Load Demand Normalized to Mean (%)   
  50-75  76-100  101-125  126-150  >150  # of Hours  
 0-20  1197  1530  1521  594  123  4965  
Wind LF  21-40  393  471  459  213  156  1692  
(%)  41-60  216  609  594  246  177  1842  
 61-80  48  129  54  18  0  249  
 81-100  3  6  3  0  0  12  
           # of Hours 1857  2745  2631  1071  456  8760  
Source: own calculations. 
 
Appendix E: Total Hours Coincident between Larnaca Wind Power and Electricity Demand 
 
  Load Demand Normalized to Mean (%)   
  50-75  76-100  101-125  126-150  >150  # of Hours  
 0-20  1197  1530  1521  594  123  4965  
Wind LF  21-40  393  471  459  213  156  1692  
(%)  41-60  216  609  594  246  177  1842  
 61-80  48  129  54  18  0  249  
 81-100  3  6  3  0  0  12  
           # of Hours 1857  2745  2631  1071  456  8760  
Source: own calculations. 
 
 
Appendix F:  Total Hours Coincident between Solar Power and Electricity Demand 
  Load Demand Normalized to Mean (%)   
  50-75  76-100  101-125  126-150  >150  # of Hours  
 0  9  117 178 151 199 654 
Solar LF up to 21  17 176 216 132 113 654 
(%) 21-40  33 345 301 121 67 867 
 41-60  68 446 337 92 38 981 
 61-80 234 609 464 176 22 1505 
 81-100 1445 1173 1072 383 26 4099 
           # of Hours 1806 2866 2568 1055 465 8760 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Appendix E: Multi Objective Multi Period Optimization Algorithm 
 
The multi-objective optimization problem during the planning period may include minimization 
of total economic cost of power generation, minimization of emissions, minimization of external 
dependency in the form oil imports, etc. In the economic cost minimization problem, the 
objective is simply to minimize the sum of discounted total costs (fixed and variable costs) of the 
electricity supply over the long term horizon while a set of constraints are satisfied. In recent 
years, the environmental dimension of the electricity expansion is added into the planning 
problem with an increasing attention paid to emissions results from conventional electricity 
generation. The basic objective is then minimization of electricity generation costs from both 
economic and environmental point of view while a set of constraints are satisfied (Fichtner 2010). 
Hence, the problem is a multi-objective (multi-criteria) optimization problem such that the objective is 
to minimize the weighted sum of economic cost and pollutant emissions from electricity 
generation with mix of renewables given the set of constraints141. The problem defined in this 
paper is a key factor for achieving sustainable development (Afghan and Carvalho 2001; Dincer 
and Rosen, 2005).  
 
The electricity expansion and generation problem is already defined as a multi-objective problem 
aiming to minimize two conflicting objective functions simultaneously. In most cases, there is no 
single unique solution with respect to multiple objective functions but there exists a set of Pareto 
optimum (Edgeworth-Pareto) solutions that satisfy the model constraints (Zitzler et al. 1993). To 
                                                          
141 Step by step method for solving single - objective optimization problem is explained in Chapter 5: A simplified 
Look at Generation Capacity Addition”, Mazer (2007, pg. 135-136). In this paper, robust formulation for the multi-
objective problems will be developed for an improved solution with simplification in order to avoid complicated 
engineering and technical details. Also, the problem stated above is defined as key factor for achieving sustainable 
development (Dincer and Rosen, 2005).  
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illustrate the problem, let 1f to be the function for the least cost and 2f  to be the function for the 
least emissions from electricity generation. 
min        xfxfxf n,...,, 21  
st. Sx   
 
where      xfxfxf n,...,, 21  stands for set of objective functions, x stands for vector of decisions 
variables and S stands for feasible region that includes set of solutions that satisfy all constraints 
The aim is to determine the set of *x  values from vector of xwhich satisfy model constraints 
and yield optimum values of all the objective functions. In words,  
 
“... *x is Pareto optimal if there exists no feasible vector of decision variables Sx  which would 
decrease some criterion without causing a simultaneous increase in at least one other criterion...” 
(Zitzler et al. 1993, pg. 23) 
 
The vector of these solutions in the Pareto optimal set is called non-dominated solutions which are 
plotted in the Pareto frontier. To illustrate the problem graphically, let once again 1f  be the 
function for the least cost and 2f  to be the function for the least emissions from electricity 
generation 
 
Figure 2.9: The Pareto frontier of multi-objective electricity generation problem  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b 
a 
1f  
2f  
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Widely applied solution methods for solving the multi-objective problem are the weighting 
approach, ε-constraint approach and the scalarizing function approach etc. (Zitzler et al. 1993). In 
the weighting method the weighted sum of objective functions are optimized by assigning weight 
to each function while in the ε-constraint method; one objective function is optimized while other 
objective function (s) is included in the constraint sets. Using the ε-constraint method, the trade-
off between the objectives can be easily computed and the Pareto optimal - nondominated solutions 
for the model can be obtained (Mavrotas, 2006; 2009). Therefore, the use of the ε-constraint 
method would be appropriate in our analysis as weights are unknown. Suppose, emissions are 
written in the constraint function and cost minimization is written as the objective function. 
Algebraically, 
min   xf
1
 
st Sx   
 
where,  xf
1
 stands for set of objective function, x stands for vector of decisions variables, 
S stands for feasible region that includes set of solutions that satisfy all constraints in which 
 xf
2
 - emissions - is also included in the constraint set.  
 
Figure 2.10: The Pareto frontier of multi-objective electricity generation problem with  - 
Constraint 
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CHAPTER 3: REAL-TIME PRICING OF ELECTRICITY IN THE CYPRIOT 
ELECTRICITY MARKET 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The ambition to achieve maximum productive efficiency in the electric power industry and to 
lower power costs (i.e. electricity prices) by increasing competition between suppliers resulted in a 
movement towards liberalizing energy markets in many parts of the world (Batstone, 2010; 
Sioshansi, 2006; Blumstein et al., 2002; Kleit and Terrell, 2001; Martin and Vansteenkiste, 2001; 
Joskow, 1997; Hogan 1993). In the EU, the Directive 96/92/EC and Directive 2003/54/EC of  
the European Parliament aim to liberalise (i.e. deregulate) its generation and supply of  electricity 
whilst maintaining the naturally monopolistic structure in both the transmission and distribution 
system in the electricity industry142. The objectives of  these directives are to separate the 
generation and supply of  electricity, to introduce competition in the industry and to regulate the 
transmission and distribution systems.  
 
Meanwhile, many countries have made so-called Copenhagen pledges to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions within the next decade and participating states are revising their energy policies based 
on this.  EU policies for meeting the renewable and emission reduction targets mainly come from 
                                                          
142 Newbery (2002) also investigates the problems of restructuring the electricity industry in the EU which arise due 
to the legislative and regulatory constraints of the union. He argues that the prices in liberalized electricity markets 
may increase if the power market is lacking enough transmission capacity and sufficient generation capacity, and not 
contestable enough. Therefore, the policy makers of the EU should carefully work on appropriate design of both 
legislative and regulatory aspects of the power market before the liberalization; otherwise the negative economic 
consequences of weak legal infrastructure arrangements in its power market can be tremendous. Green (2006) and 
Green et al., (2006) provide the liberalization activities and indicators for EU electricity markets, respectively.  Green 
(2007) investigates the introduction of competition into the EU as whole and argues that it is not an easy task due to 
low capacity cross border interconnections and differences in liberalization across member states. Trevino (2008) 
also supports the arguments made by Green (2007). 
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substituting renewable fuel sources for fossil fuels (e.g. increasing the share of  renewables in 
electricity generation) and improving energy efficiency in both industrial and domestic loads (e.g. 
energy efficient appliances). With respect to renewable electricity targets (i.e. RES-E), various 
renewable energy roadmaps such as Directives 2001/77/EC, 2003/30/EC and 2009/28/EC of  
the European Parliament promote the use of  renewables and support for their access (e.g. fixed 
FITs and ETS emission trading scheme) in the electricity market (Cansino et al., 2010)143. 
 
The electricity sector in many EU countries is therefore experiencing simultaneous transition in 
competitive opening of their electricity markets with an increase in the share of  renewable power 
in electricity generation. The transition toward competition and decarbonisation alter the way that 
today’s electricity market operates. To be more precise, many countries including EU member 
states are experiencing profound regulatory and operational changes in their electricity market. 
The simultaneous movement leads market principles to be used in design and implementation of  
energy policy measures to facilitate the liberalization of  electricity markets (Jensen and Skytte, 
2002).  
 
Although wholesale markets have been open to competition during the deregulation of  many 
electric utilities in Europe, many end-use customers still pay fixed regulated retail prices144 for their 
consumption that are almost time-invariant within a season. But, retail prices do not vary over 
time even in competitive retail market environments due to regulatory barriers as well as 
traditional metering technologies145, something that fails to send real-time price information to 
                                                          
143 For more detailed information on the choice of support policy within the EU member states, see European 
Commission, Energy Policies, Renewable Energy, Electricity 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/electricity_en.htm 
and European Commission, Renewable Energy Policy Database and Support, Legal Sources by Country 
http://www.res-legal.eu/search-by-country/ 
144 Fixed pricing is also referred as time-invariant pricing.  
145 Even when legal constraints are removed and regulators allow consumers to pay their bills at time-varying prices, the 
use of traditional metering devices and lack of technical infrastructure remains a serious obstacle. The use traditional 
metering devices meters allow consumers to observe their accumulated consumption over the billing period, mostly 
monthly. Hence, their monthly bill shows their accumulated consumption and flat tariff rate they have to pay for the 
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end-users in Europe (Bompard et al., 2007; IEA, 2003)  (ECME Consortium, 2009) or in those 
states  in the US that have open retail markets (Costello, 2004). The application of  fixed pricing 
of  electricity today is justified for various reasons including reliability, availability (keeping the 
lights on) and affordability of  electric power.  Therefore, electricity planning problems even today 
merely focus on meeting peak demand and preserving a reserve margin to maintain the desired 
level of reliability in power supply that has assumed price inelastic demand – so electric utilities 
inevitably incur high total costs of meeting the growing demand for electricity in a reliable way 
(Cutter et al., 2012; Kim and Shcerbakova, 2011)146. Nevertheless, this assumption comes from 
application of  the fixed rate of  electricity inherited from the vertically integrated public utility 
that existed before restructuring of the sector.  
 
The main problem with the restructuring and decarbonisation policies in electricity markets is 
that they often rely on supply side market forces alone to meet the growing demand for energy 
and reducing the emissions from electricity generation (Wellinghoff et al., 2007; Hunt, 2002). The 
policies are implemented under the assumption that consumers are not willing or are unable to 
respond to changing electricity prices. But the empirical literature based on pilot programs from 
voluntary participation reveals that consumers are price responsive to varying degrees147. This 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
consumption. Therefore, these meters do not allow real or near real-time prices to reach retail customers, so that they 
might react to changing prices and consume different quantities of electricity and pay different prices for their 
consumption over a given time.   
146 System reliability in the short-term refers to a perfect balance of power supply and demand in real time. System reliability over 
the long-term refers to adequate investments in both generation and transmission lines. Before competition, public utilities were 
responsible regarding preserving the reliability of the system. Due to the recent regulatory and operational changes in the 
electricity industry, there are two important supply-side issues in competitive markets to which regulators must pay particular 
attention.  Firstly, private investors decide what kind of power plant, when and where to construct the power plant(s) so that they 
earn the highest return from their investments. Secondly, maintaining the generation adequacy with growing loads requires 
investors to build new power plants. Therefore, in addition to electricity pricing, government regulators must ensure that investors 
in power generation have favorable market environments operating in competitive electricity markets, as clearly stated by 
Sioshansi (2001). 
147 See for example,  Allcott, 2011; Faruqui and Sergici, 2010; Filippini, 2010; Lijesen, 2007; Wolak, 2006; Goldman et al., 2005; 
Borenstein, 2002; Patrick and Wolak, 2001; Braithwait and O’Sheasy, 2001; Taylor and Schwarz, 2000; Filippini, 1995). 
Participation from voluntary programs might mislead policy makers; some people might not be price-responsive at all, so these 
responses may or may not be generalized for the entire population (Joskow and Wolfram, 2011). At the same time, the design of 
pilot programs and selection of target populations are very influential on the estimations of these elasticities. We need to state 
here that not only is it the industrial users who are sensitive to price changes in the electricity market. For example, Patrick and 
Wolak (2001) show that large as well as medium size end-use consumers in the England and Wales power market are highly 
responsive to half-hourly electricity pricing.  Another example includes TOU experiment in California which show that in 
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implies the potential participation of  the demand side in the wholesale market is still limited to 
the large electricity consumers only such as industrial users (Barbose et al., 2004)148.From the 
economic efficiency point of  view, the absence of  time-varying prices in retail markets is the 
main shortcoming of  the functioning of  the electricity market to achieve efficiency.  This is why 
academics and policy makers now pay a lot of  attention to dynamic pricing of  electricity in the 
electricity markets: dynamic pricing of  electricity allows retailers to sell electricity at a price which 
converges to its marginal cost of  production.  
 
In this paper, we will analyse the impacts of  time-varying electricity pricing (i.e. dynamic pricing) 
on the Cypriot electricity market. To our knowledge, such screening of impacts from 
implementing dynamic pricing of electricity is yet to be explored for Cyprus. This topic is worth 
investigating for Cyprus, because installation of  smart meters into homes will take place in the 
future. Based on Directive 2009/72/EC, EU member states will have to install smart meters for 
at least 80% of their domestic consumers by 2020149 . In this paper, we will address the 
implications of  real-time pricing on demand, power prices, renewable power generation (i.e. wind 
and solar) and on the emissions from electricity generation. By answering these questions, we 
believe this paper may be used as a future policy guide for the implementation of such programs 
while a country is moving toward green technology in its electricity supply and aims to reduce 
emission from electricity generation.  
 
3.2 Price Setting Mechanism in Electricity Markets  
 
The three key functions of  the price mechanism in the market are the signalling function, 
transmission of  preferences and the rationing functions which are all described in the ‘invisible 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
addition to industrial users, residential as well as small and medium size commercial customers also respond and certainly reduce 
their electricity usage during peak hours (Faruqui and George, 2005), now but also in the past (Caves and Christensen, 1980).  
148 Unresolved issues and uncertainties associated with the application of marginal cost pricing such as technical, 
political and society level barriers are outlined in section 3.5 of this study.  
149 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:211:0055:0093:EN:PDF 
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hand’ price mechanism introduced by Adam Smith. The price of  a service, for example an 
electricity service, should inform the seller when to produce and should inform consumers when 
to purchase. Wholesale electricity prices are largely determined by fuel prices and carbon prices, 
and changes in the mix of  the regional generation portfolio150. Given that the marginal costs of  
thermal generators are dominated by fuel costs, so volatility in fuel prices is transmitted to the 
price of  electricity. The variation in peak and off-peak electricity prices comes partially from 
volatility of  fuel prices, but mainly from demand and capacity balance. In a similar fashion, 
emission prices may respond to changes in fuel prices that may lead to more fluctuations in 
electricity prices in power market (Green and Vasilakos, 2011). 
 
Electricity is a special form of  non-storable commodity that differentiates it from other storable 
commodities and so pricing electricity correctly throughout the day is not an easy task. Firstly, 
electricity cannot be stored in large quantities, so the supply of  power has to meet demand for 
power at every second in order to avoid both shortages and/or surpluses of  electricity. 
Therefore, electricity systems face instantaneous fluctuations in their demand and supply. 
Secondly, power plants differ in terms of  the cost they incur for an additional MWh of  electricity 
generation (marginal costs) because each technology requires a different type and amount of  fuel 
to generate a unit of  electricity, and has differing non-fuel operating costs151. That is to say, peak 
electricity and off-peak electricity are different commodities with varying marginal costs to 
suppliers and marginal value to end-use consumers. Therefore, the fluctuating demand for 
electricity is supplied from a heterogeneous mix of  power plants, giving variations of  marginal 
costs of  power supply throughout the day. Thus, the value (i.e. price) of  electricity at peak times 
is ideally different than off-peak times, partly to do with the demand for electricity and partly 
                                                          
150 Therefore the marginal cost of generating electricity depends on the amount of fuel consumption per MWh, and 
CO emissions per MWh from consuming fuel.  
151 We expect electricity prices to be cheap in France and Canada due to a high proportion of nuclear and hydro 
plants, similarly in Germany due to high proportion of locally mined coal in its power generation. For price 
comparison in selected EU countries, see Murray (2009, p.53). These prices do not include fixed additives. 
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with the supply of electricity (cost of additional supply and non-storability). The short-run 
operation of  the power market gives a signal to the power industry that has an impact on future 
investments in generation capacity (to both the type of  generation capacity and the timing of  
investments) in the long-term. 
In most electricity markets, consumers purchase their electricity in competitive retail markets and 
retail companies supply electricity to their customers from their purchases in a competitive 
wholesale market, as shown in Figure 3.1. The wholesale market model is both a partial and first 
step towards deregulation (introduction of  competition) in the electricity supply industry. In this 
market, long-term contracts and spot contracts allow trade between retailers and generators in an 
auction (Trevino, 2008). Different from the traditional approach, deregulation of  wholesale 
power markets allows system operators to decide on dispatch decisions by simply matching 
power supply bids (based on short-run marginal costs of  generators) with forecast demand where 
market prices are set according to the highest bid accepted by the system operator.  
 
In most electricity markets, the wholesale prices vary constantly and actually reflect fluctuations 
in supply/demand interaction in time (say within days and seasons) and location (say network 
node). The system operator brings retailers (load serving entities) and generators together and 
allows trading of  electricity based on these time-varying electricity prices. The supply curve of  
the wholesale market is derived from per unit marginal costs of  production by each generator 
where the intersection point of  demand for and market supply of  electricity determines the 
equilibrium price. As we move toward peak demand hours, we expect incremental costs of  power 
supply to increase due to system capacity constraints. The price of  electricity might be even 
higher than marginal costs in these hours (Borenstein, 2000), so that incentives are to invest in 
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additional capacity in these hours152. 
Generators
Retailers
Consumers
Payment: fluctuating prices
Payment: fixed prices
Wholesale Market
Retail Market
System 
Operator
Figure 3.1: Trading Mechanisms in Electricity Market
 
In power markets, the supply curve (merit-order curve) ranks the power from each generator 
based on their cost curves - from the lowest marginal cost/MWh generator to the highest 
marginal cost/MWh generator to meet the demand for electricity in any particular hour153. In 
other words, it shows utilities’ time-varying marginal costs to meet the changing demand for 
electricity. End-use consumers, however, do not pay wholesale prices, but they pay retail prices. 
Retail prices include the wholesale price plus all adders such as fixed transmission and 
distribution charges, grid charges and consumption taxes (Grohnheit et al., 2011; Bode, 2008). 
Without any doubt, retail prices always decrease in response to a decrease in wholesale prices – if  
                                                          
152 Note that this is not the exercise of market power which we will discuss later. This can be seen as premium to let 
generators cover their fixed costs. 
153 Because of the fluctuations in electricity demand over time (reflected by the annual load duration curve), the 
potential cost savings from any kind of renewable generation technology is measured by comparing the cost of 
particular renewable generation with the cost of thermal generation. 
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these adders remain the same. Nevertheless, end-use consumers’ willingness to respond to 
changing wholesale prices depends on the proportion of  wholesale prices in the retail price they 
pay (Grohnheit et al., 2011)154.  
 
In competitive markets, the system marginal cost determines the bid price of  individual power 
plants operating in the competitive market. Therefore, the system marginal cost is a parameter 
that decides and sets optimal dispatching decisions in power supply. The wholesale electricity 
prices represent time-varying electricity generation costs but consumers pay the highest bid 
offered in trading. This is called a marginal bid or price that all generator owners receive from 
their sales. The lower the variable cost of  generating electricity, the less it can afford to bid, so the 
higher the likelihood that the generator is included in the dispatch schedule155’156  
 
Renewable energy sources have dispatch priority in the system. They reduce the load (demand) 
that thermal generators have to supply and the prices they receive for the energy they supply in 
the market157. In other words, thermal generators only supply the residual load after deducting the 
quantities of  renewable generators. We show this by reducing the demand for thermal power in 
                                                          
154 As of 2011, the share of wholesale costs in retail electricity prices in Cyprus is 88%, which is the highest of all EU 
countries. 
155 In some cases, system operator may choose a higher marginal cost plant with a relatively lower start up than a 
lower marginal cost plant with higher start-up costs. It is also worthwhile to state that in comparison to spot markets, 
a day-ahead market promotes the demand response (Hunt, 2002).  Not only does it promote the demand response, 
but it also lowers electricity prices by reducing the start-up costs of generators and prevents generators from 
exercising market power by blocking prices in advance. That is to say, the day-ahead market allows the system 
operator great flexibility in terms of time for dispatching the decision of generators. 
156 Alternative to the marginal bid pricing of electricity, consumers may also pay their electricity based on pay-as- 
you-bid. In this case, consumers pay for an individual generators bid so they end up with lower electricity bills from 
their purchaser. However, pay-as-you-bid may not work in practice as generators have to guess about market clearing 
prices and may offer more than their true marginal cost. As a result, this would distort the dispatching decisions in 
the electricity market. This argument for pay-as-you-bid is invalid if all traders in the market have access to good and 
sufficient information, so both trading options would give the same market price. 
157 Due to differences in timing and predictability, wind has different impacts on the system than that of solar; 
therefore impacts of RES energy sources are not the same across different RES integrated into the system. 
Increasing renewables in the electricity market increases the uncertainty in power markets arising from the 
intermittent nature of renewables (Twomey and Neuhoff, 2010). One way of reducing the uncertainty associated 
with renewables is better forecasting on the renewable power output which in turn greatly reduces both the costs of 
renewable integration and additional market risks due to uncertainty (Lew et al., 2011). In this research, we assume 
perfect predictability of wind and solar.  
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figure 3.2; use of  either demand shift or supply shift practically provides the same 
recommendations. For instance, integration of  these renewable power sources shifts the supply 
curve to the right which in turn results in lower power prices in the electricity market, the so 
called merit order effect (Bode, 2006; DeMiera et al., 2008; Butler and Neuhoff, 2008; Weigt, 2009; 
Fischer, 2009; Neubarth et al., 2006).  
 
Figure 3.2 Impacts of  Wind on Thermal Demand and Market Prices 
 
3.3 Microeconomic Analysis of  Efficient Pricing of  Electricity 
 
The price of electricity must yield the correct amount of generation capacity with its efficient 
utilization, and must cover the full social costs of the resources used in its supply (Steiner, 
1957)158. The efficient price policy in electricity is an old phenomenon and initially started with 
the pioneering discussion of the peak-load problem159. The peak-load problem arises in 
commodities that are not storable during the low demand period to make it available when 
demand is high (e.g. electricity, airline, hotel, transport services). Hence, it is necessary to install 
                                                          
158Jenkins and Evans (1978) earlier point out utilities must use the social discount rate rather than the private cost of 
resources in order to avoid inefficiency loss from production of electricity for consumption. The financial discount 
rate is different to the social discount rate if markets are distorted. So resource costs and savings must be evaluated at 
this social discount rate, because it captures these distortions in an economy. 
159 For a survey of the literature on peak-load pricing of electricity, see Crew, Fernando, and Kleindorfer (1995) and 
for a recent bibliography of dynamic pricing of electricity as well as TOU pricing, also see Enright and Faruqui 
(2012).  
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additional peaking capacity to meet the peak demand during peak demand periods. The problem 
with this peak capacity is that it is underutilized, so price-setting must able to cover these peak 
costs investments from technology itself plus from its underutilization. The old theoretical 
literature tries to solve the problem of the efficient allocation of these costs. The idea of moving 
away from time-invariant electricity prices to peak-load pricing is then tied to variations in the 
marginal cost of generating electricity and the capacity cost from additional investment. 
 
The literature’s canonical argument in peak-load pricing of  electricity is that off-peak consumers 
must pay marginal running costs and peak consumers must pay for both marginal running costs 
plus marginal capacity costs for their electricity consumption as additional peak capacity is costly 
(Wenders, 1976; Turvey 1968; Boiteux, 1964; Steiner, 1957). As demand for electricity moves 
toward peak capacity, incremental costs of  power supply increase from additional capacity with 
higher operating costs. By charging different prices for peak and off-peak consumers, utilities are 
able to cover higher cost of  peak electricity generation.160 The discussion on efficient pricing of 
electricity in current electricity policy debate is also about price differentiation over time – setting 
the price of electricity equal to the instantaneous cost of producing it - and it is referred to as the 
time-varying price of electricity (i.e. real-time pricing).   
 
                                                          
160With an inclusion of power outage costs into electricity prices, off-peak consumers might also pay more than the 
marginal cost of electricity (Crew and Kleinderfor, 1976). To illustrate, if off-peak consumers take into account 
reliability of supply and perceive it at high level (e.g. low number of outages), they might also willing to pay for 
electricity charges plus quality of supply premium to avoid such outages. In this regard, the regulated bodies (e.g. 
electric utilities) must take into consideration consumer preferences for service quality in power supply before the 
implementation of reliability measures. The outcome is economically feasible because revenues of the electric utility 
from sales and the consumer surplus from consumption will both increase. This willingness to pay varies across 
consumer types (residential, commercial, and industrial), and their individual willingness to pay depends on many 
factors including duration of outages, time of day of occurrence, advance notification of outage, income of 
consumers, average electricity bill paid, availability of back-up systems (e.g. generator ownership). Practitioners apply 
valuation methods to estimate consumers’ WTP to mitigate such power outages. To estimate these WTP estimates, 
choice experiment methods with different hypothetical scenarios are widely used in the literature.  
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In Figure 3.3, the marginal cost of  supplying electricity in peak hours exceeds the retail price in 
peak hours  pb   , whilst off-peak retail price of  electricity exceeds true marginal cost of  
supplying electricity in off-peak hours  pb  . If  retail electricity prices do not reflect the hour-
by-hour variations in the underlying cost of  electricity, end-use customers consume too much 
electric capacity (means energy at the same time) at peak times
*
pp
KK  , but they demand too 
little during off-peak hours
*
// popo
KK  . So, end-use consumers with a fixed tariff  just consume 
what they want and pay for it; there is no incentive for consumers to shift their consumption 
away from high cost of  supply hours to low cost of  supply hours with plenty of  unused capacity 
available. The outcome of  this distorted consumption choice from flat retail tariffs inevitably 
leads low utilization of  generating capacity in short-run and distorted investment in generation 
and transmission capacity in long-run (Joskow and Wolfram, 2012; Tiptipakorn and Wei-Jen, 
2007; Flippen, 2003; Turvey, 2003; Ilic et al., 2002; Dewees, 2001; Chapman and Tramutola, 
1990).  
 
Figure 3.3 Representation of  Steiner’s (1957) Peak Load Pricing with two-period demand 
 
 
 145 
 
The outcome of  such fixed pricing is more electricity consumption than the optimal quantity at 
peak times (over consumption), but less than the optimum at off-peak times (under 
consumption). The shaded triangles in the figure above represent the welfare loss at a societal 
level from fixed pricing of  electricity. This short-term inefficiency in allocation of supply 
resources will have long-term adverse impacts through inefficient and high costly investments in 
generation and transmission capacity. The increasing demand for capacity at peak times will not 
cause blackouts in the system, but rather the expansion of  capacity in generation in order to 
reliably meet this growing demand and maintain the reserve margin in the system.  With a high 
growth in demand for peak capacity, the requirement for additional generation capacity might 
take place even over a shorter time (Albadi and El-Saadany, 2008; Borenstein, 2005). Thus, an 
increase in demand for capacity will bring new investment and ultimately the need to upgrade 
transmission capacity in order to avoid congestion in transmission lines (i.e. reliability reasons). 
Therefore, incorrect pricing of  electricity harms overall grid use efficiency and incurs cost to the 
economy in the form of  higher infrastructure investments.   
Another serious problem with flat (average) electricity pricing is that end-user customers who 
consume more electricity during off-peak (low marginal cost hours) inevitably subsidize peak 
consumers (high marginal cost hours)161. From the equity perspective, this cross subsidisation of  
electricity from fixed pricing is even more severe if  substantial off-peak consumption comes 
from low-income customers. Why should low income households pay for electricity costs of  rich 
households? Why should low-income customers pay for air-conditioning usage by rich customers 
during hot summer days of  the year? 
 
                                                          
161 Actual distribution of hourly wholesale energy and retail prices in California during the summer of 2000 shows 
that more peaky consumers pay less, but mainly off-peak consumers pay more than they should (O’Sheasy, 2003:49).  
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The lack of demand response in the market clearly has adverse implications in system operations. 
The precise argument is that demand participation in electricity market design would be 
promising and in fact play a significant role in achieving an efficient use of  scarce resources in 
this sector (Joskow and Wolfram, 2012; Allcott, 2011; Orans et al., 2010; Chao, 2010; Alvarez-Bel 
et al., 2009; Zarnikau, 2008; Spees and Lave, 2007; Harrington, 2004; Braithwait et al., 2002; 
Borenstein et al., 2002a; Borenstein et al., 2002b; Hunt, 2002; Faruqui and George, 2002). The 
electricity industry will continue to be vulnerable and less efficient until such demand responses 
are pursued. Hence, letting consumers both determine and react to electricity prices will foster 
reliability in the system, increase efficiency in the use of  resources and increase security of  the 
power supply rather than increasing the unused generation capacity in the system.  
 
Figure 3.4 The Effect of  Average Pricing vs Marginal Cost Pricing on Demand (Supply) for 
Capacity 
 
 
 
 
The primary purpose of  moving away from fixed (average pricing) pricing of  electricity is to 
eliminate the disconnection between wholesale market and retail prices, so that the deadweight 
losses in electricity services due to the flat rate disappears. Therefore, the market itself  alongside 
smart meter technology must allow consumers to have access to wholesale market information 
 147 
 
and to observe time-varying retail prices, so they can change their electricity consumption in 
response to these prices (Braithwait et al., 2002; Borenstein, 2002; FERC, 2002; Caves et al., 2000).   
 
The immediate effect of  time-varying pricing would be such that consumers shift their 
consumption away from the times of  peak demand (peak clipping), and toward times of  lower 
demand (valley filling / load shifting), as shown in Figure 3.4. Alternatively, they shift their 
consumption to a time period when supply is plentiful so electricity prices are usually low and 
also by foregoing some electricity consumption during at high price hours when supply reliability 
is jeopardized. In the short-run, time-varying prices will tend to reduce use of  low capital cost 
/high marginal cost peak generation whilst increasing the load factor of  high capital cost/low 
marginal cost. By better utilization of  power supply resources, electricity prices would reflect the 
true marginal cost of  production – the price of  electricity must move with the peak162. Hence, the 
primary motivation to implement time-varying electricity prices is to move electricity prices closer 
to their actual marginal cost of  electricity and in addition to reduce peak electricity consumption 
and shift some of  the consumption to off-peak hours. In other words, peak reduction alone is 
not the primary goal of implementing RTP pricing.  
 
3.4 Dynamic Pricing of  Electricity in Practice 
3.4.1 Overview  
 
Time-varying electricity pricing is not an impact-neutral policy across demanders and suppliers of 
energy. That is to say, the distribution of costs paid and benefits received from introducing 
dynamic pricing by consumers vary across market participants (Borenstein, 2007; Taylor et al., 
2005). A change to time-varying electricity pricing will create both winners and losers Demand 
response programs will initially alter the shape of  load demand which will in turn ultimately 
                                                          
162 The price of electricity equals marginal costs of the last unit generated as long as plenty of spare capacity is available at 
that hour. This price equals the marginal cost of the last unit generated plus the rationing element when demand for 
electricity exceeds the capacity at that hour. We will discuss this later in detail, following the exposition by Green (2000). 
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change the dispatching of  power plants and thus the supply mix running in the system with 
different costs and emission levels. It is noteworthy to state that a shift in the load demand 
depends on the willingness and ability of  end-use customers to react to price changes. This is 
reflected in the own and cross-price elasticities that vary across demand side participation 
programmes and participation by each customer class (residential, commercial and industrial).  
 
One direct major implication of  time-varying pricing of  electricity (through smart meter 
technology) is that consumers have direct control over their power expenditure. Consumers can 
manage their bills by modifying their demand for electricity by time and quantity. To put it 
differently, consumers will shift their household activities to off-peak periods such as 
dishwashing, cloth washing, ironing, and water pumping, etc.163.  So, one major advantage for 
consumers is that they might take advantage of lower prices. Consumers might save on their 
electricity bills, if  they are price-responsive and able to modify their load profile in response to 
changing hourly electricity prices (Herter, 2007)164. Consumers with RTP might move their 
consumption towards times when supply is plentiful, such as off-peak hours. These reductions in 
demand for electricity, especially during peak demand time will also reduce the electricity bills of  
consumers from lower electricity prices (Marwan and Kamel, 2011; Sezgen et al., 2007; Kirschen, 
2003; Caves et al., 2000).  Clearly, these bill savings are mostly realized by consumers who are 
more off-peak oriented.  
 
Note that lower electricity prices may also induce consumption, so overall consumption of 
electricity may increase total energy bills for these customers. Given this, we cannot strictly argue 
                                                          
163 See Kolabasa (2010) who directly investigates the impacts of RTP on these types of household activities in 
Germany and changes in the system balancing costs with wind integration. He shows that these will reduce the 
system balancing costs and allow utilities to integrate the variable wind sources at lower costs. 
164 Celebi and Fuller (2012; 2007) employ a time lag response model in their empirical analysis for the Ontario 
electricity market that allows consumers to adjust their consumption from the current to the next invoice period 
based on changes in the prices of electricity.  
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that all consumers will save from energy bills just because they will reduce their total electricity 
consumption in peak hours. Consumers might have good planning of their consumption if the 
real-time prices are sent to consumers long in advance (Taylor and Schwarz, 2000; Steen et al., 
2012), but this might increase the demand during peak hours (Steen et al., 2012). Note that the 
shift in consumption is voluntary and any loss of  comfort is by choice. This shift might also 
reduce the risk of  power outages, or the number of  temporary electricity interruptions they may 
experience in high peak seasons. In addition to savings made by the utility, the positive effect on 
consumers would be a reduction in customer annoyance and higher levels of  utility through 
having a reliable power supply.   
 
We see that consumers tend to reduce their demand for electricity at peak hours while increasing 
their demand during off-peak hours. This will then decrease the prices during peak hours of  the 
day, but increase the prices during the off-peak hours of  the day. We can see that RTP will reduce 
both price and electricity consumption during peak hours while RTP will increase both price and 
quantity during off-peak hours - but the realised off-peak price would normally still be less than 
the average price of  electricity. 
 
Figure 3.5 Effects of  Demand Response on Wholesale Energy Prices 
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Referring to Figure 3.5, an increase in the off-peak consumption of electricity might decrease the 
cost of electricity to consumers in these hours of the year because the long-run marginal cost of 
electricity is less than the average price of electricity in these hours. So, consumers who do not 
join in the programme will also benefit from such a programme as demand response in the 
market reduces the average electricity prices for all grid consumers (Albadi and El-Saadany, 2008; 
Sezgen et al., 2007). Although this may be true, we believe that the impacts of  time-varying prices 
on electricity bills depend on different consumption patterns on different consumers. Also, the 
lack of  consumers’ attention to changing hourly prices might result in increased bills for these 
customers. Compared to average pricing, dynamic pricing benefits some customers while 
harming others which brings the issue of  equity concerns among consumers into view (e.g. 
Borenstein, 2004).  
 
In deregulated wholesale electricity markets, especially in peak hours, the price of electricity 
reflects differences in marginal costs and time-varying differences in firms’ abilities to push prices 
above actual marginal costs by exercising some level of  market power165. So, the increase in 
power generation costs are reflected in wholesale prices, but the increase in wholesale prices 
might be larger than the incremental cost increase if  generators exercise some level of  market 
power166. Examples of  generators exercising market especially during peak hours include, for 
                                                          
165 By definition, the market power exercise of generators arises when they are able to increase power prices above 
the competitive price (marginal cost) level – through physical withholding (reducing supply), financing withholding 
(bidding higher prices) and increasing market concentration (collusions). This also applies to future contracts, for 
example, if generators tend to reduce their output in a current trading period (t), then the spot prices tend to rise for 
the next trading interval (t+1) .Under these two circumstances, the system serves at a  lower demand but with higher 
prices. There are policy precautions to prevent market power including structural (for example removing barriers to 
entry) and regulatory measures (for example price caps and long-term contracts). 
166 Firms might exercise market power in an oligopolistic market. However, in case of deregulated market structure, 
market power might still exist as long as bid price exceeds marginal cost of electricity generation. Simply put, 
generators supply bids higher than their marginal costs and strength of anticompetitive behaviors of generators 
correlated with this gap. There are indices used to measure the market power such as Lerner Index (LI), Elasticity-
adjusted Lerner Index (EALI) being a form of price-cost margins, or forms of concentration ratios such as 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), Comprehensive Concentration Ratio (CCR), and Residual Supply Index (RSI). 
These types of estimates are very useful when we deal with oligopolistic markets. If data on marginal cost of 
electricity generation, the price-elasticity of demand for electricity and finally market shares are available, the LI or 
EALI can be used. Since we usually cannot obtain this kind information accurately (firms may not present their true 
 151 
 
example the UK (Green and Newbery, 1992), and the US (Lafferty et al., 2001; Borenstein et al., 
2000). Although this is not desirable, suppliers may still exercise market power due to the 
monitoring and mitigating difficulties encountered by the regulators and competition authorities 
(Twomey and Neuhoff, 2010), and also due to inexistence of  demand elasticity from flat retail 
prices, for example in the UK (Mansur, 2001), in Germany (Weigt and von Hirschhausen, 2008) 
and in the US (Borenstein et.al., 2002).  
 
The market power abuse can be reduced by two ways, through the supply side by reducing 
market concentration or through the demand side by allowing customers to respond to the 
changing price of electricity. If consumers are unable observe time-varying prices, they cannot 
limit the price rises so firms have incentives to exercise some market power, particularly during 
periods when capacity constraint is binding (Borenstein and Holland, 2005)167. Dynamic pricing 
of  electricity, however, might dampen wholesale price volatility, reduce the likelihood of  market 
power as if  consumers refuse to purchase electricity at high prices, and finally reduce average 
energy prices to all consumers (Joskow and Wolfram, 2011; Albadi and El-Saadany, 2008; Violette 
et al., 2007; Borenstein and Holland, 2005; Hunt, 2002; Caves et al., 2000; Moezzi et al., 2004; 
O’Sheasy, 2003; Braithwait et al., 2002; Faruqui and George; 2002). Application of  real-time-
pricing ensures competitive wholesale market outcomes in the short-run, for example in the form 
of  lower equilibrium prices (Centolella, 2010; Holland and Mansur, 2008; Zarnikau, 2008; 
Braithwait et al., 2006; Borenstein and Holland, 2005; Kirschen, 2003; Rosenzweig et al., 2003; 
Borenstein et al., 2002; Joskow and Kahn, 2002; Brennan, 2002; Borenstein and Bushnell, 1999) 
and this might also promote a more efficient generation mix in the system in the long-run 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
costs), researchers mostly apply HHI to measure market power or RSI.  A comprehensive study on market power is 
available in Newbery, Green, Neuhoff and Twomey (2004). Also, see related studies for shortcomings of pool 
markets in electricity trading, such as Green (2000).   
167 Although this is true, regulators or competition authorities may allow generators to exercise market power at certain 
degrees so that they achieve revenue adequacy in their short-run operations (especially high fixed costs plants), and keep 
investing in generation capacity to maintain the overall system reliability in long-run (Twomey and Neuhoff, 2005). 
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(Centolella, 2010; Borenstein, 2004; Borenstein, 2005). These authors clearly argue that demand 
response can restrain prices to their economically efficient levels by promoting the efficient 
operations of  the restructured power markets. A substantial reduction of price can occur when 
even a small fraction of the load responds to varying electricity prices as displayed in figure 3 
above.  
 
The use of  dynamic pricing of  electricity will also alter the emissions from electricity generation 
by simply changing the load distribution in the short-run and by changing the power plant mix in 
the long-run (Gilbraith and Powers, 2012; Friedman, 2011; Allcott, 2011; Holland and Mansur, 
2008; 2006; Kiesling, 2002; Hirst and Kirby, 2001). As with the marginal cost of production, 
power plants also differ in terms of their emission of pollutants per unit of electricity generation. 
For instance, coal plants are cheaper but more polluting than the thermal plants running with 
heavy fuel oil168’169’170. Old power plants are more polluting plants with very low operating 
efficiency, which are used only during high demand hours. A reduction in demand for electricity 
in peak hours could actually reduce the use of these old stations which are expensive to run and 
dirtier for the environment, and also reduce the requirement for operating reserves in those 
hours. The short-run effects of  marginal cost pricing on the environment is ambiguous, however. 
The changes in the load factors in peak and off-peak hours will change the capacity mix in the 
system, so we expect changes in emissions in relative terms, but not in absolute terms. In other 
words, it may not always be the case that demand response is a useful tool to reduce emissions by 
reducing the peak power generation that has the potential for poor air quality, as in Australia 
                                                          
168 For such comparisons, see for example Alcazar-Ortega et al., (2012), Tekiner et al., (2010),  Murray (2009, p.78) 
and Meza et al., (2007). 
169 At the same time, we expect benefits of demand response to drop – at least the price of electricity is likely 
increase - when a carbon tax is imposed. This is because a carbon tax tends to reduce cost differential between coal 
burned and oil burned generators, so it impacts the optimal stacking of the generation mix accordingly.  
170 Therefore, we can also raise the question of “whether it is possible that the reduction in the price of electricity 
causes positive welfare effects that are worse than the willingness to accept these emissions?”  People want to pay 
lower prices at the expense of higher emissions? Or reduction in prices with RTP dominates their willingness to pay 
to avoid such emissions with flat tariff? 
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(Wright, 2012). At the same time, emissions might also decrease as RTP may discourage the use 
of  large emitting peak plants, but it will induce the use of  cleaner off-peak plants explained by 
load shifting. Consequently, this again means that environmental consequences of  such 
programmes are unclear171 and it is hard to generalise about the environmental impacts of 
demand response.  
 
The impacts on both dispatching and emission levels depends strictly on electricity generation 
technologies in the system and to what extent do consumers alter their electricity consumption in 
response to peak vs. off-peak price changes, so environmental implications  are not the same for 
all countries (Wright, 2012; Holland and Mansur, 2008; IEA, 2003).  Hence, we have to estimate 
increases in greenhouse gas emissions from load shifting net of decrease in gas and other 
pollutant emissions from peak demand reduction. Holland and Mansur (2008) also state that 
emissions from electricity generation tend to decrease or increase depending on load demand 
change that affects the mix of  thermal system that has to supply this change. For clarification, 
Holland and Mansur (2006) find that RTP tends to reduce 2CO emissions whilst tending to 
increase both 2SO  and xNO  emissions. The reason for this is that the RTP adoption increases the 
use of  coal-fired generation which in turn increases all emissions from “dirty” coal plants. The 
net change in emissions vary, however. For example, the reduction in emissions from gas-fired 
generators in the system offset the increased 2CO emissions from coal-fired generators resulting a 
net reduction in 2CO emissions. The 2SO  and xNO  emissions will increase with the RTP 
adoption, however. The reason is that 2SO  and xNO emissions per kWh from coal-fired electricity 
generation is very large compared to gas-fired plants, so the reduction in these emissions from 
gas-fired generators cannot offset the increased 2SO  and xNO  emissions from coal-fired 
                                                          
171 Similar arguments are available in Wright (2012).  
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generators172. Athough this is true, some authors argue that real-time-pricing yields environmental 
benefits from re-allocation of  conventional plants (Friedman, 2011; Kiesling, 2001; Hirst and 
Kirby, 2001). Therefore, environmental benefits from implementation of  real-time pricing are 
system specific.  
 
In order to conclude regarding the long-term environmental benefits of  the application of  the 
RTP programme, we should critically evaluate the impacts of  the RTP programme on future 
thermal generation mix as well as its impacts on the deployment of  renewable technologies. We 
suspect that the concerns over possible negative environmental impacts of  demand response 
programs might be a serious barrier in the implementation of  such programs in some countries. 
Long-run environmental benefits from demand response, the reduction in both generation and 
transmission lines also impacts the local environment by preserving land resources for future 
generations173. Therefore, we can conclude that environmental implications such as air pollutant 
and local emissions from electricity generation from implementing dynamic pricing are 
ambiguous and increasingly unclear in the long-run. 
 
Transmission and distribution lines might be overloaded during high demand hours, so the 
possible reduction of electricity demand in those hours might relief for both generation 
congestion and transmission constraints (IEA, 2003). The reduction in peak demand is highly 
likely to reduce the potential power outages and power losses from the grid that might occur 
during high demand hours (Goel et al., 2006, IEA, 2003). Reduction in peak demand and 
flattening the load curve will help electric utilities to improve overall system performance by 
means of  improved system reliability in a cost-effective way (Centolella, 2010; Earle et al., 2009).  
                                                          
172 Various emission with their intensities from different fossil-fuels in the US is presented by the US Department of 
Energy, see http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/capitalcost/pdf/updated_capcost.pdf. These emissions vary across 
power generating units as well as kWh emissions from generators depends on emission intensity of fuel and fuel 
efficiency of power plants (e.g. how much fuel generator needs to produce 1 kWh of energy).  
173 This non-use value of demand response programs could motivate people to support and join the programme. In 
addition, they might consume less electricity if they aware of the negative impacts of energy consumption.  
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Therefore, it will enhance grid-use efficiency by means of  greater utilization from existing 
capacity and improved reliability.  When benefits from a more reliable power supply are added, 
the benefits of demand response programs increase substantially. 
 
System reliability over the long-run needs adequate investments in both generation and 
transmission lines174. Demand for generation capacity and transmission capacity must move 
together. Peak demand reduction and load shifting towards off-peak periods in the short-run 
might also avoid or postpone peak capacity investments (running just few hours in a year) in the 
long-run (Ericson, 2011; Holland and Mansur, 2008; 2006, US Department of  Energy, 2006; 
Borenstein and Holland, 2005), reduce the investments in capacity reserves over time (Andersen 
et al., 2009; Braithwait et al., 2006), and reduce the cost of  expanding transmission and 
distribution infrastructure (FERC, 2006). Therefore, a real time pricing policy will improve the 
overall welfare in a country by increasing the efficiency of generation investments in electricity 
supply (Ericson, 2011; Borenstein, 2005). For instance, Borenstein (2005) calculates long-term 
benefits from applying hourly electricity pricing and clearly shows that hourly electricity pricing 
reduces the need for peak capacity in the system in response to an increase in prices during peak 
hours. Savolainen and Svento (2012, 2013) also prove that even a small response from customers 
(very inelastic demand) and modest participation in RTP programme tends to reduce equilibrium 
capacity in the Nordic power market. Therefore, the conclusion is dynamic pricing of  electricity 
might foster system reliability both in short-run and long-run by reducing the demand for 
capacity at high price hours when the system approaches its full capacity.   
                                                          
174 In the electricity industry, the system reliability in the short-run refers to a perfect balance of power supply and 
demand in real time. Before deregulation, public utilities were responsible regarding preserving the short and long-
run reliability in its system. In the past years, for example, or consumers were given monetary incentives and if 
incentives were satisfactory for them, they were willing to lower their electricity consumption during peak times, and 
shift their consumption to off-peak times (Su and Kirschen, 2009; Hill, 1991). There were other forms of public 
utility interventions including load shedding and scheduled outages. The primary objective of these traditional 
methods was to increase the power supply reliability and postponing investments in generation –rather than having 
efficiency in generation.  
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The consensus in the literature is that demand side programmes such as RTP facilitate renewable 
investments and reduces electricity consumption which yields benefits to customers through 
lower bills and to the environment by fewer emissions175. For example, a time-varying price of  
electricity may allow us to reallocate demand to the times of  increased renewable power 
generation so that the system supports a higher penetration of  renewables, for example in the 
UK (Roscoe and Ault, 2010; Torriti et al., 2009), in Germany (Klobasa, 2010). Given this 
information, we can argue that incorporating demand responses yields more benefit from 
renewable electricity that is available during off-peak hours than the static pricing we currently 
use, as in RTP analysed by Borenstein (2005). Additionally, if  renewables such as wind and solar 
displace fossil fuel fired generation with high emissions of  pollutants, then dynamic pricing might 
yield  higher system-wide social welfare from intermittent power sources and contribute to the 
environment by integrating renewable electricity generation.  
 
When intermittent wind and solar sources are added into systems, the additional reserve 
requirement represents an extra cost for maintaining reliability and reducing the emission saving 
benefits from renewable energy sources. The demand response programs might be a panacea for 
the challenge of integrating large renewable power sources into the grid at lower costs (Milligan 
and Kirby, 2010), and facilitate intermittent renewables at lower integration costs by reallocating 
demand to times of increased renewable power generation  - thereby inducing better correlation 
between the renewables electricity output and load demand (Pina et al., 2012; Mohammadi et al., 
2011; Grohnheit et al., 2011; Klobasa, 2010; Moura and de Almeida, 2010; Jacobsen and 
Zvingilaite, 2010; Sioshansi,2010; Sioshansi and Short, 2008; Zibelman and Krapels, 2008; 
                                                          
175 For example, see customer benefits and carbon dioxide emissions savings from household demand response from 
2010 to 2030, empirically estimated for the UK economy by the Brattle Group. The report separates demand 
response into sub categories such as electricity demand reduction, electricity demand response, gas demand 
reduction and fuel switching. They estimate that total consumer savings would range from 4310-12350 millions of 
Pounds and carbon dioxide emission savings would range from 28.3 to 97.5 MT  
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Borenstein, 2008; Spees and Lave, 2007; Denholm and Margolis, 2007)176, which in turn helps a 
country in meeting its renewable targets and emission reduction targets at lower system 
integration costs (Finn, 2011; Grohnheit et al., 2011; Friedman, 2011; Borenstein, 2008; 2012).  
 
Furthermore, demand response reduces back-up costs that possibly eliminate or reduce the 
problem of  reliability associated with renewables, contribute system performance and also 
contribute to the generation flexibility requirement due to the intermittency characteristics of  
renewables (Borenstein, 2012; E3G, 2011; De Jonghe, 2011; Hamidi et al., 2008; Strbac, 2008). 
The reduction in back-up costs might come from standby and balancing reserve capacities saved 
from existing peaking capacities. Both studies by Sioshansi and Short (2008), and Sioshansi 
(2010) also show that introducing demand response, for example real-time-pricing, reduces the 
re-dispatching costs and eliminate loss of  load events in the system that might arise from the 
integration of  renewables. Therefore, their precise argument is that demand response programs 
tend to reduce system costs as well as increase the surplus from renewable sources. Given the fact 
that electricity generation is subject to rigid short-term capacity constraints, the programme may 
also contribute to greater reliability by reducing power consumption at peak hours of  the day 
when demand approaches the supply capacity. Based on these studies, we can conclude that 
operational problems due to intermittent nature of renewables are inevitable, but demand side 
flexibility from dynamic pricing can be regarded as a hedge against the uncertainty arising from 
renewable electricity supply.  
 
The distributional impacts of  such programmes are complicated (Taylor et al., 2005) and bring 
the issue of  equity into the picture. Whether demand response should be mandatory or optional 
also raises the issue of  fairness and equity. For instance, Borenstein (2012) clearly states that most 
                                                          
176 For clarification, all studies work on impacts of demand response on wind source of electricity generation with 
the exception of Denholm and Margolis (2007) and Borenstein (2008). Both studies investigate the impacts of RTP 
on solar sources. 
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poor consumers in  ‘Pacific Gas & Electric and Southern California Edison utilities’ benefit from 
critical peak pricing (CPP) with the exception of  low-income consumers when low-income 
consumers have more peaky demand profile on average than those low consumption consumers 
with less peaky demand profile.  Another problem is that these programs are voluntary programs 
due to political constraints, but low peak demand and high off-peak demand consumers might 
join the programme in order to accrue benefits from lower prices – but without paying the 
individual cost of  joining the programme177. Thus, the utility either has to bear the entire costs 
from getting lower electricity revenues at zero costs from these individuals, or utility will pass 
these revenue losses to its remaining customers in the form of  higher fixed tariffs (Train and 
Mehrez, 1994). But, it is worthwhile to state here that mandatory TOU or RTP programmes may 
face much resistance from potential losers if they realize that the flat rate is preferable from their 
perspective. Table 3.1 summarises the key impacts of RTP. 
3.4.2 Forms of  Demand Response in Electricity Markets 
 
There are two forms of  demand response programs in the electricity market, namely price-based 
demand response and incentive-based demand programs. Incentive-based demand programs such as 
interruptible and voluntary load reduction programs work in a way that consumers reach out to wholesale 
markets and receive financial returns in exchange for reduction in their consumption during certain 
hours of  the day. Therefore, these programs are applicable during peak hours when the wholesale 
prices are high and system capacity is highly constrained.  The consumers receive money directly 
from generators equivalent to the difference between the wholesale and retail price of  electricity.  In 
the longer term, demand response also includes the implementation of energy efficient programs (i.e. 
energy efficient home appliances) sponsored by utilities or governments (Greening, 2010). In this 
research, we will not analyse the incentive-based demand programs or energy efficiency programs. 
                                                          
177 The old experiment by Aigner and Ghali (1989) provides the relevant approach directed at time-of-use TOU 
experiments for residential sector, and also validates this idea.  
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Table 3.1 Literature Summary of  Short-Run and Long-Run Impacts of  RTP   
 Short-Run Long-Run 
 
 
 
 
 
Consumers 
 
 
 improve price stability by smoothing the demand for energy, 
so  consumer benefit from the demand side programmes. 
 
 risk their electricity bill with varying electricity prices 
opposed to fixed flat retail prices- depending on time-lag in 
notifying and implementing the RTP prices. 
 
 peak time users pay higher prices compared to the fixed 
price they used to pay, so decrease their consumer surplus 
from consumption. 
 
 off-peak electricity users will pay lower electricity prices, so 
increase their consumer surplus. 
 
 consumers may tend to purchase more efficient home 
appliances to lower their electricity bills.  
 
 lowers electricity bills from more efficient home appliances 
and may encourage them to re-adjust their consumption to 
more peak so there exists ambiguity for consumers in 
terms of  total expenditures on electricity. (possibility of  
rebound effect) 
 
 Fixed retail prices tend to decrease with an increase in RTP 
participation. 
 
 Both participating and non-participating customers will gain 
higher consumer surplus with an increase in RTP 
participation 
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System 
Infrastructure  
and 
Thermal 
Power 
Suppliers 
 
 
 use of  peak plants (high MC plants) tends to decrease and 
generators receive lower prices, so their profits are highly 
likely drop. 
 
 use of  off-peak (low MC plants) and intermediate load 
plants (relatively low MC plants) increase and generators 
receive higher prices, so profits will increase. 
 
 consumers eliminate the possibility of  market power 
exercise by generators – seems a promising option to 
eliminate possible market abuse by generators. 
 
 more efficient in generation supply mix - better 
utilization of  existing capacity, and greater level of  
system reliability at lower cost (i.e. less reserve with RTP 
than without RTP programme) 
 
 reduce need for peak capacity, and slow down the 
investments in new generation capacity  especially peak 
capacity investments and transmission capacity 
investments (strictly depends on own and cross price 
demand elasticities, so level of  response and actual 
participation from customers) 
 
 total equilibrium capacity might increase or decrease in 
the L-R with an increase in customer participation in the 
RTP programme depending on change in demand for 
capacity, but has no effect on either generators’ or 
retailers’ profits.   
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Renewable 
Power 
Suppliers 
 
 
 higher load factor of  off-peak renewable power with 
higher coincidence with the system load, so minimize the 
waste of  renewable power during off-peak hours. 
 
 contribute to system reliability so help the system to 
overcome the intermittency problem of  renewables (at 
least for  wind and solar sources of  electricity generation 
that are both intermittent and non-dispatchable). 
 
 off-peak hours of  renewables power suppliers will be 
better-off  by receiving higher prices whilst peak hours of  
renewable power suppliers will be worse-off  by selling 
their output at lower prices. 
 
 
 
 encourage renewable power investments with more of  
off-peak hour availability. 
 
 discourage renewable power investments with peak hour 
availability. 
 
 improves system reliability due to smoothing effect on 
the system load, and achieves greater level of  renewable 
integration in a cost-effective way – rather than 
increasing just reserves in order to cope with 
intermittency of  renewables.  
 
 
 
Environment 
 
 hard to quantify, and impacts strictly depend on effects of  
demand response on dispatching of  ‘current’ peak vs. off  
peak generation mix with different levels of  emissions. 
 
 demand response will likely improve air quality if  it 
reduces the use of  peak (polluting diesel and fuel oil) 
plants and increases the use of  more clean off-peak and 
intermediate load hours (e.g. CCGT). 
 
 expected to fall due to an increase in thermal efficiency 
of  thermal plants, higher efficiency in generation mix in 
L-R and better utilization of  renewable power 
penetration. 
 Some emissions from electricity generation might 
increase; some emissions from electricity generation 
might decrease. 
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3.4.3 Price-Based Demand Response Programs (PB-DRPs) 
 
Price-Based Demand response programme (hereafter PB-DRP) is any method that allows end-
use customers to observe and respond to the time-varying electricity wholesale prices, so both 
demand and supply side participants involve in wholesale price-setting of  electricity. This way of  
trading electricity yields the optimum level of  benefits for participants in the market (Kirschen 
and Strbac, 2004). PB-DRPs have potential to offer substantial economic benefits (i.e. cost 
savings) in the form of improved economic efficiency in wholesale electricity markets. PB-DRP 
in electricity aims to alter both the time and level of  consumption by the end-use customers over 
time in response to these prices.  
 
These programs pursue three main goals (Braithwait and Eakin, 2002) namely (i) peak clipping: 
reduction in demand for electricity at peak time hours, (ii): load shifting: redistribution of electricity 
demand based on varying electricity prices and (iii) valley filling: increase of demand toward low 
cost of supply hours. That is to say, the objective is to keep the differences between peak and off-
peak load as small as possible – it is also  evident from an economic  point of view that a ‘‘flatter’’ 
electricity load would be preferred for both short-run operations and long-run investments in the 
sector (Woo and Greening, 2010) . One clear distinction between PB-DRP and RTP or TOU, is 
that these programs might decrease or increase the overall electricity consumption, and do not 
only alone reduce the peak demand  (peak clipping), but also substitute the consumption of 
electricity between periods (load shifting).  
 
There are three demand response options where consumers might potentially modify their 
consumption decisions (i.e. individual load profiles) in response to price changes - or adjust their 
electricity consumption according to their willingness to pay for the delivered electricity by 
receiving price signals. These kinds of  demand response programs require the installation of  
 163 
 
smart meters into their homes which allow them to monitor time-varying prices of  electricity178. 
The price-based varying tariff  options are namely time-of-use prices (TOU), critical peak pricing (CPP) 
and real time pricing (RTP). We present the basic characteristics of  price based demand side 
participation in the figure below. 
 
Each of  these options captures the variations in electricity costs to a different degree (increasing 
reward), but at the same time with a different level of  risk and variation in price (Faruqui et al., 
2010; Sioshansi and Short, 2009. There are two extreme forms of  pricing schemes available in the 
market for electricity which are flat tariff  and dynamically changing real-time pricing (RTP) over 
time. Both time-of-use (TOU) and critical peak pricing (CPP) are static and fall between these 
two extremes. Real-time pricing (RTP) programme is the purest form of  PB-DRP.  In RTP, 
consumers know the wholesale electricity price on a day-ahead or hour-ahead basis. Therefore, 
RTP is a short-term demand response mechanism that allows consumers to respond time-varying 
marginal costs in electricity generation.  Examples of  some successful implementation of  such 
real-time pricing of  electricity include for Georgia Power and Niagara Mohawk utilities 
programme for large industrial customers (Hunt, 2002), to residential customers by Ameron-
Illions and Commonwealth Edison utilities in the US , and Ontario utility in Canada (Faruqui and 
Lessen, 2012).  
 
TOU pricing differs from RTP in the sense that rates are known ex-ante and they are fixed 
regardless of  the out-turn system load.  TOU prices are determined in advance (pre-set) and 
usually reflect daily and seasonal variations in electricity costs. More precisely, TOU rates are 
                                                          
178 In the United States, Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) Utility has been implementing time-of-use rates for 
residential customers since 1982 and estimates in early 1990s show that 80% of participating customers saved about 
$ 240 annually (IEA, 2003). As of December 2009, Pacific Gas and Electric customers in Kern Country has 
experienced about 1,100 complaints from customers out of 4 million customers about installed smart meters. 
Customers officially complained and write that smart meters did not record their consumption accurately, but it was 
due to over consumption of electricity during hot months of July said the utility. 
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designed to reflect expected changes in long-run conditions, and these rates do not reflect either 
volatility or inherent uncertainty in electricity supply (i.e. cost of  power supply). Because of  this, 
one major advantage of  TOU compared to RTP is that it is less costly to implement for the 
utility and consumers can adjust their consumption more easily with dynamically changing RTP. 
Because prices and periods are set in advance, TOU might not achieve peak load reduction and 
revenue erosion for the utility when demand realization for electricity is higher than anticipated 
(e.g. true costs are higher than TOU rates).    
 
CPP pricing differs from both TOU and RTP in the sense that the utility informs customers 
about critical period hours ahead or days ahead. CPP is in the form of  a cost premium that is 
applied at certain times when demand for power reaches the maximum capacity available in the 
system such as summer and winter peaking hours179.  One major advantage of  this pricing is that 
the utility might achieve a substantial reduction in peak demand when that has the greatest value 
to the system and gives an incentive to people to cut their electricity during critical peak times, 
shift electricity consumption from peak to off-peak hours when critical peak events occur 
(Wolak, 2010;  Herter, 2007). One major disadvantage of  CPP for the utility is that it applies only 
for limited hours (e.g. super peak hours) so the utility must pick the right hours, and a major 
disadvantage for consumers is that they are able to save only during very high price hours of  the 
year if  they respond to the utility’s call.  Therefore, there is an uncertainty for both the utility and 
consumers with respect to the occurrence of  these hours such that both parties do not know 
these critical peak price hours. It is very crucial for the utility to pick up these critical hours and 
                                                          
179 There is also peak time rebate that is similar to CPP. In theory, both CPP and PTR have the same goal; reducing 
the load when it is very costly to serve peak hours. In practice, consumers with PTR get credits from load reduction 
during peak hours, but are not punished if load demand during these hours increases. Examples of pilot programs 
for PTR include the City of Anaheim Public Utility, for residential customers from June 2005 to October 2005. 
Therefore, there is a safeguard for the PTR participating consumers. It is estimated that CPP pricing in France since 
1996 resulted in a substantial reduction in energy demand – such that doubling of peak prices results in load 
reductions of up to 20%, clearly stated by the IEA (2003).In France, CPP includes three types of days: least 
expensive days (blue), moderately expensive days (white) and most expensive days(red) and off-peak prices vary from 
4.64 euro cents/kWh to 17.62 euro cents/kWh during off-peak hours of these days whilst peak prices vary from 5.77 
euro cents/kWh to 49.29 euro cents/ kWh in these days (Giraud, 2004).  
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this is challenging for the utility.  
 
In demand response programs, there exists a trade-off  between risk to consumer and reward to 
consumer. Among the price-responsive options available, RTP is the most dynamic tariff  
programme. It captures the variations in electricity costs (plus a small adder or mark-up) based on 
actual demand and supply balance, and transmission costs. Hence, from an economic perspective, 
RTP must yield the highest economic benefits only if  consumers are able respond to these 
prices180. The highest bill instability to consumers is also from RTP. By risk and uncertainty, we 
mean that the time when these prices are in effect is unknown. In TOU pricing, consumers pay 
different prices at different times of  the day such that on-peak prices are higher and off-peak 
prices are lower than the original flat rate. Therefore, TOU pricing reflects the average marginal 
cost of power supplying each block of hours. So, TOU falls somewhere between RTP and flat 
rate such that it incurs lower bill instability for consumers and lower revenue instability for the 
utility as well. Therefore, TOU is less dynamic so that it neither produces full allocative efficiency 
in the short run nor efficiency of  capacity investments in the long run.  Finally, we expect CPP to 
be between TOU and RTP.  CPP is a very special form of  dynamic pricing, because the utility 
can chose limited hours to apply CPP.  These limited hours are defined as critical hours on event 
days.  The price of  electricity is much higher in these certain hours, but prices are lower in off-
peak hours than the original flat rate. Thus, the utility has to choose the right hours when 
demand reaches its super peaks otherwise the utility cannot capture the potential gains from CPP.   
 
Although RTP (dynamic pricing) is more efficient and captures greater variations in marginal cost 
of  electricity, TOU (static pricing) has been more widely used and accepted in countries as it is 
easier and less costly to implement than RTP (Faruqui and Sergici, 2010; Abrate, 2003)181. TOU 
                                                          
180 See for example, Li and Flynn (2006).  
181 Implementation of advance meeting technology is not difficult in Cyprus; see Advanced Metering Infrastructure 
in CSE countries – current implementation status, plans, and perspectives, Ernst and Young, June 2012. 
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rates for residential customers in Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) utility and CPP pricing in 
Electricité de France (EDF) utility are known worldwide as successful demand response 
programs (IEA, 2003; Aubin, 1995). Borenstein et al., (2001) also argue that CPP pricing is more 
suitable for small and medium scale residential and commercial consumers as a result of  which 
we get the benefits of  RTP with lower cost (implementing CPP is less costly) with a high 
response (CPP typically applies to 50-200 hours of  the year) from these customers. Celebi and 
Fuller (2007) also suggest that TOU pricing would be more appropriate than RTP for consumers 
and TOU prices will solve the inefficiency problems from single pricing.  
 
The empirical literature reveals that customers are able and willing to respond to price signals, but 
the degree of responsiveness varies widely across users. It is no easy task to measure these 
elasticities accurately for each of these demand response programs (TOU and RTP), because 
demand response programs must undertake to examine both overall price responsiveness of 
consumers (program participants) as well as their responsiveness to shift their demand for 
electricity to off-peak hours. Thus, responsiveness behaviour itself is complex and the elasticities  
might depend on many factors such as  target population with different level of age, house 
ownership (e.g. with and without insulation, detached vs. semidetached, with and without pool), 
income, lifestyle (e.g. rural vs. urban), occupation, education level of voluntary participants, 
sensitivity to environmental problems, and more broadly the way prices are communicated to 
program participants (how often prices change), rate design, duration of voluntary programs (e.g. 
seasons included in the experiment), information before they actually voluntarily join the 
program (e.g. Thorsnes et al., 2012; Taylor, 2005; Reiss and White, 2005; King et al., 2003; Kohler 
and Mitchell,1984)182.  
 
 
                                                          
182 These statements are valid for both TOU and RTP experiments, for example Taylor (2005) for both RTP and 
TOU experiments, and Thorsnes et al., (2012) for TOU experiment.  
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Consumers’ response to price changes is different for each of  these programmes because 
consumers receive price signals at different frequencies (intervals) for each of  these programmes. 
Hence, we expect elasticities to be different for each type of  demand participation programme 
and across users (Patrick and Wolak, 2001). Among these demand response programmes, there is 
much more certainty about rates and their times of  occurrence in case of  TOU programmes in 
comparison to RTP. Hence, the implementation of  a TOU programme is easier for system 
operators, and it is simple for consumers to understand and respond to such a pricing 
programme.  
3.4.4 Challenges and Obstacles for Incorporating Demand Response Programs 
 
Social and political reasons are the main obstacles to moving away from average pricing of  
electricity, something which we will discuss in later sections. We first however need to clarify 
these regulatory, technical, economic, political and other barriers and then find ways to overcome 
them in order to boost demand response in electricity markets. The issue is then the best way of  
transferring hourly electricity prices to consumers in order to capture the variations in the 
wholesale price through available demand side participation programmes. The lack of a direct 
connection between wholesale and retail markets can be seen as a regulatory barrier that needs to 
be resolved.  
 
The first problem relates to technology and infrastructure that allows consumers to modify their 
consumption with respect to changing wholesale prices. Meters and control systems allow 
communication between consumers and electricity retailers and coordinate retail and wholesale 
markets so that consumers can receive signals of  dynamic wholesale price movements. These 
systems are required for all types of  dynamic pricing rates and imply costs for demand response 
programs. But lack of  advanced metering infrastructure is still a serious barrier facing price-
responsive demand programs (Chao, 2011; Strbac, 2008).  
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Table 3.2 RTP Elasticity Estimates Based on Voluntary Programmes  
Author(s) Model and Data Main Findings 
 
 
 
Harriges et al., (1993) 
 
 
Nested CES  
 
Niagara Mohawk Power, data from 
9 participating large industrial 
customers with peak usage greater 
than 2,820 kW, and 6 control group 
facing TOU pricing with peak 
usage exceeding 2,940 kW. 
 
Metering Interval: day ahead hourly 
prices, hourly data is from April to 
November 199X.  
The response to RTP experiment is not 
uniform among participating firms and 
seasons (months) 
 
Intraday elasticity of  substitution estimates 
vary between 0.085 to 0.136  
 
Inter-day elasticity of  substitution  estimates 
vary between 0.073 to 0.560 
 
Approximate pool average intra-day and 
inter-day elasticities of  substitution are 0.093 
and 0.163, respectively, so elasticity of  
substitution across days is almost twice as 
larger than the substitution of  elasticity 
within days.  
 
 
 
Patrick and Wolak (2001) 
Symmetric Generalized McFadden 
Cost Function183. 
 
UK Midland Electricity Market, 
data from 520 medium and large 
scale commercial and industrial 
customers with load demand 
exceeding 100 kW, and at the same 
time peak demand being greater 
than 1,000 kW. 
 
Metering Interval: day ahead half-
hourly prices, from 1991 to 1995 
Heterogeneity across industrial customers 
such that elasticity estimates reported vary 
across industries.  
 
Water supply industry is highly responsive 
with own price-elasticity ranging from -0.01 
to -0.27, but hourly elasticity is estimates for 
other sectors range from 0 to -0.05.   
    
 
 
 
 
 
Schwarz et al., (2002) 
Nested CES  
 
Duke Power, data from 110 large 
scale customers from 20 different 
sector  
 
Metering is day-ahead, from June to 
September months, 1994-1999 
 to 1999 
Higher response from industries with onsite 
generation facilities, and those industries 
affected from power interruptions.  
 
Reduction in load during high price hours 
that is independent from elasticity estimates 
as prices during hot summer peak period 
vary 5 to 10 times.   
                                                          
183  Different from CES, in this particular methodology, electricity demands throughout the day can be treated as 
substitutes and complements across different hours of the day.  
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Braithwaith and 
O’Sheasy (2002) 
Georgia Power, USA, data from 
1600 medium and large scale 
commercial and industrial customer 
with load demand greater than 200 
kW. 
Own-price elasticity estimates vary across 
customers, as well as changing hourly price 
levels.  
 
Elasticities are ranging from -0.01 to -0.28.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Boisvert et al., (2004) 
Generalized Leontief  (GL) Model  
 
Central and Southwest Services, 
data from 54 large scale commercial 
and industrial customer with load 
demand greater than 1000 kw.  
 
Metering Interval: Two-part RTP 
tariffs, one customer segment with 
day-ahead option and another 
customer segment with hour ahead 
pricing options, years of  study 
between 1998 and 2001 
Elasticity of  substitution range across 
customer segments and classification of  the 
peak period.  
 
The elasticity of  substitution from day-ahead 
RTP customers ranging from 0.10 to 0.18 
with an average substitution of  0.14 
 
The elasticity of  substitution from hour-
ahead RTP customers ranging from 0.20 to 
0.27 with an average substitution of  0.235 
 
 
 
 
Taylor et al., (2005) 
Symmetric Generalized McFadden 
functional form 
 
Duke Power, data from 51 large 
scale commercial and industrial 
customers, with load demand 
greater than 1,000 kW.  
 
Metering Interval: Two-part RTP, 
with day-ahead hourly price 
notification, June, July, August, and 
September summer months data 
during 2001.  
Elasticity estimates vary over day and across 
customers.  
 
Higher response to price change occurs 
during high price peak hours and peak 
energy substitution is not for next or one 
earlier hour (i.e. 8pm-12am peak energy is 
substituted for potential 2pm-6pm peak 
hours).  
 
Higher response from industries with onsite 
generation or furnace oil such that own-
elasticity increase from -0.029 to -0.269 with 
onsite generation facilities.  
 
Elasticity increase with each additional year 
of  RTP experience.  
 
 
 
Boisvert et al., (2007) 
 
Generalized Leontief  (GL) Model  
 
Central and Southwest Services, 
data from 119 large scale 
commercial and industrial 
customers with load greater than 
1,000 kW.  
 
Customers are divided into two 
segments, one group is notified in 
day-ahead pricing, and another 
group of  customers are notified 
hour-ahead pricing, hourly price 
and load date is from 2000 to 2004.  
Load weighted average elasticity of  
substitution is modest at 0.11.  
 
About 75% of  the aggregate prices is 
concentrated in the 18% of  customers with 
the highest elasticity of  substitution 
estimates.  
 
Manufacturing customers are the most price 
responsive customers, followed by 
government/education, and finally 
commercial/retail customers.  
 
 
 170 
 
Note that the cost of  implementing the price response program varies, for example a billing 
engine is must for all programs, but pricing engine software is required for only RTP, not for 
TOU or CPP (Pratt, 2011, p.10). Although some argue that the capital costs of  installing 
advanced metering equipment into homes are high (Torriti et al., 2009), costs are falling due to 
technological progress (Hirst, 2002).  
 
Despite the fact that metering costs are falling over-time, it is argued that small consumer gains 
may not repay the gross costs of  such installations and equipment (Alcott, 2011; Costello, 2004; 
Borenstein, 2001; Aigner, 1984), but it would be desirable to make them mandatory for large 
users of  electricity (Borenstein, 2001). Some authors also find that the overall welfare 
implications are large enough to compensate for these costs (Borenstein et al., 2002a; Borenstein, 
2007).  Another problem arises with ownership of  such meters: who must bear the cost of  
installing these devices to allow communication between retailers and customers (O’Sheasy, 
2002)? Consumers are free to choose their suppliers (retailers), and can change their supplier at 
short notice. This might discourage retailers to install these devices  
 
In the past years, we were unable to charge prices hour by hour due to technology constraints, 
but this problem seems now to be disappearing. But it is not only metering cost, but also costs of 
program design, marketing the program, implementing the programme, educating the people, 
billing and customer services, technical assistance to customers are also part of the program 
costs. These are large infrastructure investments. Yet, these costs are still an obstacle for the 
implementation of demand response programs and reasons for their slow penetration184. But with 
falling costs, and as result of an increasing number of households and commercial customers 
equipped with smart metering (as well as intelligent appliances), they will be given an opportunity 
to face time-based electricity prices.  
                                                          
184 Based on utilities’ experience, these problems are clearly stated. For details, see Barbose et al., (2004). 
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Installation of  smart meters, and letting end-use customers react retail prices is not enough to 
guarantee that we will have high response from customers. Retailers purchase from wholesale 
markets, but end-use customers purchase their electricity at retailers’ prices.  In practical terms, 
retailers charge for electricity, including an insurance premium as well as fixed expenses such as 
grid payments and taxes.  Two main problems arise in this fixed retail pricing. First, these fixed 
costs are charged regardless of  their consumption level – they do not depend on the 
consumption level.  Therefore, the larger these adders, the less incentive is given to end-use 
customers to change their electricity consumption (Grohnheit et al., 2011, Andersen et al., 
2009)185’186.  Although this is a reasonable and valid argument, retailers need to charge these fixed 
fees in order to cover their costs. The second potential problem is the insurance premium 
retailers charge in order to secure their revenues from price risks. A potential problem is who will 
share the risks arising from time-varying price of  electricity – what is the distribution of  these 
risks between customers and retailers (O’Sheasy, 2003; Boisvert et al., 2002)? 
 
The cost-benefit analysis of  such programmes are different across users, for example, costs 
exceed benefits for small consumers (Borenstein, 2001) while benefits exceed costs for large 
industrial customers (Borenstein, 2001; Herriges et al., 1993)187.  Whether hourly metering is cost 
effective or not depends on the proportion of  metering costs over the total electricity bill 
(calculated from retail prices, not wholesale price) which consumers pay. Therefore, consumers 
prefer their billing based on an average price until metering costs come down. Note that the 
metering is likely to be cost effective for large industrial users because metering costs are small 
compared to their electricity bills. Based on this continuing disagreement about the cost-
                                                          
185 The fraction of these additives in our country of study, Cyprus, is the smallest among all other EU countries.  
186 For details, see for example the RESPOND Project (2006-2009) by Andersen et al., (2009).   
187 The benefits and costs of this programmes for a particular sector depends on their willingness and ability to 
respond the prices. In this regard, large businesses seem react changes. Estimates from Australia also show that 
elasticities of large industries are much higher than those of residential customers (NEMMCO, 2006).  Therefore, 
attracting large users might be a first step toward this programme, as authors listed above also suggest.  
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effectiveness of  demand response programs, we can verify that there is no standard checklist for 
benefits and costs that must be included in the analysis. The choice of  time-horizon in the cost-
effectiveness analysis is crucial and changes the numbers radically. To illustrate, it is easier to 
screen and capture the financial costs of  the programme, and they are mostly accrued in current 
years. But economic benefits are manifold and distributed over a longer time period. 
 
The second important issue is the widespread application of  fixed uniform retail prices and 
consumers becoming accustomed to these fixed retail rates. End-use consumers are willing to 
sign fixed contracts voluntarily, because a fixed retail contract ensures more stable and 
predictable prices, and hence bills. With time-varying electricity prices, what consumers pay for 
electricity will fluctuate with the wholesales cost of  electricity. These price fluctuations are not 
currently reflected in electricity bills  This fixed retail price discourages these customers to 
respond to these fluctuating (dynamic) pricing in these markets (Faruqui and George, 2002; Hirst, 
2002). We assume that consumers can monitor time-varying prices of  electricity and adjust their 
consumption accordingly, but this monitoring is not costless. Joskow and Tirole (2004) state that 
cost of  monitoring time-varying prices (in this case RTP) and adjusting the use of  home 
appliances for small consumers is very high implying that they do not pay attention to the price 
changes and consequently do not adjust their consumption patterns accordingly. This is another 
major obstacle to implementing time-varying electricity prices. But, the use of  more sophisticated 
computers in appliances might potentially solve this problem so consumers do not need to 
monitor the changes in electricity prices.  
 
In addition, the barriers to implementation and consumer acceptance include risks, welfare 
transfers and mandatory versus voluntary programs (Borenstein, 2007b; 2003). These barriers 
cause a debate whether demand response programs to should be voluntary rather than mandatory 
for all types of customers. The critical question would then be:  is a demand response program 
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(RTP or TOU) transparent and fair for the market participants or not? Consumers are 
heterogeneous in terms of  electricity consumption.  For instance, the residential consumers’ 
demand for electricity at particular hours of  the day differs from that of  industrial and 
commercial users. The implementation of  demand response in practice is more complex than 
anticipated when the issues of  customer price risk (volatile bills) and equity concerns are taken 
into consideration (Borenstein, 2003; Borenstein, 2011a). Faruqui et al., (2010) and Faruqui and 
George (2005) find that there is a significant reduction in demand during peak demand with 
TOU pricing, but  they also show that reductions vary between different types of  consumers. 
 
Given the impacts of  RTP pricing (for example see figures 4 and 5), consumers with smoother 
consumption patterns will win from such programmes, but consumers with a more peaky 
demand will not be willing to switch to RTP pricing as they will pay more than with a flat rate.  
This will create debate whether the implementation of  these programs should be voluntary or 
mandatory, clearly stated by Borenstein (2007a and 2007b). In fact, these changes in gains and 
losses are welfare transfers within consumers and between consumers and producers. Borenstein 
(2007b) also argues that political barriers are a serious problem, for example when real-time 
pricing increases the electricity bills of  customers who pay less than average pricing. Given this 
fact, wealth transfers from dynamic pricing also causes social as well as political barriers in the 
implementation of  time-varying electricity prices. 
 
The risk of  volatility and uncertainty in electricity bills due to changing prices (Faruqui and 
Sergici, 2009; Borenstein et al., 2002a; Faruqui and George, 2002), a complex billing structure of  
dynamic pricing for retail customers (Joskow, 2010), and possible profit losses for generators 
from the RTP programme (Holland and Mansur, 2006) is used to justify the application of  
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average pricing in the electricity supply industry188. To sum up, these issues are more related to 
public acceptance and distributional effects that reduce the incentives for RTP or other forms of  
dynamic pricing to be implemented. Every consumer is concerned about the volatility of 
electricity prices and so might ask for some forms of hedged service from their supplier (Barbose 
and Goldman, 2004). At the same time, deregulation of electricity industries transfers risk for 
retailers because they must purchase electricity from generators in spot markets at volatile prices - 
but sell their electricity to consumers at fixed retail prices. What this means is that the disconnect 
between these two markets creates revenue risks for the retailers in the deregulated electricity 
markets.  
 
The most simple risk mitigating measure is hedging against uncertain future prices so that the 
overall volatility in the electricity bill reduces (Faria and Vale, 2011; Borenstein, 2007b; Borenstein 
2006; Costello, 2004; Borenstein, 2003; Hunt, 2002; Hirst, 2001a). Based on their expectation 
about future prices, consumers can sign long-term purchase contracts for certain blocks of  their 
electricity demand at a fixed price based on their historical consumption and join the spot market 
for the residual demand they consume (e.g. two-part RTP). Utilities then provide a menu of  
electricity pricing for its customers that is composed of  spot and in advance contract prices. In 
this way, utilities (i) create incentives to consumers to join and respond to the price changes, (ii) 
maintain the incentives in generation investments over the long-term, and (iii) avoid the problem 
of  possible market power exercised by generators. Therefore, the risk of  volatility in the 
electricity bill is no reason for not implementing the demand response programs according to 
these studies. In addition to this, there are other important factors that affect customers’ 
decisions.  For example, customers with a high elasticity of  demand and a large divergence 
                                                          
188 Note that the severity of these problems differs across the demand participation programs, such as TOU, CPP 
and RTP programs. The risks for consumers and loss of profits for supplier depend entirely on the frequency of 
dynamic pricing being applied – that is different between these programs. For instance, Faruqui and George (2004) 
investigate the impacts of TOU on customers and utilities. They also point out similar problems, but for public 
utility owned electricity systems.  
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between hourly prices and average price could be encouraged to move away from average pricing. 
 
We already stated that these types of  programmes are voluntary at the moment, but the political 
risk of  implementing voluntary programs exists.  Especially, some argue that people are not 
willing to adjust their consumption in response to changing electricity prices, so they end up 
paying higher retail prices if  they shift away from flat electricity tariffs (Wolak, 2010).  This can be 
linked to cultural beliefs and lack of  public knowledge (or education) about the benefits of  
dynamic pricing of  electricity (Zarnikau, 2008; Goldman, 2005; Hirst, 2002). Customers have 
little knowledge about billing and there is a lack of understanding for potential welfare impacts of 
such programmes (Kim and Shcerbakova, 2011). Therefore, utilities and other legal entities are 
responsible for showing the opportunities for customers to realize bill savings from participation 
in the programme.  Electric utilities, regulators and policymakers have a critical responsibility in 
this matter because they are responsible for marketing these types of programs. If they market 
these programs effectively, customers would have information about their benefits.  
 
Customers may not understand all of the terms and conditions of the power purchase contract 
that is offered by the retailers and might not be able to compare the impacts of fixed prices vs. 
time-varying prices on their bills (Dewees, 2001). It is worth stating that poor marketing of the 
programme and limited technical assistance provided to help participants in managing their price 
volatility are the main reasons for low participation and penetration of these programmes, based 
on a comprehensive survey of utility experience in the US (Barbose et al., 2004). The volatility in 
electricity prices and complexity of  billing for electricity consumption was one of  the reasons 
why residential and commercial customers are given less priority in implementing these programs 
relative to industrial customers (Allcott, 2011). Most consumers have a misconception that 
volatility of prices translates into a higher electricity bills and this in itself can present a barrier 
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(Hirst, 2001b)189. On a small scale, individual utilities can even start moving their customers to 
time-varying prices which will improve the participation rate (Faruqui et al., 2010).  
 
In order to decide whether the particular programme is worthwhile to implement, or postpone 
depends on cost-benefit analysis. For the adoption of dynamic pricing in any country, we first 
need to estimate the benefits of such programs individually and then the cost of upgrading all 
residential meters as well as the cost of advance metering infrastructure. The selection and 
quantification of benefits and costs determines the benefit/cost ratio of such programs and 
(Greening, 2010; Nichols, 1995). This is a serious problem because, the share of customers 
adopting demand response programs clearly depends on market conditions, customers’ 
information, and marketing of the programs and high participation is necessary in order for these 
programs to be cost effective. That is why the economic viability of demand-side participation 
has to be evaluated carefully.  
 
The argument is then that the consumers’ response to price changes becomes essential in order 
to achieve greater value from increasing renewable deployment in a power generation mix. This is 
not true for all renewables as we will discuss in later sections, but we can now say those impacts 
of  demand response programs, for example RTP programmes, are not technology-neutral across 
thermal as well as renewable generators. The final note on the supply side is that demand 
response programmes together with renewables may also mitigate a risk of  electricity price 
increases due to possible fuel price increases for thermal plants. To sum up, renewables may lead 
to higher levels of  social welfare than we anticipate if  we incorporate price responsive demand 
into the power markets, and also help countries to comply with their national targets for 
renewables in their electricity production. 
                                                          
189 For details, see Hirst, E. (2001), Price-Responsive Demand in Wholesale Markets: Why Is So Little Happening? 
The Electricity Journal, 14(4): 25-37. 
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Finally, the supply side effects are also complicated as we should not expect the demand response 
programs to be neutral across different types of  power plants. RTP will change the demand and 
so the dispatch of  power plants. For instance, some thermal power suppliers may lose their 
profits (especially peak thermal) due to the RTP programme, such as in Spain (Torriti et al., 2010). 
The possible potential problems are190: compensating for the losses of  ‘generators’ if  incurred, 
the choice of  the right electricity price so that they get a high enough rate of  return on their 
invested capital, the possibility of  generators attempting to charge prices that deviate from actual 
marginal cost per kWh, and higher electricity rates for the revenue losses from non-participating 
customers or participating customers, or equally from all customers. 
3.5 Electricity Pricing in Cyprus  
 
The electricity market in Cyprus is not liberalised and is dominated by a public utility. It has 
closed household retail markets, and competition is non-existent due to the single supplier. The 
Electricity Authority of  Cyprus (EAC) is the responsible institution for price-setting (i.e. 
regulated prices) and billing of  electricity in Cyprus and charges different rates for domestic, 
industrial and commercial users191. Electricity prices in Cyprus are indexed to fuel oil prices with a 
fuel adjustment factor, so changes in fuel prices are reflected in consumers’ electricity bills192.  
Residential consumers choose their electricity tariff based on their individual daily consumption 
profile (i.e. whether they are at home during the daytime or during the night-time). Commercial 
and industrial customers choose depending on their load size and on their grid supply voltage. In 
terms of billing, domestic and small commercial and industrial users (with meters connected to 
high or medium voltage) pay their bills bi-monthly while large commercial and industrial 
consumers pay their bills on a monthly basis. They mostly receive their electricity bill by post.  
                                                          
190 See Salies (2013).  
191 Cyprus Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism is the responsible institution for competition policy and 
energy policies of the country, not the EAC.  
192 Fuel price changes and fuel price adjustments are available at EAC see: 
https://www.eac.com.cy/EN/CustomerService/Tariffs/Documents/AverageFuelPrice_2013eng.pdf 
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Retail electricity prices without tax or fixed adders in Cyprus are currently very high, so much so 
that they are the highest in the EU at an average rate of  0.20 euros per kilowatt-hour as of  2012 
(Eurostat, Energy Price Statistics, 2012). At this rate, consumers pay 26% more than the average EU 
citizen pays for his/her electricity consumption. Zachariades and Pashourtidou (2007) use time 
series data from 1960 to 2004 to estimate both short-run and long-run price elasticities for 
electricity demand with an error correction model. They show that short-term elasticity for 
electricity is not significantly different from zero, but long-run elasticity ranges between -0.3 and -
0.4. They did not separate the demand for electricity into different load levels.  
 
The billing of  electricity consumption is made via old meters for existing connections and new 
meters for new connections to the national grid. As of  2012, both old type electromechanical 
meters and electronic meters for new generations are currently in use in Cyprus. The major 
advantage of  new electronic meters is the high and consistent accuracy of  electricity 
consumption compared to old type meters. New electronic meters are not smart meters however, 
and so no meters used in Cyprus record electricity usage by the hour and no real-time price 
information reaches consumers.  
 
It is cheap and quick to install these meters, but they have some disadvantages over smart meters. 
These disadvantages include the high labour cost of meter-reading, lack of information about the 
consumption profile as it gives cumulative consumption over billing period, and finally their 
inability to send time-related price signals to consumers. In order to overcome these problems 
and capture the benefits of time-varying electricity prices, installations of smart meters into home 
and efficient system of communication between utility and consumers are mandatory. Even 
though smart meters are more expensive than traditional meters, their costs are falling sharply 
over time. Therefore, we expect that smart meters will quickly replace the old-type traditional 
metering devices used for measuring domestic electricity consumption, especially for residential 
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and commercial customers for whom it is not cost-effective yet (Hesser and Suucar, 2012; Torriti 
et al., 2010).  In Figure 3.6 below, we present the demand pattern for electricity in Cyprus. Based 
on this figure, we clearly see that peak demand hours are morning and night whilst off-peak 
demand hours are at mid-night. Within these hours, the system approaches its available capacity 
during the summer month of  the year while only half  of  the generation capacity operates during 
the winter months193. Demand for electricity by households has increased substantially (see Figure 
3.7) due to increasing number of home electric appliances and air conditioning units (because of  
hot weather A/C is run on a frequent basis during summer months of  the year) and electric 
water heating during winter. This is due to the Mediterranean climate giving hot and dry 
summers, and mild winters.  
 
The economic sustainability of small islands heavily depends on the service sector mainly due to 
the lack of physical resources. In Cyprus, tourism is the main source of revenue from such 
services. There is a massive influx of  people onto the island for short-term visits.  The increase in 
the temporary population during the summer months is translated into the additional demand for 
electricity as reflected in the data used in this paper. Tourism statistics of  the Cyprus show that 
even though the number of  tourist arrivals dropped in the period 1999-2010, CIE (2012) shows 
that electricity intensity of hotels and restaurants branch has increased from 393 KWh/€ (2005) 
to 560 KWh/€ (2005) in the same period. This might be due to high use of AC and construction 
of new touristic buildings (expansion of sector) as stated in the same report. 
 
 
                                                          
193 Higher temperatures may raise or lower the electricity demand – one peak in summer, and one peak in winter. 
Expected relationships between temperature levels and demand for electricity is as follows: There is a strong positive 
correlation between load consumption and an increase in temperature (possibly also humidity) whilst negative 
correlation between load consumption and a decreasing temperature. A seasonal model might be applied to isolate 
differences between summer demand patterns from winter demand pattern.  
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Figure 3.6 Typical Daily Load in Cyprus – Winter and Summer Days in 2000 and 2010 
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Source: Based on data available in web, supplied by Transmission System Operator, Republic of 
Cyprus 
 
Figure 3.7 Peak and Off-Peak Capacity Growth in Cyprus between 2000 and 2010 
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Source: Based on data available in web, supplied by Transmission System Operator, Republic of 
Cyprus 
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The demand for electricity has time-dependent characteristics. Based on the figure above, 
demand for electricity follows both diurnal and seasonal changes in Cyprus.  Thus, electricity at 
midnight in February is completely different from electricity at noon on a hot July and August 
afternoon194. Dispatching of  power plants must follow the same pattern so that demand equals 
supply at all hours of  the day and during all seasons of  the year. As opposed to the  thermal 
power supply, electricity generation from wind and solar sources differs during different hours of  
the day ( e.g. more wind at  mid-night and more sun during day time hours) as well as differing 
across the seasons (e.g. more wind during winter, more sun during the summer months) 
(Koroneos et al., 2005). Hence, electricity generation from renewable sources also follows both 
diurnal and seasonal changes in Cyprus. 
 
The key reason to identify the load demand is to select the right target population to implement 
an appropriate demand response program. In other words, the aim is try to find major 
contributors to summer peak demand and the critical question is whether these customers would 
actually use less electricity at these times if  the utility charged them more.195 To illustrate it 
another way, as the primary aim is to reduce summer peak use of electricity in Cyprus, the 
appropriate focus group would be households with air conditioning. A detailed analysis of 
demand would be strictly necessary in the assessment of the potential demand response in any 
country. In the figure below, we clearly see that the demand for electric capacity is above 85% for 
about 2% of the time. In other words, 98% of the time, only 85% of capacity is used. The lack of 
price responsiveness during peak periods has been a major concern to utilities as demand for 
electricity and cost of supplying tend to concentrate in these peak hours. 
 
                                                          
194 Based on need of electricity from weather conditions, we can expect that elasticities might vary seasonally.  
195 For example see Faruqui and Sergici (2009).  
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Based on the figure above, we expect growing load factors in winter and summer peaks in Cyprus 
and this will create serious problem in the Cypriot electricity system. This is because these growth 
rates have led to the extensive use of peaking load plants continuously, causing higher costs for 
the whole power system in Cyprus under the current pricing regime. Therefore, we can suggest 
that consumers in Cyprus need to be motivated to reduce their energy consumption during peak 
hours when capacity is becoming stretched.  
 
In Cyprus, old power plants are more polluting with a very low operating efficiency, and are used 
only during high demand hours. Reducing the demand for electricity in peak hours could actually 
reduce the use of these old, expensive to run, and highly polluting plants. Note that these peaking 
plants are needed to meet a very small number of hours of peak demand each year with relatively 
high operating costs relative to capital costs. If  this happens, the electric utility in Cyprus can 
avoid the capital cost of  this extra generation, achieve a higher level of  utilisation of  existing 
generation capacity and reduce the environmental harms visited on society in Cyprus.  This is 
necessary from the investment efficiency point of  view: simply shifting electricity consumption 
away from peak periods provides many potential efficiency benefits for the economy.  
 
Table 3.3: Fixed and Variable Cost Characteristics of  Supply System in Cyprus in 2010 
 
Type of  
Load  
 
Annualized 
Capital Charges 
($/MW)196  
 
Fuel 
Consumption 
(kg/MWh)  
 
Emission 
Intensity  
(kg/kWh)  
 
Total MC 
(Euro/MWh)197  
Peak 43,180 0.210 1.072 178.10 
Mid-Merit 67,854 0.285 0.855 138.55 
Off-Peak 135,708 0.357 0.683 109.26 
    Source: Poullikkas and Kellas (2004, p. 526) 
 
                                                          
196 Social discount rate of 8% is used in the calculation of annualized fixed cost.  
197 Variable cost components accounted in the generation dispatch include fuel cost, variable operating and 
maintenance costs and emission costs. 
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Based on approval of the renewable projects in Cyprus, we can say that wind power investments 
represent a strongly increasing percentage of overall renewable electricity production, but the 
problem with wind is that it does not normally does not follow the typical demand profile. In 
other words, wind mostly blows at low-price hours. So, additional peak plants (standby reserves) 
are required for grid flexibility with wind power. Hence, demand response programs seem to be 
necessary to reduce prospective peak investments and use of existing peaking plants to maintain 
grid flexibility is required with a high penetration of electricity from wind. Unlike wind, solar 
power is available during high-price hours of the year. 
3.6. Simulation Model 
3.6.1 Model Assumptions and Data Description for Simulations 
 
The aim of  this paper is to study whether the use of  real-time pricing can increase efficiency in 
the electric industry and reduce the cost of  integrating renewables generators. Therefore, we  
analyse the impacts of  real-time electricity pricing (i.e. marginal cost pricing for end consumers) 
in the Cypriot electricity market on power prices, peak and off-peak capacities, emissions from 
electricity generation, welfare change, and renewable energy sources such as wind and solar. 
Although wholesale markets have been open to competition during the deregulation of  many 
electric utilities in Europe, most end-use customers still pay fixed regulated retail prices for their 
consumption that do not vary with the time of  day or level of  demand. We use a merit order 
stack approach to generation investment and operation decisions. Effectively, a system planner 
minimises the total cost of  capacity and output – this produces equivalent results to those that an 
efficient competitive market would give. The system planner will have to charge a set of prices for 
RTP-participating customers and a single price to non-participating customers in order to cover 
the cost of supply. We apply the the model developed by Borenstein (2005) and Holland and 
Borenstein (2005), so we also model consumers’ demand with a constant elasticity function. We 
compare the impacts of  time-varying pricing on load profile by splitting customers into two: 
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those who pay their electricity bills with time-varying prices and those with flat-rate electricity 
prices. We apply the model to a real electricity market using real (hourly) market data for Cyprus.  
 
Three types of  conventional power station are modelled, representing peak, mid-merit, and 
baseload generators. The model includes wind and solar generators as the two kinds of  renewable 
power most suitable for Cyprus. The generation specific data is presented in the table below. 
Based on approval of  the renewable projects in Cyprus, we can say that wind power investments 
represent a strongly increasing percentage of  overall renewable electricity production. Therefore, 
we include wind only in order to see the potential impacts of  real-time pricing on the system with 
wind power. The model, however, can provide results with a mix of  wind and solar. Due to 
confidentiality of  data, capital and variable cost data of  generation technologies only 
approximates the production cost structure of  the Cypriot electricity system. In our simulations, 
we chose the shape of  the 2010 annual load duration curve198. The reasons to choose the 2010 
annual load duration curve are the system deterioration from July 2011 caused by the explosion at 
Vasilakos power plant and the unavailability of  the 2013 annual load duration curve. The 
simulation results are very sensitive to supply and demand characteristics of  the system. 
Therefore, fully accurate generation level data might produce slightly different results than shown 
here.  
 
Before proceeding with the model, we summarize the following assumptions that clearly set the 
boundaries of  the equilibrium models. In the implementation of  dynamic rates, first we assume 
that a two-way price communication mechanism (and infrastructure) between retailers and 
consumers exists. We assume that all electricity consumers (residential, commercial and industrial) 
have meters to observe the changes in electricity costs (price) and so can interact with the 
supplier. The system operator is assumed to operate and implement the programme, so the 
                                                          
198 This means that we take 24 hours x 365 days in a year, so total of 8760 hours of the year.  
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system operator can anticipate perfectly the customer response to price changes. We also assume 
that there is no control over market prices by regulators or competition authorities while also 
assuming that sellers do not exercise market power199. Even though demand for electricity 
depends on the user’s capital stock in long-run, our conclusions and policy recommendations are 
based on the assumption that there will be no change in terms of  ownership in home appliances 
or types of  houses. 
 
We present one common elasticity with respect to price, but elasticity depends on many factors 
including household types (target population), income levels of  different customers, temperature 
and types of  home appliances householders have in their homes. It is very important to estimate 
the elasticities accurately as the welfare implications of  correct pricing are linked to these 
elasticities. In addition to this, the elasticity depends on ownership of  appliances such as air-
conditioners, electrical water heaters and other facilities such as swimming pools, implying that 
elasticity estimates vary by household type (Reiss and White, 2005)200 We expect a higher elasticity 
of  substitution between hours for households who have their own air-conditioners from those 
who do not. In this paper, we are going to apply three different own-price elasticities (-0.025, -
0.050 and -0.10) to show the sensitivity of  the outcomes to these elasticities. The cross-price 
elasticities between demands in different periods of  time are assumed to be zero. Each consumer 
consumes so little relative to the aggregate load they cannot act strategically to alter significantly 
the load on their own.  
 
We simplified the supply side of  the model, working with the residual demand obtained after 
subtracting renewable power from the load in each hour. Although cost curves of  thermal plants 
                                                          
199 The final remarks apply in deregulated markets, however, higher electricity prices above marginal costs might also 
exists in case of public monopoly electricity market, for example due to bad cost accounting. 
200 For instance, Matsukawa (2001) estimates price elasticity for TOU pricing using data on 279 households in Japan 
and estimates high price elasticity for households with electric water heaters. Reiss and White (2005) also provide 
detailed elasticity estimates based on ownership of various appliances and house facilities such as swimming pools.  
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follow a non-linear function with an increasing marginal cost, we will use a constant marginal cost 
per MWh of  electricity generation from a given plant in our model. We also ignore start-up costs 
and minimum load operating levels. Therefore, short-term dispatching costs such as shut down 
and start-up costs other than fuel are assumed to be zero. Retail prices equal the wholesale price 
(ignoring fixed charges, and transmission and distribution charges per MWh for now). In 
addition, we assume that transmission constraints alongside the ramp rate constraints and 
minimum up- and down-times constraints are satisfied.  This is equivalent to assuming firms have 
fixed cost functions within each trading interval in real-time markets. Hence, in the case of  a 
market this implies that generators bid the same cost function across multiple pricing intervals, 
but in reality generators may bid differently in each trading period. There is no market power to 
alter electricity prices, individually or jointly by the generators. This issue in reality may 
significantly affect the bidding prices in power markets. 
 
In our simulations, we compute the residual demand by subtracting the hourly renewable outputs 
from demand.201 The quantities of  electricity net of  wind and solar electricity are thus the residual 
quantities that thermal plants must supply to meet demand. We assume that integrating wind into 
the system incurs no additional costs, so the zero marginal cost wind source of  electricity output 
is initially displaced from the demand curve.  In our simulations, we do not have minimum 
capacity restrictions on power generation technologies except forced renewable supply.  
 
3.6.2 Structure of  the RTP and Simulation Algorithm 
 
Defining two electricity price structures as follows: 
 
 
                  (1) 
 
                                                          
201 See equation (2) in chapter 1.  

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where h  is hour of  the day, p  is the fixed retail price at all hours of  the day and  
  
is the hourly electricity price at each hour, dhp is demand price in hour h  
 
Following Borenstein and Holland (2005) and Borenstein (2005), we also define the functional 
form of  short-run demand for electricity as follows: 
 
  hpApD hhhhh 

                     (2) 
 
where
h
D is the aggregate demand function for hour h, 
h
A  is the scale parameter, or demand 
shifter that locates the demand curve at each hour based on observed demand in hour h from 
base case price and hourly load demand, hp is the market-clearing price at Dh and h  is the 
constant own-price elasticity of  demand.  
 
In this demand model, we assume that consumers are willing to respond to changes in each 
hour’s own price (-∞ <own price elasticity<0), but they are not willing to respond between hours 
such that a peak price increase does not affect the off-peak demand for electricity (so cross price 
elasticity between hours is equal to zero). Therefore, we take into account consumers’ willingness 
to adjust from immediate response to price signals, but do not take into account load shifting 
between hours. This is reasonable and should not affect the qualitative results of  the analysis if  
these cross-price elasticities between demand blocks are positive, but own-price elasticities 
substantially dominate the sum of  cross-price elasticities across demand blocks (Taylor et al., 
2005; Faruqui and George; 2002). They use elasticities based upon values from the literature 
ranging from -0.025 to -0.2. They also apply larger elasticities such as -0.3 to -0.5 because of  
possible new technologies over longer term that will increase the demand response (Faruqui et al., 
2012).   
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In order to show the impacts of  time-varying prices on load profiles, we simulate the changes 
from estimated anchor points for each hour. This is the reference point with no real time pricing, 
so all customers are still assumed to be under a uniform pricing structure. The hourly data on 
demand profile must be accurate to set this anchor point in the simulations (Borenstein, 2005). 
The price of  cp is not the actual flat-tariff  that would be charged with the program: it only aims 
to show the impacts of  RTP from an initial load distribution. This gives us: 
 

c
h
h
p
D
A               (3) 
 
where cp is the (constant) break-even price.   
 
Holland and Mansur (2006), Borenstein and Holland (2005), Borenstein (2005) first derive the 
aggregate wholesale demand from all customers. They compare the impacts of  time-varying 
prices on load profile by splitting customers into two: a proportion (α) who pay their electricity 
bills at time-varying prices  hp  and the remainder (1-α) on flat-rate electricity 
prices  p electricity prices.  
 
Given this information, RTP is not the mandatory tariff  for all end-use customers. If  the share 
of  end-use customers on real time pricing ( ) is less than 1, then the competitive equilibrium is 
not Pareto efficient, and does not therefore yield the first-best electricity resource allocation in 
short-run or investment capacity in the long-run. The combined demand function,  ppD hh ,
~
 is 
decreasing in hp and p .  ppD hh ,
~
 is perfectly inelastic if  0  as fixed retail prices create 
price-inelastic wholesale demand.  ppD hh ,
~
 
is increasing in  for pph   but decreasing 
in for pp
h
  , so the wholesale demand becomes more elastic with an increase in the share 
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of  customers with RTP adoption, as shown in Figure 3.8.  
 
Figure 3.8 Impacts of  RTP Participation on Demand (Borenstein and Holland, 2005, p.472) 
 
 
Therefore, defining: 
 
 
       pDpDppD hhhhh   1,
~
                    (4) 
 
 
Plugging (4) into (2), we get the following expression: 
 
 
     HhhAppppD hhhh hh  ,1,
~           (5) 
 
Based on demand equation (5), we can clearly infer that impacts of  time-varying prices on the 
demand depend on three important elements: (i) the fraction of  consumers who participate in 
the programme, (ii) the fraction of  demand for electricity coming from participating and non- 
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participating customers – this is what  measures – and (iii) own price elasticity estimates ( ) 
and their ability to respond to these prices (e.g. more elastic demand leads greater response, so 
greater benefits from RTP programme). Therefore, simulation results relate to the effects of  RTP 
are based on varying parameters;  and .  Equating demand for and supply of  electricity in the 
wholesale market at each hour gives us the short-run equilibrium condition: 
 
      hhhhhh KAppppD hh    1,
~
                             (6)
             
 
Where h  represents system the marginal cost. Therefore, we need data for the load profile 
and cost information of  the generation mix in the system. The results are sensitive to the 
elasticity assumption and cost parameters of  the production technologies (variable and fixed 
costs). The industry supply curve  hhK  is obtained from aggregating the supply from each 
individual generating unit '.'g  
 
   gg ghh mcqK                      (7) 
 
In the short-run, total generation capacity is limited. Therefore, the wholesale price of  electricity 
 hwp  equals industry marginal costs  hmc of  electricity as long as   ,,
~ T
rsh KppD   when 
plenty of  generation capacity is available in the system, as can be seen in Figure 3.9. But, the 
wholesale price of  electricity  hwp  equals industry marginal cost  hmc plus the rationing 
element of  the price  if    ,,
~ T
rsh KppD   
when the capacity constraint is binding and there is a 
risk of  excess demand for electricity capacity.  
Given that: 
 
 g g
T
rs qK            (8) 
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and  
 
     T rshhhT KAppppD hh    1,
~
                   (9) 
 
 
Therefore, when there is enough installed capacity, the wholesale price of  electricity will be equal 
to marginal cost. In periods when   T rsh KppD ,
~
, the real time price of  electricity has to adjust 
to achieve market clearing condition.  
 
Given that both generators and retailers will maximize their profits their profit functions are 
written in the following form:  
 
nr ,...,1   
 
            (10) 
 
 
Different from retailers, generators have capacity constraints, so annualized capital costs (cost per 
unit of  capacity multiplied by the capacity)202 are deducted from their revenues.  
 
mg ,...,1  
 
 
      KKppDMCppDwp
H
h
hhhh
g   ,
~
,
~
                                                          
(11)
 
 
such that: 
 
MCph  if  
T
rsh KD                           (12) 
hP solves for  
T
rshh KPD   if  
T
rsh KD   as follows: 
 
                                                          
202 These numbers are highly sensitive to the cost of capital and the rate of economic depreciation.   
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Although wholesale markets have been open to competition during the deregulation of  many 
electric utilities, end-use customers often still pay a flat retail price for electricity that is usually 
constant for months at a time. The retail sector will purchase electricity from wholesale market 
and distribute it to the final consumers based on real-time pricing and a flat-tariff.  Retailers will 
charge a short-term optimal real time tariff  for RTP customers that is equal to the wholesale 
price, if  we neglect the fixed transmission and distribution charges per MWh. The RTP would 
also affect the flat tariff  for non-participating customers. In order to satisfy the break-even profit 
condition for retailers from these flat rate customers, the price of  electricity for them will be 
adjusted, such that: 
 
      01  
H
h
hh pDwpp                    (14) 
 
Rearranging terms and writing the equation with respect to p gives us203: 
 
 
 
 

H
h
h
H
h
hh
pD
pDwp
p           (15) 
 
Therefore, the short-term optimal flat-tariff  p  is the weighted average of  wholesale prices for 
that period where weights are the relative quantities demanded by flat-tariff  customers. In 
addition, this adjustment of  the flat-tariff  will also avoid the problem of  cross subsidization 
between the RTP and flat-tariff  customer.  This is the only way to achieve equilibrium for 
generation and the retail sector simultaneously, with optimal prices that let retailers earn zero 
profits in the short-run. 
                                                          
203 Also see Borenstein and Holland (2005, p. 475) 
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Figure 3.9 Derivation of Price Duration Curve from Screening Curve  
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Following the work by Borenstein and Holland (2005), and Borenstein (2005); in the long-run, 
capacity is built up to the point where both retailers and generators receive zero profits, which in 
turn leads a unique long-run equilibrium for the total available generation, .
RL
K

  
 
This result also holds for a welfare-maximising utility (the structure assumed for Cyprus): 
 
                         (16) 
 
Similarly:  
If  T rsh KD  then hh MCp           
If  T rsh KD  then hP solves for  
T
rshh KPD   as stated in (13). 
 
The new optimal flat tariff  of  electricity for non-participating customers can be also obtained 
from equation (15) we just described above. Since hhh pwpMC  , the equation (15) is not 
different than what we describe below: 
 
 
 pD
pDp
p
H
h
h
H
h
hh

 
                       (17)
  
 
These prices charged to consumers will allow the utility to cover its costs of  power supply and at 
the same time, it will avoid cross subsidization between RTP and flat tariff  customers.   
3.7. Results 
 
We show the impacts of RTP on total energy consumption (MWh), capacities (MW), emissions 
(tonnes), fixed and demand weighted prices (€/MWh) and welfare (€).  Wind turbines in Cyprus 
were installed in 2010, but they were not operational until 2012.  Therefore, we separate the real-
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time pricing simulations with and without wind power. In this way, we can capture the potential 
impacts of implementing RTP ‘with’ and ‘without’ wind capacities in the Cypriot electricity 
market. Since smart meters will be installed in Cyprus in 2020, we also test the potential impacts 
of wind and solar mix on the long-run capacity mix, emissions and welfare. Because an RTP 
programme is yet to be implemented in Cyprus and elasticity estimates for such a programme are 
not available, we present results simulations with varying price elasticities assuming half of the 
Cypriot customers are actually on the real-time pricing program204. The results from RTP are very 
sensitive to both program participation and elasticity estimates in addition to the cost parameters 
we described above.   
 
In Table 3.4, we illustrate how switching from fixed pricing to real-time pricing changes the 
energy consumption, capacities and emissions in the power market. The results from an RTP 
program without wind/solar integration are as follows. In comparison to the status quo (base 
case without RTP program), with 50% participation in the RTP program and a low demand 
elasticity of -0.025, equilibrium off-peak capacity (sum of baseload and mid-merit capacities) will 
stay almost the same at 915 MW while the equilibrium peak capacity will decrease sharply from 
217 MW to 171 MW, therefore total MW equilibrium capacity will decrease from 1,139 MW to 
1,086 MW. Total energy production/consumption (i.e. total MWh) will increase from 5,194 
GWh to 5,199 GWh with the real-time pricing and the increase in energy production will come 
from off-peak plants205.  
 
Keeping the program participation the same at 50%, if demand is more elastic at -0.050 and (-0.1) 
we find that new equilibrium off-peak capacity will decrease from 915 MW to 912 MW (908 
MW), new peaker capacity will sharply drops from 171 MW to 136 MW (87 MW) and new total 
                                                          
204 We will test the impacts of changes in RTP participation on the outcomes.  
205 Reduction in capacity does not mean that energy production will decrease. In this case, same amount of capacity 
produces more energy – in other words higher load factor.  
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equilibrium capacity will therefore decrease from 1086 MW to 1048 MW (995 MW). Total energy 
production/consumption will increase drastically at the higher elasticities with real-time pricing. 
For instance, keeping the program participation the same, if demand is more elastic at -0.50 and -
0.1, we find that total energy production/consumption will increase from 5,199 GWh to 5,209 
GWh and to 5,226 GWh, respectively. This means that while the utility will save from capacity 
reductions, it will have to generate more energy from the new equilibrium capacities to meet the 
additional demand for energy or alternatively we can conclude that the utility will be able to 
utilize its off-peaking capacities more with the RTP program. This will be reflected in the total 
cost of energy supply by means of additional fuel expenses to meet the increased demand for 
energy. Based on empirical results, we find that the electric utility will end up spending less on 
additional fuel compared to savings from capital and fuel expenditures previously made without 
the RTP program. For example, the total cost of power supply will decrease from €659.0 million 
(base case) to €658.0 million (at an elasticity of -0.0025) to €657.4 million (at an elasticity of -
0.050), will further decrease to €657.0 million (at an elasticity of -0.1) at 50% program 
participation. These cost reductions are reflected in new optimal fixed and time-varying power 
prices such that fixed and real-time pricing customers will have to pay less so they will tend to 
consume more energy with the program.  
 
In terms of environmental impacts of implementing real-time pricing, emissions from electricity 
generation will increase with the program participation at all levels of elasticity. The net change in 
emissions is a factor of four things: relative emission intensities of peak and off-peak plants in the 
system, changes in emissions from peak energy consumption savings, changes in emissions from 
off-peak energy consumption and the possibility of replacing mid-merit plants to operate in peak 
hours with lower emission intensity (depending on peak hours). In our results, we present the net 
changes in emissions to see whether emission reductions during peak hour consumption 
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compensate for the increase in emissions from higher total energy consumption mostly during 
off-peak hours.  For example, emissions from electricity generation will increase from 3.391 
million tonnes (in the base case-without real-time pricing) to 3.395 million tonnes (at an elasticity 
of -0.025) to 3.400 million tonnes (at an elasticity of -0.05); and will further increase to 3.408 
million tonnes (at an elasticity of -0.01) at 50% program participation. The increase in emissions 
from energy generation comes from induced energy consumption as both participating and non-
participating customers will end-up paying lower prices for their additional energy consumption 
with the real-time pricing program. In other words, the total reduction in emissions from 
electricity generation during peak times is less than the total increase in emissions from off-peak 
electricity generation. In this analysis, we did not capture the dynamic constraints such as shut-
down and start-up times of generators although this is important and might alter the results. For 
instance, with a greater number of peak hours, the electric utility can operate low marginal cost 
and less pollution emitting mid-merit plant in order to avoid using expensive to run-peaking 
plants.  
 
We also compute the program benefits to customers in the form of bill savings with real-time 
pricing as presented in table 3.5. We initially assume that total energy (MWh) without the 
program is consumed equally by the two groups of customers and they pay a constant price of 
130.28 €/MWh – a price that allows generators to earn zero profit. Then, we compare initial 
price/quantity combinations with the new price and new quantity of energy consumption to 
estimate the changes in total customer bills. We find that both fixed price and flexible price 
consumers with real-time pricing will end up paying lower prices at all levels of elasticity so both 
types of consumers will consume more energy than they used to consume without the program. 
Although fixed and real-time pricing customers will end up consuming more energy, they will still 
pay less on their energy bills. In other words, positive impacts of price reduction outweigh the 
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total increase in energy consumption with the program. The values of bill savings are as follows. 
At low elasticity of -0.025, fixed price customers will pay €9,879 thousand less on their energy 
bills and RTP customers will pay €9,872 thousand less on their energy bills. The amount of bill 
savings with the RTP program increases at higher elasticities because of both capacity and energy 
cost reductions. For instance, at elasticity of -0.05 (-0.10), fixed price customers will pay €10,592 
thousand (€11,382 thousand) less on their energy bills and RTP customers will pay €10,586 
thousand (€11,376 thousand) less on their energy bills. 
We repeat the analysis after introducing various wind and solar capacities into the system. In 
order to see the future potential impacts of wind and solar together, we impose both wind and 
solar capacities to the system and get the demand net of wind and/or solar capacities206. The 
reason for why I forced wind alone, wind and solar capacities into the system is that neither wind 
nor solar capacity was in the system as of 2010. In this analysis, we assume that both wind and 
solar sources of energy are consumed in equal amounts between the customers and they pay both 
fixed prices on these renewable sources (i.e. 95 Euro/MWh for wind and 200 Euro/MWh for 
solar)207.  The main objective is to see how RTP program with wind alone and wind/solar power 
penetration affects the electricity system in Cyprus. In our simulations, the wind and solar 
capacities are constrained and they are deducted from the load curve in each hour.  
 
In Table 3.4, we present the analysis on changes in capacities and emissions from electricity 
generation with wind/solar integration. When we introduce renewables into the system, the 
results are as follows. In comparison to results from implementing the real-time pricing without 
renewable integration and assuming demand elasticity of -0.025 and 50% participation to the 
RTP program, introducing 50 MW wind alone will reduce equilibrium off-peak conventional 
capacity from 915 MW to 904 MW and will slightly reduce the equilibrium conventional peaker 
                                                          
206 See equation 12 in chapter two described on page 110. 
207 These prices reflect the MWh cost of wind and solar in the current year.  
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capacity from 171 MW to 168 MW and will reduce the total equilibrium installed conventional 
capacity from 1086 MW to 1072 MW. Keeping the participation to the programme at 50% and 
elasticity at -0.025, increasing the wind capacity to 100 MW (150 MW) will further reduce the 
equilibrium conventional baseload capacity to 894 MW (887 MW), but will leave equilibrium 
conventional peaker capacity unchanged. The reasons for wind not reducing the peaker capacity 
are that wind power is mostly available during off-peak hours and the price-reduction 
implications of wind power on the energy needs. Therefore, adding extra wind capacities into the 
system at the low elasticity will have smaller incremental effect on the equilibrium conventional 
capacities. At the higher elasticity, adding the same amount of wind capacities into the system will 
even have much smaller impact on the equilibrium conventional capacities. The reason for this 
again is that increasing the wind capacities will lower the energy prices so much so that the utility 
will need to keep conventional capacity to meet the increased demand for energy. In other words, 
adding wind capacities alone will not meet the increased demand for energy in the system.  
 
In terms of environmental impacts of implementing real-time pricing with wind capacity alone, 
emissions from electricity generation will increase more than implementing an RTP programme 
alone at all levels of wind capacity and at all levels of elasticity. For example, emissions from 
electricity generation will increase from 3.391 million tonnes (base case) to 3.398 million tonnes 
(at an elasticity of -0.025 and 50 MW wind capacity) to 3.401 million tonnes (at an elasticity of -
0.025 and 100 MW wind capacity) and emissions will further increase to 3.403 million tonnes (at 
an elasticity of -0.025 and wind capacity 150 MW) at 50% program participation. The increase in 
emissions is even higher with the same quantities of wind capacities but at the higher level of 
elasticities. In other words, the total reduction in emissions from wind electricity generation 
cannot compensate for the increase in emissions from conventional electricity generation. 
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Therefore, wind integration with real-time pricing might not provide a cost reduction in the form 
of emission savings.  
 
We also compute the benefits to customers in the form of bill savings in the case of wind 
capacities added in the system with real-time pricing. We assume that the quantities of wind 
energy (MWh) are consumed equally between customers. We then compare the new price and 
new quantity of energy consumption with the prices and quantities without any renewables to 
arrive at the total customer bill savings due to wind integration. Compared to the scenario 
without renewables, we find that both fixed price and flexible price consumers with wind in the 
system will end up paying lower prices at all levels of elasticity and incremental wind capacities, 
except at high elasticity. At the high elasticity of -0.10, both fixed and real-time pricing customers 
will end-up paying higher prices with renewables than without renewables. However, real-time 
pricing customers will pay less with incremental wind capacities. Both types of consumers will 
consume more energy than they used to consume without wind in the system.   
 
Both fixed and real-time pricing customers will end up consuming more energy due to wind 
quantities that they have to consume at lower fixed prices, and so they will still pay less on their 
energy bills. In other words, the positive impacts of price reduction due to wind are bigger than 
the total increase in energy prices with the wind integration. Therefore, consumers are still better-
off with wind integration. The values of bill savings are as follows. At low elasticity of -0.025 and 
50 MW wind integration, fixed price customers will pay €11,344 thousand less on their energy 
bills and RTP customers will also pay by the amount of €11,338 thousand less on their energy 
bills. At elasticity of -0.05 (-0.10) with 50 MW of wind capacity will reduce the energy bills fixed 
price customers will have to pay by the amount of €12,026 thousand (€12,784 thousand) less on 
their energy bills and RTP customers will pay €12,019 thousand (€12,778 thousand) less on their 
energy bills. At the higher elasticities, higher wind penetration will yield more savings in the form 
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of energy bills. For instance, adding 10% wind capacity in the total system capacity (which is 
equivalent to having 150 MW wind in 2010) will allow fixed price customers to save up to 
€15,632 thousand and real-time pricing customers to save up to €15,626 thousand.  
 
We finally compare the solar/mix scenario with wind penetration scenarios because wind 
capacities will be already in the system in 2020. In comparison to the real-time pricing with 100 
MW wind integration case, having 50 MW wind and adding 50 MW solar into the system will 
reduce equilibrium off-peak conventional capacity from 904 MW to 877 MW and will reduce the 
equilibrium conventional peaker capacity from 167 MW to 159 MW and will reduce the total 
equilibrium installed conventional capacity from 1062 MW to 1035 MW. Keeping the 
participation in the programme at 50%, elasticity at -0.025 and reducing wind capacity at 50 MW 
but increasing the solar capacity to 100 MW will further reduce the equilibrium baseload 
conventional capacity from 877 MW to 856 MW and reduce equilibrium peaker conventional 
capacity from 159 MW to 147 MW.  
 
Keeping the program participation the same, if demand is more elastic at -0.050 and (-0.1), 
splitting 100 MW renewable capacity equally between wind/ solar rather than adding 100 MW 
wind alone into the system will reduce equilibrium off-peak conventional capacity by an 
incremental amount of 15 MW (6 MW) and will reduce the equilibrium conventional peaker 
capacity by an incremental amount of 12 MW (22 MW), and will reduce the total equilibrium 
installed conventional capacity by 26 MW (28 MW). Therefore, adding extra wind/solar 
capacities into the system at the low elasticity will have larger positive impacts on the equilibrium 
capacities than wind alone in the system. This is due to solar availability mostly being during high 
demand hours when relatively expensive and dirtier plants operate in the system. Therefore, we 
can conclude that there are potential capacity and energy cost savings from smart metering even 
with low levels of consumer response, with a half participation to the programme.  
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In terms of the environmental impacts of implementing real-time pricing with a wind/solar 
capacity mix, emissions from electricity generation will be almost always smaller than wind alone 
except in the low wind capacity scenario with very low elasticity of -0.025. On the expectation 
that wind capacity will be large in the future system, adding solar capacity with capital cost 
reduction in solar investments in the future will potentially help the electric utility to save 
emission costs at all levels of elasticity. Compared to 100 MW wind capacity (i.e. 7% of total 
generation capacity as of 2010) in the system, adding 50 MW of both wind and solar capacity will 
reduce emissions from electricity generation from 3.401 million tonnes to 3.399 million tonnes at 
an elasticity of -0.025; from 3.405 million to 3,401 million tonnes at an elasticity of -0.05; and will 
further increase from 3.414 million to 3.411 million tonnes at an elasticity of -0.01.  The 
reduction in emissions is even higher with the same quantities of wind capacities but a higher 
capacity of solar integration.  
 
When we introduce a mix of wind/solar capacities into the system, we find that mix of 
wind/solar capacities will allow utilities to save more from capacity and energy during off-peak 
and peak hours208. That is to say, wind/solar combination work better and are complementary 
sources of renewable energy when real-time pricing is introduced. With real-time pricing and 
possible reductions in solar technology costs, we can argue that wind/solar together will be 
economically more viable in the near future by means of both capacity (MW) and energy (MWh) 
cost reductions, and emissions cost penalties. In other words, the levelised cost of avoided energy 
and emission costs and the capacity credit value from wind/solar integration will be potentially 
bigger than the levelised cost of solar energy with the real-time pricing program.  
 
 
                                                          
208 Note that although energy reduction is substantial, total cost of power supply increases with mix of wind and 
solar as solar energy today is still not competitive and very expensive source of renewable energy. 
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Table 3.4 Capacity and Emissions Impacts of  Real-Time Pricing, “with” and “without” renewables 
 
Source: own estimates 
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Table 3.5 Welfare Impacts of  Real-Time Pricing, “with” and “without” renewables 
 
Source: own estimates 
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We also compute the benefits to customers in the form of bill savings in the case of wind/solar 
capacity mix with real-time pricing. We assume that both wind/solar quantities of energy (MWh) are 
consumed in equal amounts by the two customer groups. We will again compare the solar/mix 
scenario with wind penetration scenarios. Except at the high elasticity of demand -0.10, compared to 
100 MW wind capacity alone, both fixed and real-time price customers will pay more with 50 MW 
each wind/solar integration or higher solar integration. This is because consumers have to pay high 
fixed prices for solar energy and prices for conventional energies from wind/solar integration will be 
higher than wind alone. Lower energy bill savings come partly from higher prices for conventional 
energy to cover the fixed capacity costs and partially due to the high cost of solar energy. Both types 
of customers are still better off without the programme, however.  
 
The values of bill savings are as follows. At a low elasticity of -0.025 and 50 MW/each wind and 
solar integration, fixed price customers will pay €7,817 thousand less on their energy bills and RTP 
customers will also pay the amount of €7,801 thousand less on their energy bills. The amount of bill 
savings with the RTP program increases at higher elasticity because of both peaker capacity and 
energy reductions. For instance, at elasticity of -0.05 (-0.10), 50 MW of wind capacity will reduce the 
energy bills fixed price customers will have to pay by the amount of €8,495 thousand (€9,310 
thousand) and RTP customers will pay €8,479 thousand (€9,288 thousand) less. At all elasticities, 
higher solar penetration will yield fewer savings in the form of energy bills, in fact almost half. Given 
that solar costs will not be lower than the wind cost, customers will be better-off with wind/solar 
integration but solar capacity should not exceed the wind. This is true as the value of wind energy 
will increase over time with real time pricing.  
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3.8. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
 
We set out a theoretical model that simultaneously incorporates demand response and wind and solar 
sources into the electricity market, which we applied to the island of  Cyprus power system. Based on 
our empirical results, we clearly see that the load curve will flatten with dynamic pricing, which 
means off-peak demand for capacity is increased relative to peaking demand, which is translated into 
a higher load (capacity) factor and better utilization of  off  peak capacity (supply) in the system. Since 
electricity prices in the market are set by thermal plants, consumers who join and do not join the 
RTP program end up paying lower average prices for the electricity they consume. Given this, we 
also estimate the changes in consumer welfare from such dynamic pricing. In comparison to a fixed 
pricing of  electricity, we find that both fixed and real-time pricing customers will be better off  as 
they will both pay lower prices for their increased consumption than without the program. The 
emissions from electricity generation will increase, however. The increase in emissions comes from 
an increase in MWh energy generation and consumption during off-peak times, which is higher than 
emission reductions during peak hours.   
 
We also find that dynamic pricing promotes renewable investments that generate electricity more 
during off-peak hours (wind) and peak hours (solar). Based on the power supply mix in Cyprus, a 
mix of  wind/solar will reduce equilibrium total thermal capacity in the system by lowering peaker 
capacity sharply as well as reduce the energy generation from conventional plants. This will reduce 
costs in the system with decreasing solar costs, will help the utility to save fuel, reduce emissions 
from electricity generation.  The overall conclusion for Cyprus would be that dynamic pricing of  
electricity will increase capacity utilization, reduce power prices in Cyprus, reduce emissions from 
electricity generation and increase the use of  wind/solar resources in the island. Hence, the Cypriot 
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authorities should let market participants react to changes in electricity prices. This means that the 
country should switch to smart metering and shift away from an average pricing of  electricity.   
 
Given that solar energy will allow the utility to save both capacity and energy (and so emissions), 
comparisons of the levelised cost of avoided energy with and without the wind/solar mix will 
potentially allow the utility to decide and set the green tariffs with the program. This is because the 
levelised cost of solar energy is not estimated based on capacity and energy savings from a renewable 
source. And, the levelised cost of avoided energy production estimates for wind and the “right 
mixture” of wind and solar with the real-time pricing program might bring solar capacities to the 
system earlier than predicted without necessarily giving subsidies in later years with very high wind 
capacities.  
3.9. Limitations of  Research and Future Research 
 
In this research, we could only assume values for the demand parameters such as elasticity 
coefficients and consumers’ willingness to join such programmes while analysing the impacts of 
implementing real-time pricing.  Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) will require substantial 
investments to correct the inefficiency of fixed electricity prices. The welfare implications of 
correcting this inefficiency depend on not only the investments in AMI system but significantly on 
how price elastic the consumers are – on their ability and willingness to respond to prices and by 
how much. If we assume that consumers who will join the programme will pay the capital cost of 
these investments, they must compare the benefits in the form of energy bill savings against the price 
they will have to pay for joining the programme. It is also equally important to distinguish between 
the amount of different types of benefits from such pricing as well as who will gain and lose from it 
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and by how much. Therefore, it might be costly to the utility and to consumers simply to assume that 
consumers behave in the way we want them to.  
 
These demand parameters, however, significantly determine the welfare implications of such pricing. 
At the same time, correct estimates can only effectively guide policy makers and/or regulators to 
implement real-time pricing and make the necessary arrangements before and during the actual 
implementation this radical shift. To illustrate, although we expect consumers to reduce their peak 
demand whilst increasing their off-peak demand for energy, consumers might not react as we expect 
from them. For instance, the experiment of Alcott (2011) finds that US residential consumers are 
price elastic to their energy demand, and they reduce their peak demand but they do not increase 
their average consumption during off-peak times. Therefore, before implementing such programs, 
policy makers or regulators should conduct similar experiments on both residential and industrial 
customers to verify these elasticities. Given that cost of generating (at wholesale stage) and selling 
electricity (at retail stage) is highest in Cyprus compared to other EU member states, implementing 
such a program might increase the retail prices with no or little return to consumers. 
  
Another limitation is that we did not identify and monetise all benefits of marginal cost pricing. It is, 
however, important to identify and monetise the full array of potential benefits from real-time 
pricing. For instance, the reliability benefit of moving to real-time pricing should be considered and 
added as a market-wide benefit because it affects all participants in the market. The monetary value 
of enhancing reliability from RTP might come from reduction in revenue losses from less planned 
outages, reduction in capacity investments to maintain reserve capacity from reduced peak capacity, 
reduction in coping costs from not running self-generating units especially during high demand 
hours etc. The answer to the question of ‘how many hours of outage per year potentially might be 
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reduced from RTP?’, and the estimate of ‘what is the value of lost load’ would provide an 
approximate answer to this question209. 
 
In Cyprus, the variable cost of power generation is dominated by the fuel price but the Electricity 
Authority of Cyprus also increases the prices when generators emit more than allowed. In our 
analysis, we excluded the emission price from the variable cost, but it would be better to see (i) the 
impacts of RTP in the system with and without emission price, and (ii) the impacts of RTP with 
wind/solar mix integration considering the effects of the emission price on the capacities, prices and 
emissions themselves. In this way, we can clearly see how much actually RTP alone and RTP with 
wind/solar integration change the system capacities, energy prices and emissions. Then, we can 
conclude whether these energy policy instruments are complementary or substitutes for each other. 
These issues can be corrected in the model.  But, the price implications of such analysis are quite a 
complex task for the utility and have feed-back effects on capacities and emissions. The questions 
coming from such analysis are: by how much participating and non-participating customers should 
(and will) benefit from wind integration and by how much participating and non-participating 
customers should (and will) pay for higher emissions. If the Electricity Authority of Cyprus informs 
consumers how these renewable benefits and emission penalties will be distributed among 
consumers, both the participation in RTP programmes and their impacts might change. Hence, this 
is worth studying before implementing such programs.  
 
 
                                                          
209 Note that potential energy, capacity and emissions savings from critical peak pricing (CPP) should be also studied as 
the demand for electric capacity in Cyprus is just above 85% of the peak demand for about 2% of the time. This simply 
means that the results from implementing CPP pricing might or might not generate greater benefits and be simpler to 
achieve.  The government of Cyprus, however, will implement real-time pricing and critical peak pricing is not under 
discussion by the regulators and local authorities.  
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Appendix  
 
Glossary  
 
h  is hour of  the day, h=1,…,8760 
p
is the fixed retail price at all hours of  the day 
  
is the hourly electricity price at each hour 
d
hp is demand price in hour h  
h
D is the aggregate demand function for hour h 
h
A is the scale parameter, or demand shifter that locates the demand curve at each hour based on 
observed demand in hour h from base case price and hourly load demand 
h
  is the constant own-price elasticity of  demand 

cp is the (constant) break-even price 
  is the share of  end-use customers on real time pricing and pay  
(1-α) is the remainder who are on flat-rate electricity prices  p  
 ppD hh ,
~
 is the total demand for capacity that comes from RTP participating and non-participating 
customers 
 is the wholesale price of  electricity  in hour h 
is the marginal costs of  electricity in hour h 
hK is the system capacity, MW 
  is the capital charges  
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T
rsK  is the total capacity available in the system, MW 
gq is the capacity supplied from each generator g 
g Is the profits of  generator g 
r Is the profits of  retailer r 
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OVERALL CONCLUSIONS  
  
Electricity generation from fossil fuels threatens the long – term growth of countries due to their 
limited availability, volatile prices and mounting environmental externalities. Therefore, energy 
policies today must achieve a delicate balance between sustaining economic growth and preservation 
of the environment for current and future generations. This involves finding a set of generation 
sources so as to meet energy requirements in a manner which is both cost-effective and 
environmentally friendly.  
 
Renewable sources are available in many island economies. The main motivations for switching 
electricity generation to renewables are their potential to help sidestep increasing fossil fuel prices, 
reduce external dependency of non-oil producing countries on imports whilst maintaining system 
reliability (meaning both energy security and energy adequacy). These desires are stronger for island 
economies as they are vulnerable to high fuel dependency in their energy supply and a high cost of 
generating the electricity, while the reliability of their power supply can be low. These problems in 
turn have debilitating effects on their economies.  
 
In chapter 1, we provide a method to allocate and evaluate the quantified and monetized 
benefits/costs from grid-connected wind investments. The interest groups included in this study are 
the private supplier, the electric utility, the country-economy and the national government. Then, we 
apply our framework to obtain the actual impacts of grid-connected wind investments on each 
stakeholder if this wind farm project is undertaken by the private sector. Using this method, we can 
capture the net earnings of each interest group so that we can contemplate redistribution of the 
benefits and costs to compensate the losers. For example, we can transfer some benefits from the 
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private sector to the national economy if that economy is earning very little return from the wind 
farm project while the private sector entity earns a substantial return. This is possible via negotiating 
over the PPA prices or more precisely, stating what are the break-even prices. In the literature, such 
analyses have been carried out typically on the basis that the electric utility owns and operates the 
renewables, but in reality, such projects are often undertaken by the private sector.   
 
In this analysis, we evaluate the wind power project at the generation level. Although some fraction 
of wind might not be transmitted and delivered to end-users, this study excludes such losses. It is 
however worth including these losses especially in those countries (e.g. Cape Verde) where the 
quality of system infrastructure is poor and the system is undergoing rehabilitation. Based on our 
empirical results, we conclude that wind generation will yield high economic and financial returns 
(from the utility’s point of view) in Cape-Verde as energy generation from diesel plants is extremely 
costly to the utility (and so to consumers). Hence, we can conclude that connecting existing 
customers to the wind farm (or any grid-connected renewable) will potentially increase social welfare 
by means of price reductions for existing consumers and will allow the utility to recover its costs, and 
will also allow the utility to improve reliability given that existing connections already suffer from 
chronic power supply unreliability and high electricity prices. Additionally, the utility will be able to 
expand electrification from fuel cost savings that will bring even more societal benefits given that a 
large fraction of the population still live in the dark. Finally, ex-post analysis undertaken in similar 
countries is highly recommended as part of the decision-making process when it comes to the 
distribution of utility level benefit in order to maximize welfare from wind integration with private 
sector opening210. 
                                                          
210 Looking at price changes alone in countries with large utility debts and low electrification cannot provide us with 
sufficient information whether investments in renewables are cost-effective or not. 
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In chapter 2, our primary objective is to test the effect of green energy regulations on the electricity 
generation mix to see whether these investments are a cost-effective way to reduce emissions and 
achieve a renewable energy share in electricity generation. To do this, we define our objective 
function to minimize the costs and emissions from electricity generation while satisfying the 
regulatory constraints alongside other system constraints.  We apply the proposed model for Cyprus 
where wind and solar sources of electricity generation will inevitably increase to meet emission 
reduction and renewable targets set by regulators.  
The use of renewable sources in the Cypriot national electricity supply will increase in order to 
comply with its renewable targets and reduce emissions from electricity generation as set out by the 
regulators. This chapter investigates the impacts of wind and solar renewable power sources on both 
electricity generation and planning by employing a cost minimization model including economic, 
technical as well as regulatory constraints such as renewable targets. The cost minimization model 
demonstrates that the use of wind and solar power together in an electricity generation mix reduces 
the overall cost of the system. Given the fact that solar power will not be utilized in the national grid 
in the near future, current public policies in promoting renewables in the form of taxes and other 
policy measures impair the system by relying on wind alone in the thermal-renewable generation mix. 
In the first place, as the market for wind and solar has grown, so the costs per kWh are rapidly 
decreasing over time. From the empirical analysis, we suggest that it is not yet the right time to shift 
to renewable energy sources in Cyprus and it is better to postpone such capital intensive investments 
in electricity generation. These conclusions are based on the assumption that consumers will pay 
fixed regulated tariffs for their energy consumption.  
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In chapter 3, we study the impact of real-time pricing on the Cyprus power system as a way to 
improve the utilization of off-peak generation capacity and save on peaking capacity when the 
proportion of variable renewables (wind and solar) increases. We apply a merit order stack approach 
to generation investment and operation decisions so that a system planner minimises the total cost 
of  capacity and output to meet the changing demand for capacity and energy with real-time pricing. 
 
We conclude that dynamic pricing will help the utility to get rid of  excess capacity (that is peak 
capacity) and will increase the load factor of  existing capacity. Because it will allow consumers to pay 
lower prices for their energy consumption, it will however increase the total electricity generation. 
This is reflected in fuel spending and emissions from electricity generation. Without any renewable 
generation in the system, the total cost of  power supply will decrease but emissions from electricity 
generation might increase with the induced energy consumption as emissions are a function of  
output and emission levels from power generators – not their capacities. With respect to consumer 
bills, we find that both fixed-price and real-time pricing customers will consume higher quantities 
from lower energy prices but will end up with lower energy bills compared to a fixed regulated tariff. 
These savings are larger at higher elasticities. Because wind (solar) availability comes mostly during 
low (high) demand hours when relatively cleaner (dirtier) plants operate in the system, we find that 
there is considerable potential for capital cost savings and emission savings from smart metering 
even with only a small consumer response, and/or with moderate participation in the programme. At 
the current costs of solar, investing in wind alone will however yield higher bill savings. 
 
This thesis has studied three aspects of  renewable integration in two small island states.  In Cape 
Verde, we showed that wind power could bring benefits to the utility, its consumers and the private 
investor, in part because of  the high price of  the imported fuel that it would displace.  The 
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distribution of  these benefits, however, depends on the prices that are negotiated with the developer.  
In Cyprus, chapter 2 showed that wind investments would increase the financial cost of  power 
supply (at the fuel prices studied) but bring significant emissions reductions.  Solar PV power, in 
contrast, would reduce the cost of  power because its output comes at a time when it can displace the 
most expensive peaking plants.  Chapter 3 showed how the introduction of  real time pricing in 
Cyprus would help with the integration of  renewable power by smoothing patterns of  demand and 
matching them to the availability of  wind and solar generation.  This would help to reduce 
consumers’ bills.  On the island of  Cyprus, the combination of  wind and solar power, with 
complementary output patterns, would provide a better trade-off  between cost and emissions 
reductions than wind power alone. 
 
One avenue of future research is to consider the impact of future changes in technology and fuel 
prices on the trade-offs shown in this thesis.  Cape Verde found wind generation to be cost-effective 
because of the price of its fuel imports; if fossil fuel prices rose more generally, or the cost of wind 
turbines fell further, then Cyprus might also save money from investing in wind.  Case studies in 
other islands could help to determine the importance of the temporal pattern of wind and solar 
generation in comparison to the local electricity demand, since a country with a peak load at times 
when renewable generation is not available will not be able to save on conventional generating 
capacity by investing in these renewables. 
 
It is possible that energy storage will have a role in smoothing the delivery of renewable output, and 
that this would increase the benefits from it; however, the costs of energy storage devices are 
currently high.  The models used in this thesis respect the most important engineering constraint in 
the electricity industry, that generation must always equal demand, but do not take into account the 
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need to have reserve capacity or to respect constraints on the transmission system.  These additional 
factors are unlikely to overturn the main results given here, but a more complete study would take 
them into account.  Doing so would involve interdisciplinary work with electrical engineers and 
would be an interesting future challenge.  
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